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ABSTRACT 
The current Hong Kong educational situation 
in comparative persgective 
This thesis explores the issue of adaptation within Hong Kong 
society to political change, with special emphasis on Hong Kong 
education. 
Chapter One introduces the problem: two societies, which differ 
in political and economic systems and in social structures, will 
merge under one authority. The People's Republic of China will 
assume sovereignity over Hong Kong and form 'one country, two 
systems'. The emergence of the topic as a public issue in Hong Kong 
resulting in tension and realignment of political power is 
described. The comparative element is introduced with a discussion 
of contemporary areas of convergence and divergence between Hong 
Kong and the PRC. 
Chapter Two extends the comparative element in the thesis with a 
description of Hong Kong in terms of its socio-political, economic, 
and educational systems. The emphasis is on aspects of these 
systems which may contradict existing systems of the PRC. The 
chapter also highlights examples of public response to previous 
social cnange in Hong Kong. 
Chapter Three discusses the comparable systems of the PRC. The 
thesis argues in Chapters Two and Three that tension may emerge 
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because of structural contradictions between the systems in Hong 
Kong and the PRC. 
The preceding macro analysis is grounded by, and narrowed by an 
emprirical investigation into one example of adjustment to the 
transfer which the thesis argues is occuring in Hong Kong. Chapter 
Four describes this research and demonstrates that the established 
culturally-based behavior patterns relating to educational and 
occupational choices are persisting in the present period of 
transition. 
The thesis concludes in Chapter Five with a discussion of 
various scenarios possible for Hong Kong education during and after 
the transition period. In its conclusion the thesis argues that the 
social change brought about by the transfer of sovereignity can be 
prepared for, with purposive and selective adjustment. 
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INTRODUCTION: BACKROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
AND OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT 
On July 1, 1997 the political status of Hong Kong will change. 
On that date it ceases to be a dependent colony of the United Kingdom 
and becomes a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic 
of China. Under terms of the Draft Aaneement between the Goverment of 
the Pegale's Rtaublic of China and the United Kir:adorn of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland on the Future of Hou Kona, initialled 
in 1984, Hong Kong is guaranteed the preservation of its economic 
system, its legal system, and the right to determine its own 
economic, financial and trade policies, but sovereignity over Hong 
Kong is transferred from the UK to the PRC. Simply put, non-Hong Kong 
actors have enacted a decolonization but not, at the same time, 
provided independence. In its place, control has been transferred to 
a second external power. Thus, two societies, differing in economic, 
educational and ideological systems, in class structure and social 
and economic mobility, will co-exist as one nation under one 
authority: the PRC assuming sovereignity over Hong Kong forming one 
country, two systems'. 
The departing Government of the United Kingdom has 'strongly 
commended' this Agreement to the people of Hong Kong as providing 
...the necessary assurances about Hong Kong's future to allow the 
territory to continue to flourish and to maintain its unique role in 
the world as a major trading and financial centre"(1). 
Despite these assurances, the participants in the transfer will 
confront both abstract and practical problems. The PRC must solve 
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several political, social and ethical dilemmas. For example, it must 
resolve the ethical dilemma of allowing Hong Kong residents to make 
money in a communist country(2). Secondly, the PRC faces a sensitive 
issue when attempting to anticipate the seriousness of the social 
tensions which will be caused by the existing gap between the 
standards of living in the two societies. If the gap increases, that 
problem worsens. They must also formulate, and propagate, an official 
view of the Hong Kong people: are Hong Kong residents 'bourgeois 
liberals' or are they benefactors of the new China? 
Hong Kong faces the problem of devising strategies which enhance 
preservation of social and economic 'stability and prosperity' during 
the lead up to 1997 and the post-merger period. There is, for 
4 
example, in Hong Kong widespread anxiety that the present standard of 
living, as well as economic and political stability, will be 
impossible to maintain under the new government. There is also fear 
that the existing socio-cultural and economic envirlent will be 
unacceptable to the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC). There are also 
attempts being made by people staying in Hong Kong 1997 to predict, 
without the benefit of historical models, the effects the 
institutional differences between the PRC and Hong Kong will have on 
the transfer and merger process and on their society. Such efforts to 
predict the effects, and adjust to them, are made more complicated by 
the probability that social and economic change is likely to be a 
continuing and continual process. 
The merger is without obvious historical precedent. It is an 
event of decolonization and transfer - and it is this event of 
decolonization and transfer, a continuing social process, which this 
thesis will attempt to analyze. The thesis breaks down this process 
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into three constituent parts. These parts are (a) the definition of 
the event as a public issue resulting in shifts of interest groups 
and power alignments within the colony; (b) the existence of implicit 
and explicit contradictions posed by the profound structural 
differences between the institutions of Hong Kong and the PRC, and 
(c) the cohesive effect of the local ideology of Hong Kong society 
which is likely to affect the process of adjustment. Analysis of 
these major component issues is made more complex by the possibility 
of rapid local, social and political innovation in Hong Kong as an 
increasingly more sophisticated understanding of the process 
develops. 
In general, then, the thesis takes as its central analytic 
concern the contemporary processes of change in Hong Kong, with a 
special bias toward the analysis of the emerging tensions within the 
education system. In particular, the thesis will investigate 
contradictions involved in the forthcoming Hong Kong and PRC societal 
merger, and will place a special emphasis on the educational 
contradictions of the merger situation. 
Two forms of educational analysis are involved. A structural 
analysis, grounded in the historical assumptions and institutional 
patterns of education in the PRC and Hong Kong, will be presented. 
Second, an account is given of the contemporary reactions of young 
Hong Kong people to the educational choices which they judge are 
facing them. In other words, the thesis is grounded both in a 
structural analsyis and in the perceptions by social actors of the 
educational situation. 
In the literature there are a variety of methodological 
perspectives in which to frame studies. In the case of this study - 
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of the processes of education during social and political merger - 
focus is needed on the separate educational , social and political 
institutions, and on the relationships between them. The approach of 
this thesis utilizes a sociological perspective, and, within that 
approach, the macro-theoretical position of the thesis is structural 
functionalist(3). This approach views the stability of a society as 
grounded in the relationship among its systems(4) and the acceptance 
by individuals within these systems of common goals and values(5). 
The thesis attempts to examine how Hong Kong education shapes, 
and is shaped by, changes in other social institutions. 
Micro-categories of investigation are used, within an analysis of the 
changing meaning and role of education in the broader social context. 
This context includes ideologies, traditions, institutions, language, 
modes of production, socio-political structures, and international 
relations(6). 
At the most general theoretical level, therefore, the thesis 
the. 
accepts that'Hong Kong education system must be analyzed in the 
context of the society in which it functions(?). However, within this 
framework, the thesis accepts the argument that education is a 
process, in continuous social exchange with the surrounding 
environment(8). Operationally, Hong Kong education is viewed as a 
aarticipant with other social institutions, in this dynamic event and 
there exists reciprocal impact between the decolonization/transfer 
event and the education system. 
This approach has been further influenced by the argument of 
Margaret Archer that analysis of education requires examining the 
kinds of social interaction within the society, as well as the 
structures which determine the context in which this interaction 
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occurs(9). The relationship between structure and process, in the Hong 
Kong context, forms the broad link between the chapters of this 
thesis. The thesis proposes to trace historical and cultural 
structures which strongly influence the context of interactions which 
may occur at present; to investigate the kind of interaction occuring 
within those structures; and finally to outline scenarios for the 
course of education as its exchange with its evolving context 
develops. 
There is an automatic comparative element in the analysis. 
Neither the existing Hong Kong system, nor the likely social change 
precipitated by '1997', can be understood by reference to Hong Kong 
as a single state. The distribution of its internal power, its 
economic development, and its unique social system have developed not 
only from forces present within the colonial state, but also under 
the influence of forces in the PRC. Overall, the thesis accepts the 
view of comparative educators(10) that "...national school systems 
exist within the context of unequal power relations among 
nations...". However, the thesis also argues that the power 
relationship between Hong Kong and the PRC is highly complex and 
cannot be described as simply "unequal". Consequently, a strong 
comparative theme - of contrasting Hong Kong and the PRC - is useful 
to deepen understanding of the transfer. 
Although some comparative education literature is useful in 
understanding some aspects of the Hong Kong problem, no one set of 
literature provides clarification of the whole situation and the 
existing literature must therefore be extended. In order to clarify 
this issue, the following section discusses the existing comparative 
education literature and categorizes it into several broad groups. 
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There is firstly a considerable body of literature within 
comparative education on policy studies in a comparative perspective. 
This literature focuses on educational planning and expansion and 
usually discusses these themes in the context of the 
nation-state(11). Some of this literature is concerned with the 
technical aspects of planning and its outcomes(12). This research has 
been used to guide policy and improve the educational systems by 
providing choices among comparatively displayed policies. 
Transfer and 'educational borrowing' literature also focuses on 
a specified state or a group of nations, and, athough its aim is to 
suggest generalizations that can be replicated in other 
societies(13), most of this literature assumes a stable nation-state 
of independent political and educational sovereignity, and for this 
reason the literature is not readily applicable to this study. 
Other policy literature which describes the worldwide rapid 
expansion and spread of schooling has been very persistent in 
comparative research. However, although Hong Kong has participated in 
this worldwide expansion, the perspective is incomplete for this 
analysis because the imminent change is not merely result of 
expansion of the education system. 
A second broad category of literature is about education and 
development, including the concerns about dependency and education. 
This literature argues that relations, including political, economic 
and educational, are unequal between nations. It focuses therefore on 
these unequal power relationships to explain economic hardships and 
argues their link to educational systems. 
These models are concerned with interpretations of 
underdevelopment(14) and Erwin Epstein has described these models as 
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utilizing "...concepts such as neocolo nialism, world-systems 
analysis and dependency theory to argue that education systems are 
directly affected by international currents and that national schools 
systems and the relations between school and the nation are no longer 
worthy subjects of analysis"(15). Although Hong Kong is a 
newly-industrialized country and is entering an unequal power 
relationship with the PRC, this literature is not broadly applicable 
to this thesis. The main concern here is neither the colonial 
experiences of Hong Kong nor its status as an industrializing 
territory. Colonialism and industrialization are examined, but as two 
of several important contexts of the education system. This 
literature does not, therefore, provide a sufficiently complex 
contextualization for this investigation. 
There is also literature, stemming from world systems or 
conflict analysis, on how knowledge is generated and used in 
education systems to make policy and shape society(16). This 
literature looks at the diminution of cultural, educational, and 
economic sovereignity, but Kelly and Altbach point out that these 
models assume independent political nation states(17). 
There are other bodies of research(18) but generally, as Kelly 
and Altbach note, "Research [within comparative education] still 
focuses on development and on the outcomes of schooling, and 
is...predominantly quantitative. [It also continues to] "...presume 
the autonomous nation-state"(19). 
These propositions summarize briefly the obstacles to finding an 
appropriate model within existing comparative education literature in 
which to ground the thesis. The problem which this thesis addresses 
involves a society which is not, nor will it become, a nation-state, 
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and the problem, further, is not grounded in development or the 
outcomes of schooling issues. 
There is a fourth broad category of comparative literature which 
is about education in the context of colonialism(20). This literature 
defines the both colonial context and structure of education and 
describes the element of 'coercion' in educational transfer(21). 
Other parts define some of the psychological attributes of the 
colonized and their education(22). Such literature, according to 
Vandra Lea Masemann "...emphasizes the dissimilar interests of 
various classes and their differing relationships to (and benefits 
from) the workings of the education system."(23) 
This is the most promising literature for this thesis but it 
leaves several important themes underexplored. For example, 
literature on ex-colonies traces the patterns of evolution of 
education, but does not discuss the options available to them at the 
time of decolonization(24). Although this thesis accepts the argument 
that the political orientation of new elites within society 
determines how education is utilized in the decolonization 
period(25) , the power of the literature is diminished because it does 
not carefully specify the options for the colonized. It often assumes 
that the end of direct colonization will be followed by other forms 
of external imperialism which severely limit the options available to 
the new nation-state(26). This thesis attempts to discuss the options 
available to Hong Kong before the end of colonizghon and, therefore, 
the literature on colonialism and education is not sufficiently 
complex to provide a complete base for this thesis. 
In summary, Hong Kong education shares many characteristics with 
other education systems. For example, it is the product of a colonial 
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tradition, it has expanded rapidly in concert with other systems in 
the world, and, it is attempting, with other systems, to provide 
answers to questions of achievement, selectivity, and relevance. 
However, it differs from all other education systems. The crucial 
difference is the fact that, after 1997, Hong Kong education will be 
directly subordinate to a socio-political system which is the product 
of an unfamiliar ideology. The people of Hong Kong have, however, 
been promised local admiri'stration of education. The existing 
comparative education literature provides analyses of various 
elements of this situation but no one single existing framework 
provides a model for a complete analysis of the contemporary 
situation in Hong Kong. 
The introduction continues with a statement of the argument of 
the thesis and concludes with a description of the organization of the 
chapters. 
ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
(a) Argument 
The thesis has one broad argument, the understanding and defence 
of which require the presentation of four sub-arguments. The broad 
argument is that the transfer can be partially prepared for by 
selective adjustment to new contexts, particularly in terms of 
educational decisions in this decade. (In the context of this thesis, 
adjustment is synonomous with adaptation and both terms refer to a 
arocess whereby the course of behaviour is altered in terms of the 
demands of the social situation.) 
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The broad argument links the sub-arguments of the thesis in the 
following manner: following Archer, the selective adlustment is 
'social interaction' as it "...involves the exchange of resources or 
services (wealth, power, or expertise) against one another by the 
interest groups involved."(27) In the Hong Kong education situation 
examined in this thesis, this social interaction involves an exchange 
of expertise, in the form of acquisition of suitable skills, against 
freedom to pursue a prosperous and stable social enviroment. 
The sub-arguments offer theories about the 'structural contexts' 
in which the interaction is occurring, and, further, theorize about 
the potential outcome of the interactions. The effect of the process 
of interaction in its structural context is "...an internal 
restructuring of education itself"(28), and the concluding 
sub-argument theorizes about scenarios of change to Hong Kong 
education as a result of the transfer. 
(b) Organization 
The following section describes the organization of the thesis 
and introduces each of the four sub-arguments in sequence. 
The thesis begins with the theme of the first sub-argument: a 
description of the recent emergence of '1997' as a salient issue for 
Hong Kong and of the ensuing political shifts within the colony. 
'1997' is initially analyzed as a double process: (a) the creation of 
a public problem, and (b) perception of the problem by the public. 
Therefore, the historical and political events which led up to the 
Agreement are discussed and a description of the legal, political and 
economic base of the public problem is included. 
'1997' is then defined in terms of the widespread uncertainty 
about the effects of the transfer originating in the perception that 
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the post-1997 political system (Hong Kong Special Adminstrative 
Region) may not enhance their lives. Chapter 1 argues that 
uncertainty and negative perception about the future have created new 
structural contexts by bringing about a realignment and consolidation 
of power and interest groups within the colony which will, in turn, 
affect the outcome of the ongoing social and political interactions. 
Both of these factors affect the adaptation process. 
In summary, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the 
events of the past six or seven years, highly complex and 
unprecedented occurences, have created a public issue which has 
provoked a state of tension and uncertainty in Hong Kong, resulting 
in a new political alignment in the colony: a new structural context. 
The interacting local actors and structures are the public; 
information sources; and established and emerging power groups. 
Throughout this analysis, the thesis accepts Archer's statement 
that "Bargaining power is essentially a matter of numbers and 
organization; it can obviously vary in strength and plays an 
important part in determining the relative success of different 
assertive groups."(29) Therefore, defence of the first sub-argument 
requires tracing, through research of public statements by community 
leaders and by speculation in the media, the sequence of events from 
the increased publicity around the issue to broader public awareness 
and the emergence of 'grassroots' political activity, in response to 
the uncertainty. This uncertainty will interact with certain 
political institutions of the Hong Kong Chinese to affect the 
outcome. 
These discussions then link to Chapters 2 and 3, because, 
although the Agreement to transfer was - in public - the resolution 
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of a legal problem, other elements such as ideology, dependency, 
economic interest and political aspiration were also important in the 
Agreement. The most important aim of chapters 2 and 3 is to provide a 
structural analysis of the varying ideologies and institutional 
patterns of Hong Kong and the PRC. These are contexts of the transfer 
and suggest 'structural contradictions' between Hong Kong and the 
PRC. The second sub-argument, the theme of these chapters, is that 
the existence of various structural contradictions between the 
societies will lead to tension within the Hong Kong community, which, 
in turn, will persist until adjustment occurs. 
Within this organization of Chapters 2 and 3, categories of 
analysis had to be selected. Frederick Wirt has commented on the 
importance of the relationship between the argument of a project and 
the categories or 'units' of analysis requiring comparison: he 
suggests that the argument guides the researcher to the units of 
analysis which must be compared to test the theory(30). Since the 
contradictions are of 1. socio-political assumptions, 2. economic 
assumptions, 3. educational differences, testing the argument of this 
thesis requires comparison between political systems, economic 
systems and socio-cultural systems. (Points of potential convergence 
are also noted as they comprise part of the new structural context.) 
The systems are classified by their functional aspects, i.e., how 
they will broaden or limit the intellectual, economic, and cultural 
mobility of the members of Hong Kong society. In these chapters, the 
thesis argues that perceptions of those contradictions in social, 
eonomic and political systems are causing tension among individuals 
in Hong Kong society, prompting them to mobilize in various ways. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 is a description of the socio-cultural, 
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economic, and educational systems of Hong Kong. It describes the 
period since World War II which co-incided generally with the periods 
of greatest immigration from China and the establishment of the 
People's Republic of China. A second aim of Chapter 2 is to describe 
the emergence, the ideology, and the characteristics of the new Hong 
Kong middle class, those who will be most affected by takeover. This 
group exhibits considerable loyalty to "China" and cultural pride, 
but has adopted many Western traits. They compromise 'a society in 
transition' in several economic and existential senses of that term. 
Chapter 3 is a description of corresponding aspects 
(socio-cu)tural, economic and educational) of the society of the PRC, 
covering the period since its establishment, but emphasizing the 
period since 1978. This year marked the beginning of implementation 
of the policies which will affect the future of Hong Kong residents. 
A second aim of this chapter is, through description of the PRC from 
a comparative perspective, to focus attention on the differences 
between Hong Kong and the PRC, and thereby demonstrate that tension 
is likely and adjustment is necessary. 
Chapters 2 and 3 highlight many of the differences between Hong 
Kong and the PRC, but also suggest the ways in which they are 
similar. As Thomas B. Gold has pointed out citizens of the PRC are 
'caught in two historic streams: traditional Chinese culture and the 
Leninist traditions of the CP"(31). The Hong Kong Chinese are caught 
in two historic streams as well: they value the traditional 
behavioural patterns of China, but have been influenced by Western 
values under the colonial government and British laws. Yet Hong Kong 
and the PRC remained different and separate and very few of the 
events in China had lasting negative effects on Hong Kong government 
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or politics. Until this decade adaptation to the more powerful PRC 
has been unnecessary. 
The theoretical analysis of the first three chapters is followed 
by description of empirical research into the reactions of 
individuals to ongoing events. This emp„irical research is based on 
the third sub-argument which proposes a theory about social norms and 
adaptive behavior in the Hong Kong context. As described above, a 
crucial aspect of the analysis in Chapter 2 is an attempt to define 
the conventional assumptions which affect the reactions of Hong Kong 
people to their social environment. This discussion has been 
influenced by the suggestion that understanding a society's 
educational practices can be furthered by analysis of how local 
political rationales and social theories interact with education(32). 
The chapter suggests that the political and social norms which have 
cemented Hong Kong society together in the past will define the 
nature of the reaction to the new stresses on society. In other 
words, established behaviour patterns will persist in the face of 
change because they reflect deeply held values(33). 
Archer develops this theme of behavior patterns and change 
further when she suggests that "...rewarding or frustrating 
experiences condition different action patterns"(34), in other words, 
a society which has benefitted from existing institutions will 
'defend institutional stability'. Thus, this thesis is proposing that 
the behaviour patterns which have interacted successfully with other 
institutions in Hong Kong (economic and political) have been 
positively conditioned by experience and will be applied to the new 
context with the aim of preserving as many of the rewarding 
institutions as possible. 
Specifically, the argument is that individuals are using their 
political and social institutions and utilizing established pragmatic 
behavioral patterns to interact with the new situation. They are 
reacting pragmatically to the problem by adapting to and preparing 
for the new social, economic and political realities in this decade. 
Therefore, a theory about individuals and education is advanced. The 
theory suggests that unfamiliar and dramatic occurences in the 
socio-political and economic contexts, in which individuals function, 
are causing them to resort to established behaviour patterns which, 
in the Hong Kong context, will be an attempt to modify the education 
system to meet the new realities. 
The thesis concludes in Chapter 5 with the final sub-argument: 
that there are various scenarios for Hong Kong education in the new 
environment of the HKSAR. It addresses the question of what the role 
of the Hong Kong education system might be during and after the 
merger period. This analysis of the scenarios of transition is not 
grounded in existing research on scenarios of decolonization. 
These four sub-arguments are interrelated. Three sections of the 
analysis are documenting research focused on understanding 
institutional patterns in their cultural, socio-economic and 
political contexts. The fourth section of the analysis locates and 
identifies the activity of individuals - selected social actors - in 
their social, specifically, their educational context. 
It is to the first of these sub-arguments that attention now 
turns. 
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CHAPTER I 
'ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS' 
BACKROUND TO AND PREPARATION FOR CHANGE 
I. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
The primary purpose of chapter 1 is to demonstrate that 
recent events related to negotiations for the terms of the 
transfer of sovereignity over Hong Kong to the PRC have created a 
public issue. The chapter argues that the emergence of this issue 
has, in turn, provoked a state of tension and uncertainty in Hong 
Kong, resulting in a new political context within the colony. The 
chapter also introduces the comparative element of the thesis in 
its concluding overview of the historical convergence and 
divergence between Hong Kong and the PRC. 
Achievement of the primary purpose necessitates a survey of 
the historical events which led to the recent change in Hong 
Kong's political status and which caused shifts in the 
distribution of power and interest groups. The organization of the 
chapter is as follows: discussion of the issues and events leading 
up to the negotiations between the UK and the PRC on the Hong Kong 
problem is followed by a summary of the points addressed in the 
Joint Declaration and description of local reactions to it. 
The next segment is a description of the drafting and content 
of the Basic Law. The Basic Law is intended by the PRC to be the 
constitution of Hong Kong. The make-up of the drafting committees 
and the content of the Law itself have emerged as highly prominent 
and controversial topics. This segment also highlights the efforts 
of the PRC to maintain stability in Hong Kong during the 
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transition period, as well as to establish influence. 
Discussion of another salient issue follows: the number and 
nature of reforms to the present Government. Finally, the broad 
areas of divergence and convergence between Hong Kong and the PRC 
are introduced: although Hong Kong and the PRC are connected by 
ancient cultural ties and many established commercial links, 
history has separated them in the political and economic systems. 
II EMERGENCE OF THE ISSUE 
The following pages present a description of the historical 
and contemporary events which led up to the signing of the Joint 
Declaration. This and the following discussion of the Basic Law 
attempt to demonstrate the creation in Hong Kong of the public 
issue of '1997' in terms of public statements by community leaders 
and speculation in the media. This requires tracing, through the 
media sources, the sequence of events from the initial increased 
publicity around the issue to broader public awareness, to the 
eventual emergence of 'grassroots' political activity, and 
eventually to an increase in tension surrounding the issue. These 
discussions also demonstrate that, although the event was overtly 
the resolution of a legal problem, neverthe less ideology, 
dependency, economic interest and political aspiration were also 
important elements. These elements were discussed in the media, 
and contributed to the public concern about the issue. 
Role  of the Media in Creation of '1997' as a Public Issue 
The print and broadcast media have played a significant role 
in the formation of public attitudes toward the issue and, for 
this reason, the literaure search related to the Joint Declaration 
and the Basic Law has included print, media and public statements. 
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It is relevant here to note that Hong Kong is considered to have a 
free press(1) and to note also that the use by Hong Kong residents 
of print and broadcast media to obtain information about the 
political and economic environment has been documented(2). 
For example, Joseph Y.S. Cheng describes a study which 'shows 
the preponderant role of tne media in informing the public about 
local affairs..."(3). Emly Lau reports that the media have 
'inlayed an important role in the dissemination of information and 
in fostering debates about public issues..." (4). Studies about 
the specific role of the Hong Kong media related to the '1997' 
issue have been carried out. A study of the role of the press in 
problem recognition(5) reported that from early 1963, when the 
issue began to appear regularly in the press, to December, 1984 
(shortly after the Joint Declaration was signed) the number of 
respondents who reported that '1997' was important to them doubled 
to nearly two-thirds of all respondents. It has also been reported 
that almost seventy per cent of items in sampled newspapers - 
representing a spectrum of political affiliation - focused on the 
effect of '1997' on Hong Kong's economic prosperity(6). "These 
newspapers defined the question of '1997' primarily in terms of 
economic terms,"(7) Also within that sample, reports from 
grassroots Hong Kong sources, when compared to official sources 
from the PRC, Britain and the Hong Kong Government, were most 
likely to empnasize political issues and were least likely to be 
concerned with economic matters. 
N. Miners describes the use of the pro-communist Hong Kong 
press by the PRC to influence public perception of issues(8). E. 
Lau discusses, in tne '1997' context, the significant relationship 
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between the Hong Kong mass media and public opinion, which she 
calls the "...most efective means of checks and balances in Hong 
Kong"(9). J. Cheng also describes the use of the media by PRC 
officials to increase public awareness of its stance on this issue 
and "win the local community's acceptance of its proposal"(10). 
Cheng writes: 
The most important targets of China's 
united front strategy initially were 
businessmen, leaders of opinion, academics, 
and student union activists. Later efforts 
were concentrated on cultivating the local 
media and various professional 
associations(11). 
The Hong Kong media has been a significant and influential 
source of information about '1997', and this research has included 
data from various Hong Kong and international publications to 
demonstrate that the issue of the Joint Declaration, Basic Law 
and, therefore the issue also of'1997', have become highly visible 
in Hong Kong. 
Backround to the Issue 
Hong Kong is a dependent colony of the UK because of 
developments resulting from the Opium Wars of the last century. In 
1843, overpowered by the superior firepower of the British Navy in 
battles along the Pearl River between Hong Kong and Canton, China 
signed and ratified the Treaty of Nanking, ceding in perpetuity 
the island of Hong Kong to Britain. Less than twenty years later, 
hostilities had again broken out between China and the West. Again 
victorious, England demanded the permanent cesession of Kowloon. 
Peking acceeded, signing the Convention of Peking in 1860, and the 
tiny area of mainland and islands, known collectively as Hong 
Kong, began to prosper in banking, commerce, and shipping. Under 
threat of further hostilities with 
	 Britain, China agreed in 
the Convention of 1898, to lease (without rent) the New 
Territories from July 1, 1898 for a period of 99 years. 
Although the People's Republic of China has consistently 
maintained that these treaties were "unequal" and that Hong Kong 
is part of China's territory(12) they also maintained that the 
problem was an historical one which they would solve when they 
felt it appropriate. Indeed, Anthony Dicks noted in 1983 that 
...China has not up to now made any demand, formal or otherwise, 
for the reincorporation of the territory of Hong Kong into the 
territory...of the PRC..."(13). However, economic considerations 
forced both sides to consider the fate of the colony two decades 
before the expiry of the lease. 
After the Hong Kong riots of 1966 and 1967, which coincided 
with the activities of the Cultural Revolution in the People's 
Republic and which can be regarded as "...revealing Hong Kong's 
vulnerability to developments in China that [can] spill over into 
Hong Kong..."(14), Hong Kong settled into a watchful , but 
beneficial relationship with China. By 1972 the relationship was 
described as a "...sound and mutually satisfying working 
relationship...[with Hong Kong]...debending on the communists for 
most of its food, and the 800 million communists depending on the 
colony for 40% of its foreign exchange earnings"(15). Indeed that 
year a formal statement by the Chinese Ambassador to the United 
Nations to the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on 
Decolonization, asserting that Hong Kong should not be regarded as 
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a colony but as part of Chinese territory, caused little concern 
in Hong Kong. Most newspapers described the mood at that time as a 
mix of fatalism and hope - hope that by the time 1997 arrives 
those who wish to, will be safely settled in another country. 
During the early and mid-seventies the issue was given little 
prominence and most people were confidently improving their 
economic position in Hong Kong. Peking periodically offered 
reassurances to Hong Kong, apparently recognizing the role a 
stable Hong Kong was playing in its own attempts to modernize(16). 
A pro-Peking newspaper noted that Mao's policy had made it clear 
that the expiry date would have nothing to do with how and when 
China intended to recover Hong Kong. The decisive factor seemed to 
be the usefulness of Hong Kong in building China's domestic 
economy(17). 
A sense of urgency, accompanied by heightened public 
awareness of this issue, began to develop in Hong Kong in the late 
1970's(18) and grew quickly. For example, an article was published 
listing the advantages to Peking of maintaining the status quo in 
Hong Kong: the source of foreign exchange earnings, the contacts 
to the West for banking, technological and commercial expertise, 
and Peking's own heavy investments in Hong Kong property and 
business ventures(19). It continued that, although no one expected 
the Red Army to march in to Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, the 
approaching expiry of the lease presented 'critical problems' for 
Hong Kong which had to be 'tackled soon'. Noting that foreign 
investors were becoming reluctant to sign long-term agreements, it 
asked the PRC for assurances that Hong Kong's present 
administrative and legal system would continue. David Bonavia 
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notes, at that time, that is 	 was chiefly the Hong Kong 
business community, including big American firms, that pressed the 
Hong Kong Government to find out , through Britain, what China had 
in mind for the post-1997 period"(20). 
Throughout the remainder of 1978 and early 1979, concern 
increased and warnings of the effects of this concern on 
prosperity were expressed. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping eventually 
attempted to reassure investors by telling tham to 'put their 
hearts at ease'. Though not a guarantee, the statement, combined 
with the belief that Hong Kong was a vital link in Peking's 
intention to modernize China, encouraged investors for a while. By 
late 1979, however confidence was low again after prolonged 
silence from both sides. Later, after Prime Minister M. Thatcher 
announced that she had held discussions with Chairman Hua Guofung 
about Hong Kong's future, confidence, and the stock market, rose 
again. 
Uncertainty continued throughout 1980. In the commercial 
sector, investors were more hesitant to sign long term leases and 
complained of the inability of the Hong Kong Government to grant 
new ones extending beyond 1997. Many leases involve a fifteen year 
date, and, as 1982 approached, it became difficult to attract 
investors. Demands for a ':bankable commitment"(21) were made, and 
there was frequent speculation about the future. A statement by "a 
leading cadre in Guandung" promised that Hong Kong would retain 
the status quo after the expiry(22). On the one hand, the view was 
expressed that it was indisputable that China would regain 
sovereignity, but another opinion was that people have no idea 
what will happen in 1997. Uncertainty evolved into worry which in 
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turn evolved into a 'sense of urgency' about the unknown future. 
Both announcements and concerns became far more specific 
during 1982. Sir (then Mr) Humphrey Atkins, Lord Privy Seal, met 
with Premier Zhou Ziyang and raised the question of Hong Kong and 
the imminent expiry of the )ease. He was "given significant 
indications of Chinese policy toward Hong Kong 	 which confirmed 
the view of Her Majesty's Government that negotiations should be 
opened"(23). Shortly thereafter, the PRC included in its draft 
constitution for the National People's Congress a provision 
(Article 30) that "...when absolutely necessary, the nation could 
set up special administrative regions" whose political systems 
would be "...set up by law in accordance with conditions existing 
in these regions"(24). Speculation followed that Hong Kong would 
become one of these new regions. 
The Hong Kong Chinese Press was, at this time, expressing a 
generally pessimistic view and appeared to reflect the concerns of 
the community at large. Doubts that the standard of living and 
stability would be maintained in a Special Administrative Region 
(EAR), and the opinion that the "Hong Kong people's sense of 
values, the concept of rule by law, their cultural identification, 
and the local economic structure, would definItely be unacceptable 
to the PRC"(25) were aired. The same article concluded by stating 
that a BAR could not exist too long because its presence would 
lead to discontent in the PRC. An independent opinion poll 
conducted around that time revealed tnat the majority of poeple 
favoured retaining the status quo in Hong Kong(26) and were not 
prepared to adopt the lifestyle and social system of the PRC. 
Three months after the announcement of the additions to the 
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draft constitution, Peking announced the establishment of a State 
Council committee to study the subject of Hong Kong. This was the 
first substantial acknowledgement that Hong Kong was not just a 
British problem(27). Simultaneously, Deng Xiaoping was reported as 
saying that China would regain sovereignity in 1997, although it 
would take steps to maintain stability in Hong Kong(28). This 
report was interpreted as a method of preparing public opinion for 
an eventual takeover(29), and it had a profound negative effect on 
confidence in Hong Kong despite its promises of continuity. David 
Buena de Mesquita describes the reaction: "...the stock, property 
an d foreign exchange markets went into a virtual free-fall"(30). 
Asset values on the stock exchanges fell by one-third within a few 
months, and land values in the choice sections of Hong Kong Island 
and Kowloon fell to as low as one-fifth of their pre-announcement 
1982 prices. The floating exchange rate that had been in effect 
since 1974 fell from HK6.20 to the US dollar in mid-1982 to a low 
of HK9.55 to the US dollar on September 24, 1983 and leakage of 
capital from Hong Kong began. 
By the end of 1982, the negotiating positions of the three 
parties were clear. First, the people of Hong Kong had described 
themselves as, although proud to be Chinese, wanting to retain the 
status quo, hold on to what they had achieved, and therefore 
willing to wait for the PRC to catch up to their lifestyle before 
reunification with the motherland. They were concerned by 
declining business confidence and the pessimistic economic 
climate, and skeptical of the glib statements exhorting them to 
have confidence issuing from both the UK and the PRC. 
Second, the UK undoubtedly saw benefit in improving its 
economic ties witn China. However, despite having a sense of moral 
responsibility and duty to the people of Hong Kong and despite the 
facing a legal issue which needed resolution (the expiry of the 
lease), it was ...slow to develop [its] own stance and anxious 
not to make any wrong steps...'(31). 
China had one benefitted from Hong Kong's prosperity, and 
preferred to reach an agreement which would ensure a future in 
which the economic vitality of Hong Kong continued to contribute 
to the Four Modernizations. Yet China had a political issue to 
contend with and remained adamant on the issues of recovering 
'sacred territory' and reaffirming its opposition to colonialism. 
In this three-edged environment of overlapping, yet 
confrontational need, discussions between two of the parties, the 
UK and China, were opened in September, 1982. (The PRC considered 
itself as 'solely responsible for the welfare of the local [Hong 
Kong] pooulation"(32) and the only participant who was a resident 
of Hong Kong was a London appointed Hong Kong political adviser, 
Robin MacLaren.) 
These discussions, described as having the "...common aim of 
maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong"(33) began 
unpropitiousiy, reportedly because of Mrs.Thatcher's insistence on 
affirming the validity of the treaties under international 
law(34). (As noted, the Chinese hold the view that the treaties 
are illegal, and as such are only a formality atbest.) 
Negotiations were stalled further for several months because the 
UK insisted that the sovereignity issue be left aside, and asked 
instead for discussions of the "...importance of the British 
administrative role in maintaining the existing systems in Hong 
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Kong"(34). The PRO made it "...clear that the continuation of 
British administration after 1997 would not be acceptable to China 
in any form"(35). 
These negotiating conflicts were resolved by acceptance by 
the UK of China's fundamental assertion that sovereignity over 
Hong Kong must be regained(36). The confidential negotiations 
progressed to the issue of what form of Chinese administration 
would ensure the continuation of stability and prosperity in Hong 
Kong. 
However, events during the two years between the first 
meeting of Thatcher and Deng and the publication of the Joint 
Declaration added to local anxiety and scepticism. For example, 
there were reports that the UK would admit to the UK only a 'few 
hundred civil servants' after the takeover(37). On the other hand, 
there were (unofficial) statements from Peking regarding the 
proposed abolition of the Hong Kong dollar, and the proposed 
placement of cadres in every Hong Kong Government office(38). 
During this period there was a marked increase in the number of 
emigrant and visa applications at Western consulates(39), and in 
September, 1983, the Hong Kong dollar dropped 14% in 48 hours 
following a series of accusations and demands by China that 
Britain change her attitude toward the talks. 
On September 26, 1964 a draft agreement between the two 
governments relating to the future of Hong Kong was initialled. 
It consists of a Joint Declaration and Three Annexes. Each part 
of the agreement has the same status. The whole makes up a formal 
international agreement, legally binding in all its parts. An 
international agreement of this kind is the highest form of 
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commitment between two sovereign states"(40). 
On the day of debate by the British Parliament on the draft 
agreement, 50 of parliament's 635 members attended; the topic did 
not appear on the front page of any newspaper. An analyst 
commented: "Hong Kong is in the out tray"(41). 
In conclusion, Hong Kong began its existence as a colony when 
Britain's desire for economic gain prevailed over the territorial 
integrity of China; Hong Kong will cease to exist as a colony 
again because the wish for economic gains by both the UK and the 
PRE is prevailing over Hong Kong's own cultural and territorial 
integrity. The previous description of the events which led up to 
the signing of the Joint Declaration has attempted to bring into 
focus the fact that the event was not merely the resolution of a 
legal problem, but also an event affected by the nationalism, 
economic interests and political aspiration of the partipating 
parties. Although one intention of the authors of the Joint 
Declaration was reassure the people of Hong Kong that nothing 
Would change, as the 1997 date begins to draw closer, nervousness 
increased. The preceding analysis has shown that the residents and 
the economy react quickly to local political events related to the 
issue of 1997. During the first period of uncertainty and 
negotiations, local reactions, based on fears about the possible 
loss of their lifestyle, were reflected quickly in various 
economic measures. 
III THE JOINT DECLARATION 
The terms of the Joint Declaration (JD) are discussed because 
the Joint Declaration set forth, after years of speculation, the 
40 
type of political entity Hong Kong would become after the UK 
withdrew. Its publication initially reassured residents by 
providing relief from speculation. In addition, the JD is referred 
to by both the PRO and the UK in discussions of post-1997 Hong 
Kong and, therefore, familiarity with its terms is essential to 
understanding discussions of the status of Hong Kong. The purpose 
of this presentation is not an intellectual analysis of the Joint 
Declaration, but a description of some of its terms which relate 
to the thesis argument, which includes the description of the 
creation of a public issue of '1997'. 
The Joint Declaration was signed by the UK and the PRO and 
states that the PRO will resume sovereignity over Hong Kong from 
July 1, 1997. It sets out basic policies towards Hong Kong after 
that date. Under these policies, the UK promises to restore Hong 
Kong to the PRO on that date, and the PRO promises that, for 50 
years beyond 1997, the current legal, judicial, and economic 
characteristics would be preserved. Until 1997, the UK will 
administer Hong Kong "... with the object of maintaining and 
preserving its economic prosperity and social stability..." (42). 
A Sino-British Joint L;ison Group is to be set up to aid in 
implementation of the declaration. 
Section X of the agreement provides that the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region 
....shall maintain the educational system 
previously practised in Hong Kong [and] ... 
shall decide on its own policies in the fields 
of culture, education, science and technology, 
including ... policies regarding the 
educational system and its adminstration, the 
language of instruction, the allocation of 
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funds, the examination system, the system of 
academic rewards and the recognition of 
educational and tecnnological qualification. 
Institutions ... may retain their autonomy. 
...Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of 
education...(43). 
The Joint Declaration contains a list of twelve basic 
policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong. These include themes such 
as: administration of the territory, makeup of tne government, 
characteristics of the social , economic and legal systems after 
the takeover, policing of the Region, taxation, and international 
relationships, as well as a statement that a Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong special Administrative Region of the PRO will be stipulated 
by the National People's Congress (NPC) of the PRO and shall 
remain uncnanged for fifty years. 
One of tne most significant sections of the Joint Declaration 
relates to the cnain-of-command which will be in effect after 
1997, making it clear that the ultimate control will be in Peking. 
As was anticipated, Hong Kong is established as a Special 
Administrative Region under Article 30 of the Chinese 
constitution, and the basic policies section suggests that the PRO 
will have 'direct authority' over Hong Kong. Although the HKSAR is 
described as having a high degree of autonomy in executive, 
legislative and judicial areas, the Chief Executive, elected or 
cnosen by local consultation, must then be appointed by the 
Central People's Government. "Principal officials shall Pe 
nominated by the chief executive 	 and appointed oy the Central 
People's Government..."(44). The government and legislature of 
Hong Kong is to be composed of 'local inhabitants', a term which 
is yet to be defined, and which appears to be open to conflicting 
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interpretations. 
The Joint Declaration promises the development of a Basic 
Law: a constitution according to which HKSAR is to be governed as 
a capitalist system. The present constitutional framework is 
provided by the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions, issued 
by Britain to Hong Kong in 1888. These documents stipulate the 
powers of the governor in the colony, and provide for the creation 
of two advisory bodies (the Executive and Legislative Councils), 
and stipulate the terms of their legal relationship. After the 
estaolishment of the HKSAR, these documents will be replaced by 
the Basic Law. 
Laws and amendments passed after 1997 must be in accord with 
the Basic Law, but present aws, passed according to the present 
authority, will remain 'basically unchanged' as far as they do not 
conflict witn the Basic Law. However, this phrase, as well as the 
term 'local innabitants', nave caused local concern because of the 
possiblity of various,'and controversial, interpretations. 
The judicial system will remain in the courts, which are 
described as remaining independent, while acting in accordance 
with the laws of tne HKSAR. The existing system of management of 
the public service is to be maintained. 
Hong Kong is promised full autonomy in all financial matters, 
including "...disposing of its financial resources and drawing up 
its pucgets and its final anrnunts"(45) though they will be 
reported to the Central People's Government for the record'. Its 
revenues are to be used entirely for the purposes of Hong Kong and 
not awarded to the Central People's Government. The capitalistic 
system is to be maintained and Hong Kong is promised independence 
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in determining economic and trade policies. However, questions 
were immediately raised about the 'free market' spirit of certain 
clauses of the JD because Hong Kong residents are not awarded 
representation on significant planning commissions(46). 
Hong Kong is intended to retain its status as an 
international finance centre. This is supported through statements 
that the existing systems of regulation and supervision of 
deposit-taking companies and financial markets, the free port, the 
free trade policy shall be unchanged. The Hong Kong dollar is to 
ciruculate freely and remain freely convertible. Shipping and 
Aviation guarantess are adjusted to reflect the new status of Hong 
Kong(47). 
The Joint Declaration was presented to Hong Kong by former 
Governor Sir Edward Youpe on September 27, 1984. He described the 
agreement as a 'binding commitment on the part of both governments 
to implement all its provisions"(48). He said it would give 
confidence to Hong Kong and to the world, enabling Hong Kong to 
move ahead. Describing the detail in the agreement as sufficient 
to ensure continuity of the "...systems and circumstances which 
Hong Kong people find essential", Youde also emphasized that there 
was no possibility of an amended agreement and that the 
alternative to this agreement was to have no agreement at all. 
Initial reaction to the agreement was generally favourable - 
and cautious. There was extensive media coverage of its 
publication and comments reflected relief over the end to years of 
uncertainty about what form the future would take. They also 
reflected general satisfaction with the intentions expressed in 
the document. Local share prices climbed moderately after 
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publication, and both ousiness people and property developers 
praised the Joint Declaration for its "pledges of political and 
economic autonomy"(49). 
The Hong Kong Government utilized the media to ensure a 
favourable public reception for the document and '...kicked off a 
oig PR campaign to champion the agreement"(5U). The campaign was 
evidently successful in arousing interest, as the 1.2M initial 
printing (one copy for each household) was depleted almost 
immediately. For their part, the two signators praised the efforts 
of the other: the FRC was described as "farsighted" in its new 
one country, two systems' policy by Geoffrey Howe, and tne PRC 
praised Britain for snedding a colony. Sir Philip Hadon-Cave, 
long-time financial secretary for Hong Kong during some of its 
most successful 'growth years', assured delegates at a conference 
on the future of Hong Kong that tne declaration '...provides for 
continuation of tne elements for confidence and progress"(51). 
In Hong Kong an air of reconciliation prevailed, and the 
prevalent theme was working together to ensure stability and 
prosperity(52). There were calls for people to be active, and to 
"...insist that we do get what we have been promised"(53). The 
agreement was recommended to the people of Hong Kong bv most of 
the Right- and Left-wing press, academicians, diplomats, big 
business, traders on tne stock market, Tory MP's and the Executive 
Council. Educators were urged to use the agreement to help 
introduce civic education in the scnools, and, thereby, eliminate 
tne durable political apathy of the Hong Kong oeopie(54). Many 
felt tnat Hong Kong could expect a stable period of five to eight 
years as a result of the declaration, and that prosperity was now 
guaranteed at least into the 1990's(55). 
There were, however, notes of unrest. An increase in share 
prices followed publication, but was accompanied by media 
criticism of the 'loopnoies' in the Joint Declaration because it 
is not legally binding, omitted detail about election mechanisms, 
and contradicted tne fundamentals of socialism. In addition, the 
Joint Declaration "...should not be difficult to manipulate... if 
the hardliners come back"(56). Another article expressed doubt 
about the actua amount of autonomy Hong Kong would ever 
experience(57). Generally, however, "pragmatism and adaptability 
once again prevailed"(58) and most residents indicated a 
willingness to carry on within the terms of the Joint 
Deciaration(59). Attention now shifted to the issue of the Basic 
Law. There was perhaps greater interest in its formulation because 
Hong Kong people were to be members of the drafting committees. 
Overall, then,the terms of the Joint Declaration promised the 
return of the exercise of sovereignity over, and administration 
of, Hong Kong to the PRO with the establisnment of a one country, 
two systems' arrangement guaranteeing Hong Kong considerable 
independence in financial and social matters. However, discussion 
of the future began to return repeatedly to more immeasurable 
factors than written guarantees. These factors are confidence in 
the signators and the importance of political and economic 
relationships. Recent conflicting signals from China about its 
own internal economic and political Q0I1CiES, and loss of 
confidence in Great Britain's intentions have increased 
nervousness in Hong Kong. 
IV THE BASIC LAW 
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As mentioned previously, the Basic Law is to be the 
constitution of the HKSAR, and the following overview of the 
debate about the Basic Law discusses two themes which have emerged 
and which are relevant to the thesis. The first is the 
socio-political change brought about by the process of formulating 
the Basic Law. On the one hand, tension and anxiety have furtner 
increased as a result of the prominence given to uncertainties 
about the BL, and on the other hand, the politics of internal 
local power have become more significant. 
The second relevant theme is that of the major areas which 
need to be resolved by the Basic Law. 
The section begins with a description of the political 
activities related to selecting members of the Basic Law 
committees. 
Formulation of the Basic Law 
In July 1985, the Basic Law Drafting Committee CELDC) began a 
series of meetings under news blackout because '...some news that 
might reach Hong Kong may cause unnecessary disturbance and 
concern"(60). The objectives were, over five years, to outline a 
legal system in line with the intention of the Joint Declaration, 
to describe the structure of the HKSAR government with Hong Kong 
people governing Hong Kong, and to provide for the retention of 
the social and economic systems. The text of Basic Law will 
effectively determine the operation of Hong Kong as a capitalist 
enclave in a socialist country and most people in Hong Kong 
acknowledge its importance. The timetable announced included 
opportunities for comment from Hong Kong on the drafts. The first 
draft is available in 1988. A consultation period follows the 
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publication of this draft and review in light of the comments. A 
revision will be ready in 1989 for further comment, and the final 
draft is planned to be enacted by the National People's Congress 
in 1990. 
Heated discussion about the make-up of the committee began 
almost immediately after announcement. 	 Because the people 
of Hong Kong were not included in the drafting process of the 
Joint Agreement(61), there was great concern in Hong Kong to 
obtain local representation in the drafting process of the Basic 
Law. Tnere were universal calls for membership and participation 
by Hong Kong people representing the views of Hong Kong. J.Cheng 
describes the difficulty in selecting members: 
The difficulty was how to select a 
respectable working sample which would be both 
trusted by the Hong Kong cnmmmunity and 
acceptable to the Chinese authorities. The 
cnoice had to enhance its [the PRC's] united 
front work in Hong Kong too. This select 
group, however, must avoid being perceived as 
a new centre of authority challenging the 
British administration in Hong Kong(62). 
The PRO initially refused to allow participation by residents 
in the discussions claiming that the the mainland negotiators 
represented the Hong Kong Chinese people. However, as the 
importance of the Basic Law become more widely covered in the Hong 
Kong media, local residents became convinced of the necessity of 
their particiation to protect their interests. Apparently 
realizing that confidence in the Basic Law would be determined 
partially by the amount of local participation in the drafting, 
the PRC agreed to invite Hong Kong people to participate in the 
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drafting   but reminded them that Beijing retained the 
right to the final word on its proposals(63). 
The final committee of fifty nine included twenty three Hong 
Kong residents, whom Xu Jiatun, the chief representative of the 
PRO in Hong Kong, indicated were '...responsible to China and its 
1 Billion population"(64). A large number were barristers and 
solicitors. Management and owners from the industrial and 
commercial sector were also heavily represented, making it "clear 
that the Chinese bovernment placed to priority on the stability 
and prosperity of Hong Kong and that radical political reforms 
would be unlikety"(65). 
Thus, although public expresion of concern from the local 
population forced a concession from the PRO about the make-up of 
the BLOC, the usefulness of the concession was questioned. The 
Economist questioned Chinese sincerity in its concession about 
membership and pointed out that only residents who were known 'Lc: 
friendly to the PRO and those with "...enviable records of 
successful business with the PRO..." were invited(66). 
One opinion group in Hong Kong reported that many were 
unhappy with the selection but '...declined to openly voice [sic] 
their dissatisfaction either because they do not...want to incur 
Peking's wrath or simply feel that what they have to say would not 
make any difference"(67). Another source described the Hong Kong 
public as reticent to criticize because they were "...uncertain of 
China's threshhoId of tolerance..."(68). 
In another effort to calm fears and stop the continuing 
erosion of confidence, the chairman of the BLOC: announced at the 
conclusion of its first meeting in July, 1985, that the committee 
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had unanimously agreed to set up an unofficial and widely 
representative" committee in Hong Kong to collect and collate 
public opinion and advise the BLOC on the opinions of the people 
of Hong Kong (The Basic Law Consultative Committee: BLCC). 
Initially there was confusion about whether the BLOC would be 
appointed by the National People's Congress or by the BLOC, and it 
was eventually announced that the Hong Kong members of the BLOC 
and two officials from Xinhua would appoint members oy 'democratic 
consultation', recommendation, and invitation, although reserving 
the right to veto recommendations. Members of the BLOC would be 
able to sit on both committees. The (Beijing-appointed) members of 
the BLOC were to select the group with the task of collecting, 
analyzing and representing Hong Kong opinion. 
This system of seiection brought strong, negative public 
reaction and Immediate Questions from Hong Kong pressure groups 
regarding tne independence from Peking and tne weight of tne BLC. 
Some adopted a stance of resigned acceptance to the inevitably 
increasing influence of the NCNA in Hong Kong. 
Despite the reservations about the selection procedures, the 
announcement of the creation of a BLOC set off a period of hectic 
campaigning by groups and individuals, a type of political 
activity unusual in its intensity and scope in Hong Kong. The goal 
was representation on the committee, responding to the early 
perception that the Basic Law could be shaped in Hong Kong for 
Hong Kong. There was an early, lively effort to ensure that this 
committee provide a forum for real Hong Kong representafivPs. 
Eventually one hundred and fifty Hong Kong people were 
appointed (of whom nine were Educators). There was a mixed 
WML 
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reaction to the initial make-up of this group because 
representation from the grassroots element was comparatively low. 
Thirty more places were later alloted to provide places for more 
members of Hong Kong's political establisnment, but also to 
provide places for local members of the National People's Congress 
and the ONPOC. 
The committee immediately plunged itself in to yet more 
controversy when it began the task of selecting its standing 
committee. Ignoring its own constitution, which specifies that 
members shall be selected 'through consultation and election", the 
group approved, without election, the single slate of nominees 
presented for the posts. In addition to the fact that this 
violated the constitution, many of the new standing committee 
could be considered to be primarily accountable to Beijing, either 
because they have been appointed by the National People's Congress 
or because tney are local deputies of the National People's 
Congress or OPPOC. Since, again by constitution, the standing 
committee has "...full autnority to carry out the affairs of the 
consultative committee when it is not in session"(69), its make-up 
was seen to be nighly important. 
All six members of the Drafting Committee who held membership 
on the Consultative committee were selected to the standing 
committee. Predictably, public confidence in the BLOC plummeted in 
the light of the twin faults of the committee ignoring the rule of 
(its own) law, and the decidedly pro-Peking bent of the standing 
committee. 
The feeling that the PRO was 'orchestrating the whole 
works'(70) was expressed by both English-language newspapers. The 
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Hong Kong Standard stated that "...the centre of power is 
obviously swayed to the Chinese side,"(71) Lord Kadoorie, albeit 
indirectly and almost certainly unintentionally, supported this 
view by explaining that he was probably chosen to be on the BLCC 
because China. believed that his past experience would be useful to 
the committee(72. 
The fact that, after public argument conducted largely in the 
media, the PRC recognized the "desirability of a formal 
territory-wide consultative committee"(73) and agreed to the 
establishment of the BLCC to collect public opinion on the Basic 
Law, suggests the degree to which public salience of the '1997' 
issue had developed. The prominent media coverage given to the 
forceful manouvering by the PRC to obtain control of the 
committee, and the Hong Kong Government's use of the media to 
influence public opinion about the events relating to '1997'(74) 
show the effectiveness of the media in the development of this 
issue. 
Despite this, the events, highly public, from July to 
December, 1985 provided an unpleasant glimpse into the future for 
those staying in Hong Kong. The elements of election by 
nomination, closed-door consultations, and built-in veto, conflict 
with the promise of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" with "a 
high degree of autonomy". The BLOC greatly discredited itself in 
the opinion of the people, and it seems likely that many people 
ultimately concluded that Beijing has indeed already made up its 
mind about the details of the HKSAR. By the end of the year most 
of the initial enthusiasm had given way to "enhanced nervousness' 
and 'revived and accentuated... foreboding"(75). 
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Content of the Basic Law 
Miners suggested that "... the Drafting Committee will not 
have an easy task"(76) because the JD has not been comprehensive 
or specific in its description of the system of laws and 
government for the HKSAR. There are four crucial areas which need 
to be resolved by tne Basic Law: (1) Law and the definition of 
Human Rignts within tne HKSAR, (2) the political relationship 
between the HKSAR and Beijing - including the issue of the degree 
of autonomy. (3) the structure and composition of tne government 
of the SAR (encompassing the issue of pre-1997 political reform in 
Hong Kong), and (4) residuary powers: the powers not mentioned in 
the Basic Law. Discussion of these issues in Hong Kong elicits, 
firstly, a great deal of confusion because of many conflicting 
signals from Beijing regarding their resolution, and secondly, 
fear that when decisions are announced, Hong Kong will have lost 
much of the social security it has had under colonial 
administration. Whether these are questions that will be answered 
through tne process of writing the Basic Law, or whether 
fundamental decisions have already Peen made in tne PRC concerning 
these points is not clear. The following analysis of these issues 
attempts to explain their fundamental connection to the Quality of 
life in the future HKSAR. 
1. Law and the Definition of Human Rights 
Because the Basic Law has been described as the 
constitutional instrument of the HKSAR, outlining legislation and 
implementing the one country/two systems intention while keeping 
tne spirit of the Joint Declaration, its treatment of the legal 
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system is of great concern to Hong Kong. Mr. Henry Litton QC wrote 
that the Chinese law and the English-based law of Hong Kong were 
incompatible. Noting that Hong Kong had English Common Law, 
guaranteeing individual personal liberty, freedom of the judiciary 
from political pressure, predictability of the legal consequences 
of behaviour, and ready access to courts and legal representation, 
he emphasized the advantage to Hong Kong that countries with 
contacts with Hong Kong understand this system better than they do 
the Chinese Law. The business community has had more experience 
with it and consequently more confidence in the system(77). 
The Attorney General of Hong Kong described the binding link 
between capitalism and the concepts of the common law. The 
success ...is founded upon...the Common Law, upon free enterprise 
and free trade...the freedom of individuals to move about,...to 
choose their own occupation. And the cultural and social life... is 
founded upon...oersonal freedom, freedom of 
belief,...speech,...the press"(78). 
Liu Yiu-Chu, Hong Kong lawyer and member of the BLDG, 
described the importance of the legal system in determining the 
success of the 'one/two' system. In her view, it is important to 
prevent 'blurring' of the two systems of law within the one 
nation. Loss of separation between the two systems can occur both 
unintentionally, as through, for example, the use of inappropriate 
language, or intentionally, by ignoring the fundamental 
differences between the two systems in areas of ownership, rights 
and duties of citizens, and social values. Areas of the law in the 
latter areas differ between the PRC and Hong Kong because they are 
linked to the local social and economic system and will require 
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careful treatment to demonstrate that two distinct and separate 
legal systems do exist within one nation. She describes the 
linguistic danger to the intent of the law, if legal terminology 
from the socialist legal system is borrowed when translating Hong 
Kong laws into Chinese. In this way, courts interpreting the laws 
in reacning judgements, will "...inject "socialist" 
economic-social values into the Hong Kong (or SAR) capitialist 
legal system unintentionally"(79). 
Apprehension and controversy have surrounded the issue of 
which of the present laws will be preserved in the Basic Law. In 
order to ensure that many of the present laws will not conflict 
with the BL, activity has oegun to adapt them - and the lawyers 
who implement them - to the needs of a changed Hong Kong. The 
(relative) number of local Chinese lawyers in Chambers has doubled 
since 1981, and the government has adjusted its policy to staff 
the Attorney General's office with mainly local lawyers(80). 
Localisation of Hong Kong laws began in August 1986, when the 
first set of Br. tisn laws dealing with civil aviation, merchant 
snipping and admiralty jurisdiction was enacted as Hong Kong law. 
Before 1997, approximately 120 laws currently binding under 
British sovereignity will have to De locally enacted. 
In order to preserve judicial independence and prevent 
political manipulation of judges, the government has issued 
directives to leading judicial officers to take steps to create a 
judiciary which is truly independent of the government(81). Hong 
Kong now follows that English tradition of unwritten judicial 
independence, whereas, in the PRC, judges are not independent, but 
rather closely representative of party policies. There is doubt as 
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to whether China will be able to grasp the concept of judicial 
independence. 
Although the importance of maintaining the existing legal 
system is widely agreed upon, some recent events cause doubt about 
its feasibility. Rumours about the imminent or planned migration 
of many lawyers(82) give cause for doubt that it will be possibi„e 
to maintain the present system. There have been reports(83) th..Rt 
few students were interested in studying law at present because of 
the feeling that the qualification would be useless after 1997. 
Many analysts can for a clear description in the Basic Law 
of the rights and freedoms which Hong Kong people will enjoy after 
1997. There is a fundamental difference between the present 
philosophy in Hong Kong, which regards individual rights as basic 
and to be carefully protected from state interference, and that 
described in the Chinese constitution, which states that the state 
grants freedoms and rights and that their exercise must not 
infringe on tne interests of the state(84). The Hong Kong 
residents, in particular, have therefore shown great concern over 
the possible loss of tne rights they now enjoy. A Bill of Rights 
in the Basic Law to define rights and freedoms, and empower the 
courts to enforce them has been called for (85). 
2. Political Relationship between the Hong KSAR and tne PRC 
and 
3. The Composition of the HKSAR Government 
A difficult area which has attracted the attention of lawyers 
and politicians is that of defining clearly the power relationship 
between the HKSAR and Beijing to prevent political manoeuvring. As 
one political columnist noted that without "... a clear concept of 
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separation of authority in the power structure, it would be 
difficult to outline in detail the relationship between the 
Beijing and SAR authorities"(86). 
The Joint Declaration states: The HKSAR will be directly 
under the authority of the CPG of the PRC. Tne HKSAR will enjoy a 
high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs 
which are the responsibility of the CPG"(87). A precise 
definition of 'highly autonomous' is regarded as a very delicate 
issue - the key objective is to preserve tne intention of the 
Joint Declaration which seems to promise local administration, but 
avoid encroaching on China's sovereignity, thereby provoking 
intervention. 
The slogan, 'Hong Kong People administering Hong Kong', was 
part of a sixteen character slogan widely quoted in Hong Kong 
summarizing the Joint Declaration. Reassurance tnat this is indeed 
the intention of the PRC would increase confidence in the future. 
However, the fears that the PRC would interfere after 1997 have 
Peen neightened by statements such as that made by Mr. Lu Ping, 
that the "spirit" of the concept of 'Hong Kong people 
administering Hong Kong'will be written in legal terms into tne 
Basic Law, and adding that the expression itself can only be 
verbal (88). 
Mr. Ji Pengfei, China's Sate Councillor in charge of Hong 
Kong affairs, was described as having set the upper limit for 
autonomy: "The central government will administer the SAP in four 
areas - defence, foreign affairs, the Basic Law and the 
appointment of the SAR's chief executive - the symbolic figure 
standing for the central government(89). But undefined areas 
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related to the degree of autonomy remain. Among tnese are the 
right to interpretation and the right to amendment. 
One analyst suggested that the one/two system would fail if  
the PRO exercised the right to rule on individual cases, and, 
describing the issue as 'pivotal', called for the power of 
interpretation of the Basic Law to go to Hong Kong (90) as 
promised in the Joint Declaration. The problem of distinguishing 
between the 'judicial' and 'legislative' power of the 
interpretation has emerged. Early in the discussions Beijing 
announced that Hong Kong courts would be allowed the judicial 
power of interpreting the Basic Law after 1997(91) but also 
maintained that it is "...rightfully in the bounds of the Central 
Sovernment to judge local legislative and/or administrative acts 
to see if they go beyond (the promised) autonomy...to check on any 
broadening of autonomy which eroded the power of the PRC"(92). 
The importance attributed to giving Hong Kong a right to 
contribute to making ammendments is, then, that since the Basic 
Law will be enacted by the National People's Congress, presumably 
any amendments will go through the Chinese legislature. However, 
doubts have been expressed on whether China might abuse the power 
for political ends if it has the sole power over amendments, and, 
therefore, proposals have been made to give Hong Kong the right to 
'initiate amendments or be fully consulted if the initiation comes 
from BeiAing..."(93). 
4. Residual Powers 
The argument over the exercise of residual powers was 
resolved in the second meeting of the BLDC with a compromise. 'The 
National People's Congress and the State Council will authorise 
58 
the SAR to exercise other duties and powers" other than those 
stipulated in the Basic Law. This gives Hong Kong authority to 
make decisions on residual powers, but also carries a safeguard 
should the FRC feel its sovereign rights are in danger of being 
eroded. 
The Issue of Reforms to the Hong Kong Government 
Chief Secretary Sir David Akers-Jones said that developing 
'...the Hong Kong system of government will perhaps be the 
greatest challenge because there are no precedents for what has to 
be accomplished, no texts of political theory which apply, and no 
models..,[the task is to] take the present colonial system, adapt 
and mould it so Hong Kong will pass through 1997 without 
dislocation in its social, economic, or political 
organization"(94). He described the desirable system as meeting 
tne hopes of local people and providing a nigh degree of autonomy. 
The PRC government voiced their opposition to changes to the 
existing governmental and political system before the transfer(95) 
but, despite this, the issue of reforms to the existing system in 
order to prepare it for local administration has been in tne 
forefront of discussions in the media. The nature and extent of 
the reforms is very controversial and the public depate has 
contributed to the tense atmosphere in the colony. 
The Joint Declaration provides that 
The chief executive of the HKSAR shail be 
selected by election through consultations 
held locally and be appointed by the CEG. 
Principal officials (equivalent to 
Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief 
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executive of HKSAR and appointed by the CPG. 
The legislature of the HKSAR shall be 
constituted by elections. The executive 
authorities shall abide by the law and shall 
be accountable to the legislative(96) 
This seems to provide for a more democratic form of 
government after 1997 than Hong Kong has had under colonial rule, 
and consequently there were soon many calls in Hong Kong for more 
local participation in government, in order, firstly, to have in 
place a proven system of government at the time of the takeover, 
and secondly, to develop a pool of experienced local people able 
to deal with government after the colonial administrators leave. 
J. Cheng notes that particularly the younger generation have Peen 
demanding the right of political participation, "...arguing that 
only an elected government can effectively promote the interests 
of the people ana maintain Hong Kong's international status"(97). 
J. Cheng warns that the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong 
depend to a great extent on the commitment of youth to Hong Kong. 
This commitment would be strengthened by satisfaction of their 
demand for increased local participation(98). 
The British government issued a 1984 Green Paper on 
Democratic Reform in Hong Kong, announcing a 1987 review of 
options for political reform with the aim of developing political 
institutions in Hong Kong in order to give the locals 
opportunities to 'practise' self-government before 1997, 
eventually developing a highly autonomous political system in 
accordance with the spirit of the Joint Declaration. Subsequent 
actions, however, suggest that their initial commitment to further 
development of political reforms has weakeneo. 
There has been resistance to the reforms outlined in the 
Green Paper from several quarters - both internal and external, 
all of which have been given extensive media coverage. Beijing was 
critical of the proposals(99) and Mr. Xu Jiatun reminded Hong Kong 
that there was only one fundamental principle to uphold: support 
the capitalist system for the next 62 years, changes should, 
therefore, be carefully considered - and gradual 	 Mr. ji 
Pengfei, speaking at a meeting of the BLDC, said tnat Hong Kong 
could have prosperity and stability but not prosperity and 
reformation (101). The SCMP described a message sent from China 
'tnrough channels' to proponents of the one person, one vote' 
that it was unhappy with the latest political developments, and 
included a warning that they were detrimental to the transfer of 
power. The method of choosing officials by democratic consultation 
was preferable, in the opinion of the PRC, to universal 
elerflons(107). Local capitalists and industrialists, upon whose 
confidence continued prosperity depends, and Hong Kong BLDG 
members warned of the danger of democratic reforms bringing on 
'social disorder' and jeopardizing tne territory's prosperity and 
stability (103). Finally, a leading leftwing paper emphasized that 
rights over Hong Kong were returning to China, not to the Hong 
Kong people(104). 
In a news conference on November 22, 1985, given prominent 
and extensive coverage, Mr. Xu Jiatun indirectly criticized Great 
Britain for departing from the principles of the Joint Declaration 
by initiating political reforms, and stated that political reforms 
might mean trouble for Hong Kong. Great Britain has stated that 
Hong Kong's political system was a matter for Britain oefore 1997, 
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whereas the Chinese are looking for continuity before and after 
1997. People's worries about a smooth transition were renewed, as 
China's unnappiness with the development of representative 
government sePq1a6 to indicate that a different system would 
eventually be implemented. The stock market dropped 49 points in 
one day. 
The ensuing weeks were among the most nervous Hong Kong has 
experienced, for these messages from China were followed by a 
concessionary speech by Akers-Jones in which he expressed 
skepticism about modelling Hong Kong on the one person/one vote 
system, as there was no support in Hong Kong for direct 
elections(105). Soon after this speech, there was a warning from 
China of 'chaos" if there were changes in the political system 
incompatible with the Basic Law during the run-up to 1997(106). 
Although polls consistently show that a majority support 
direct elections(107), the PRC consistently states that political 
reforms should converge with the Basic Law. However, waiting until 
the early 1990's to introduce direct elections would not offer 
enough time for the "practice' of democracy and the development of 
experienced politicians. 
Miners has concluded that no changes will be made to the 
existing system in the run-up to 1997(108). China is against 
political reforms in Hong Kong. The Chinese have never had a 
Western-style democracy and, ideologically, they have rejected the 
system. In Hong Kong, however, they are forced to deal with the 
issue very carefully as the initial moves toward reform were made 
by a well-intentioned Hong Kong government and seem to be what the 
Hong Kong people want. They must simultaneously consider the 
threat from some in the Pusiness community that if grassroots 
democracy movements are given power, they would leave Hong 
Kong(109). These factors, combined with their own fears that 
democracy in Hong Kong would "...bring power to the free-lunch 
brigade, those who squander money to satiate electorate's 
demands"(110), force the PRC to step very carefully indeed around 
this issue. 
The Hong Kong Government eventually narrowed the aims of tne 
review of representative government. The limited brief avoios  
several issues such as the autonomous position of the governor 
and the formation and powers of Executive Council which is the 
highest policy making body) "...which might bring Britain into 
direct confrontation with China"(111). Worry is growing that the 
eventual reforms will be little more than window dressing (112). 
The Governor of Hong Kong, addressing the opening of the 1986/87 
Legislative Council , stated "Experience over the last year suggest 
that this structure [i.e. the existing] is serving Hong Kong 
well"(113). Such comments heighten the scepticism and concern of 
reformers and of the population at large. 
In summary, the drafting of the Basic Law and makeup of its 
committees, as well as the local political activity to gain places 
on these cnmmittes, 'became public issues through the extensive 
publicity they received. The salience of these issues and events 
changed the local political environment by forcing Hong Kong 
residents to react to these issues by increasing their political 
participation in the events. They perceived that the writing of 
the Basic Law is an extremely significant process. The make-up of 
the committees writing the law has been very controversial: Hong 
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Kong Residents became aware of the urgency of sufficient local 
representation on the committees, and the PRC were careful to 
include representation from the Party. Therefore, negotiations for 
committee membership heightened public awareness of, and political 
involvement in, the '1997' debate. The fierce campaigning within 
local interest groups to potain a place on the committee achieved 
some favourable results for local politicians. For, apparently in 
response to the polictical activity, the FRC appeared aware of the 
necessity to take steps to calm Hong Kong jitters, and concessions 
were made to increase local representation during the initial 
planning stages. 
V BACKROUND OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA 
All the detailed tensions (for example over the Basic Law) 
which have been discussed in the previous analysis are, of course, 
predicated on anxieties about the political, economic and 
sociological discontinuities of tne PRO amd Hong Kong. Before 
:beginning the studies of the two societies, it is useful to 
present an analytical overview of their relationship. This linkage 
section has two functions: to reintroduce the comparative element 
of the thesis through analysis of the relationship between Hong 
Kong and China and to emphasize the complexity of the historical 
and existing relationships and thereby further explain the issues 
involved in merger. 
First, there is a discussion of the areas in wnich Hong Kong 
and China have expediently converged: economically and socially. 
H.A.Turner noted "Throughout its history since 1843, the 
development of Hong Kong has been...intimately connected with and 
influenced by its connection with the great continental society of 
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China, by alternate conflict ano rapprochement underlaid by a 
continuing commercial and cultural reciprocity"(114). 
Secondly, there is a description of the areas in which they 
have historically diverged: in their political and economic 
systems. Although both sections deal mainly with occurences after 
WWII, earlier periods are discussed and for this reason the PRC 
will be referred to as China. 
ConvetIgence 
'toungson described the economic relationsnip: 
The network of (economic) connections 
is...far more extensive and more complex than 
is usually stretched across any frontier. Hong 
Kong and China are inseparable, strange as the 
relationship must in some ways be between a 
gigantic, poor, centralized, professedly 
egalitarian and predominantly rural economy 
and tiny, capitalist, free-wheeling and 
relatively rich Hong Kong. It is a curious 
play of contradictions and advantages...(115). 
Hong Kong has experienced remarkable economic growth since 
the early 1950's and, of the many contributory historical, 
geographic, and cultural factors, its proximity to China emerges 
as the pivotal factor. Across the border, as a result of change 
and uoneavai in China, an influx of human resources, business, and 
capital arrived to power the growth - accompanied by a reliable 
supply of nPrPssities to fuel it. The necessitites included 
supplies of food, water and natural resources which were 
available, often at prices lower than the world market, exempting 
Hong Kong from inflation during its period of greatest economic 
growth (116). Noting that China provides up to 50% of Hong Kong's 
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food and water, and much of the petroleum and yarn supply, A. 
Youngson comments on this aspect of the relationship: '[the] 
goodwill of China and the state of the Chinese economy 
are...always matters of the utmost importance for Hong 
Kong...'(117). 
C. Howe suggests that the flow of human resources and skills 
from China into Hong Kong is one of four main categories in which 
the economic links should be analyzed(118). Among the immigrants 
were many capitalists from Shanghai escaping the Communist 
takeover. They brought capital, expertise and Chinese business 
traditions, all of which contributed to Hong Kong's rapid 
development as a manufacturing economy. The process has been 
described as '...simply a transfer of economic activity from one 
industrial centre to another...'(119). Benefits from this transfer 
remain. Describing the current business relationship, an analyst 
wrote 'While most foreign businessmen remain confused by the 
gigantic, complicated Chinese trading bureaucracy, shrewd Hong 
Kong businessmen have been able to go in and out of the system and 
cut out profitable deals"(120). 
At the same time as the Shanghai migrations, other Chinese, 
poorer and less-skilled, migrated, providing a labour force for 
the new manufacturers (121). This influx, which began in 
substantial numbers at the end of the Chinese Civil war, has yet 
to be significantly reversed. Because of this, China's human 
contribution to the development of Hong Kong is greater than the 
reverse, which is just beginning, and is taking a different form 
of transfer of skills through investment by Hong Kong firms in 
China, and through contacts between (educational) 
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institutions(122). 
Howe's second category for ana;ysis of economic links between 
Hong Kong and the PRC is visible trade. A trade relationship has 
existed between the two since WWII, and originally consisted 
primarily of the PRC exporting goods to Hong Kong, its largest 
export market. However, since its new open-door economic policy 
began, the ties have multiplied and China has become one of the 
largest markets for Hong Kong goods. It has been argued about the 
the relationship tnat it 	 is difficult to imagine a more 
satisfactory bilateral business relationship... "(123). Hong Kong 
is the second largest trading partner of the PRC (after Japan), 
and the PRC has recently overtaken the US to become Hong Kong's 
largest trading partner(124). 
Since the late 1970's, Hong Kong has resumed its original 
role as entrepot for China: the PRC has become, since 1960, both 
the largest market for, and the largest source of, re-exports from 
Hong Kong(125). P. Jacobs comments that this contradicts 
predictions that as China developed economic relationships with 
the rest of the world Hong Kong's role in the PRC's foreign trade 
would diminish. He attrioutes the renewed status of Hong Kong as 
entrepot to the "...acute infrastructure problems, notanle in 
transport and communications...(in the PRC). The managers of the 
Chinese economy '...know that they can either find or obtain 
rapidly througn Hong Kong anything they need...'(126). China has 
been the net beneficiary of visible trade because it 
"...consistently has a trade surplus with Hong Kong [providing] a 
major source of foreign exchange earnings to finance imports of 
technological and capital equipment required by the four 
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modernizations"(127). 
Commenting on the irony of a situation in which Hong Kong 
wants China to keep a distance from the colony's politics out is 
profiting from renewed closeness in economic relationships, the 
expanding trade relationship has been described: "Like a strong 
centripedal force, the burgeoning China trade has pulled Hong 
Kong...cIoser tnan ever to China's economy... . by virtue of 
...obvious reasons, there seems no otner course for Hong Kong but 
to make the most profit out of it"(128). 
Howe's third category is invisible payments (cash remittances 
by Hong Kong residents to their dependents in China; tourism; 
profits from investments by corporations, industry, and banks; 
advertising, etc.). Hong Kong appears to be a net exporter of 
these services to the ERC(129). 
The fourth category is direct investment interests - both 
China in Hong Kong and Hong Kong in China, primarily in the SEZ's, 
and in residential developments elsewhere. since the late 1970's, 
the activities of the PRC investing in Hong Kong have expanded and 
existing ones increased(130). They have moved for the first time 
into property, stockbroking, foreign exchange dealing and 
manufacturing(131). Jacobs suggests reasons for the new ventures: 
opportunity to earn foreign exchange, practice for Chinese 
companies and staff in the skills needed for international 
trading'  opportunity to acquire real estate and hotel management 
know - how, and lastly, transfer of techonology and manufacturing 
skills to China through investment in the manufacturing 
sector(132). 
The Hong Kong business community has substantial investments 
68 
in residential areas in China, and accounts for 90% of the SEZ 
total foreign investment(133). It is the latter group of 
investments which may prove more significant in determining the 
nature of the economic relationship if the PRC intends, as many 
analysts are predicting, to develop a 'single great megalopolis' 
in the area around Hong Kong, Macau and Canton(134). (At least one 
analyst has speculated about China's plans for a"...strong, 
technologically advanced economic region ...stretching from 
Shanghai ...Eto provinces adjoining Hong Kong3...and encompassing 
Hong Kong"(135). The economic success of the Shenzhen SEZ has 
meant that Hong Kong money has had a direct impact on the standard 
of living of this area of China, raising it to almost three times 
that of most of China and providing employment opportunities in  
manufacturing in many small, previously depressed 
villages(136)(137). 
The assets of Hong Kong which are potentially most useful to 
the PRC are the harbour and container port, the well-developed 
trading and other commercial links with the rest of the world, the 
well-developed infrastructure in transport and communication, 
which the PRC lacks, and the financial and related services in 
Hong Kong which no city in the PRC can equal. The transfer of 
technology to the PRC through Hong Kong is ongoing, and the 
educated skilled and labour force,with origins in Chinat possess 
the expertise to contribute to the modernization of China. 
Socio-Cultural Convergence 
The labour force from China accounts for the second major 
area of convergence: the social and cultural aspects of the 
respective societies. The social connection is perhaps the 
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strongest because both cultures stem from traditional Chinese 
society which they have adapted to the 20th century. Only 57% of 
Hong Kong residents were born there, and many of tne rest are 
first generation(138). The British colonial system has given them 
the freedom to determine tneir own cultural and social life(139), 
and tne Hong Kong people have maintained close cultural ties with 
China. Hong Kong residents, particularly those with recent ties to 
China, often describe themselves according to the place of origin 
in China of their families, and links of feelings of loyalty, 
social connections and business relationships persist between Hong 
Kong and China. 
Turner has described (in Hong Kong) 
a network of Peking-orientated 
associations and agencies, which include 
trading, commerical amd financial 
organizations, cultural societies, 
businessmens' associations and clubs, 
educational bodies, some clan and 
neighborhood associations, voluntary services, 
information agencies, and so on. It is at 
least a reasonably supposition that they are 
linked...by a combination of national pride 
with interest and prudence, also...by a 
leavening of Communist Party membership, and 
in some cases by more formal links with the 
Province of Canton's Party(140). 
China, for its part, has pointedly never termed the Chinese 
of Hong Kong as 'overseas Chinese '^ but refers to them as 'home 
Chinese. . 
In summary, the socio-cultural convergence has resulted from 
the fact that 98% of the inhabitants of Hong Kong are Chinese. 
They retain many cultural and familial links with China. 
Political Divergence 
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In contrast to these strong links, there are significant 
areas of divergence between Hong Kong and the PRC. Anayisis of the 
areas in which they have diverged begins with the differences in 
their governmental and political systems. The depth of this 
divergence is best described in a statement by several members of 
Hong Kong's Legislative ano Exer . utive Councils: "The inescapable 
fact is that the Chinese Government is committed to a political 
philosophy which is at least incompatible, and at worst hostile, 
to the philosophy on which the various systems and freedoms 
enjoyed by Hong Kong..,rest"(141). 
Since the 19th century Hong Kong has enjoyed political 
stability and security because of two historically-determined and 
interlocking factors. The first is the non-interventionist 
philosophy of its colonial government, so non-interventionist that 
it leo one observer of the Hong Kong scene to write: "What is 
remarkaole about Hong Kong is that tne governmental institutions 
are generally irrelevant to politics... . My own description of 
Hong Kong in fact is that it is an administrative no-party 
state"(142). Traditional political institutions, parliament, 
legislative assemblies, parties, have not emerged as part of the 
governing proces in Hong Kong, but rather the colony is run by a 
series of bureaucratic institutions grafted onto government(143). 
The Governor, Executive Council and Legislative Council are 
distanced politically from the social and economic life of the 
public and their 'power' is strictly limited by law(144). 
There is, however, political activity in Hong Kong. It has 
been suggested that "...political activity is inevitable in all 
free countries where individuals and groups are at iiperty to 
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organize in order to press their demands against other groups or 
against government"(145). However, in Hong Kong, that activity has 
not been organized by political parties, but has been 
issue-directed and carried out by individuals or self-interest 
groups reacting to a specific governmental decree(146). The 
political formula in Hong Kong consists of a political arrangment 
of decision and dialogue as between the bureaucracy and a strongly 
entrenched Plitc. and interest groups"(147). 
A second factor explaining the political stability is the 
acceptance by the governed of the government. Youngson(148) 
rnmmPnts on the link between the refugee backround of the Hong 
Kong people and their contribution to making Hong Kong 'work' 
politically. Youngson suggests that, upon entering industrial 
employment in Hong Kong, many refugees felt that they were rising 
in tne world and that their standard of living was much better 
than that across the border. Eager to work for their wages, and 
relieved to be free of the political impositions in China, they 
were not 'distressed' by inequalities in Hong Kong, and have been 
satisfied, for the most part, to remain uninvolved in 
government(149). 
Ironically, the PRC has also had an indirect input into 
political stability in Hong Kong: intermittent local calls for 
changes in government policies have been countered by statements 
from the Hong Kong Government that China would object to such 
changes, and that Chinese objections should not be ignored. 
In contrast to Hong Kong, although governed by just one party 
since its founding, the FRC has experienced profound swings in the 
political arena and the policy is determinedly interventionist. 
72 
Hong Kong and the PRC remained so different and separate 
politically that very few of the upheavals in China have had 
negative effects on Hong Kong government or politics, the 
spillover from the GPCR in 1967 being the most notorious 
exception. On the contrary, it might be said that Hong Kong has 
henPfittPd from the differences because it has peen perceived as a 
secure refuge for people  	 the instability and 
interventionist philosopnies of the government in the PRO. 
Economic Divergence 
The divergence of tneir respective economic systems is also 
extreme. No sharper contrast in economic policies anmd economic 
performance can be found than in the side-by-side comparison of 
the incredibly successful record of Hong Kong's freemarket economy 
and the dismal results of the command and control system of 
economic management employed by its colossal communist 
neighbor"(150). China, perhaps in an attempt to offset this kind 
of unfavourable comparison, until recently used the term 
"Hongkongism' as an term of abuse :1 ...levied against tnose [in 
the PRC] woo wanted its affluent lifestyle"(151). 
The Hong Kong economy has thrived in an exceptional set of 
historical circumstances. Financially autonomous from GB since 
1958, it has inherited both a colonial government whose 
fundamental purpose has been '...to provide the best possible 
enviroment for a laissez-faire economy"(152) and a work force 
wnose "refugee mentality of deep anxiety" drove them to want to 
achieve(153). "Measured by most accepted indicators, Hong Kong 
Qualifies as a newly industrialized region"(154). 'Hong Kong's 
enterprises are privately owned; their profits are used for 
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private oenefit, with a proportion being remitted overseas'(155). 
During the period of Hong Kong's great expansion, China had a 
government committed to a centrally-controlled socialism and a 
government which pursued a variety of economic policies - 
relatively unsuccessful in attracting investment funds from tne 
international community or in sparking initigi4O. within its own 
business community. The PRO has experienced profound economic 
unrest since 1949, as development plan after development plan has 
resulted in chaos rather than growth and quickly abandoned. 
Although China appears to have adopted a more stable and realistic 
programme since the late 1970's and is attracting more foreign 
interest and investment, the standard of living in China remains 
far below that of Hong Kong. 
Altnough in both Hong Kong and China, the performance of the 
economic sector has been a central concern of government, and the 
governments' economic ooiicies have been heid accountable for 
economic performance, in one case the link between government and 
economy is maximumally interventionist, and has had negative 
effects, and in the other the design is minimal intervention, witn 
highly positive effects. 
Many Hong Kong people feel pride in the recent achievments of 
China, but polls do not reveal a desire to adopt the Chinese 
system. Indeed, an 'unease' in Hong Kong resulting from recent 
closer economic ties with China has emerged. "Their foremost 
concern is that Chinese domination will unleash undesirable 
factors - such as favouritism and corruption - tnat usually go 
nand in hand with absolute power"(156). The article continues to 
give examples of rules already being bent to accomodate Chinese 
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needs and examples of Hong Kong people 'pending over backwards to 
piPa'afa' the Chinese. 
In summary, despite the differences in the ideology of their 
respective economic systems, Hong Kong and China have converged 
economically due to their proximity, the need of Hong Kong for an 
expanded labour force as well as a site for investment, and the 
need of China for expertise and capital which are available in 
Hong Kong. There are also similarities in the social systems, but 
the political differences are dramatic. Hong Kong, as one of the 
last remaining colonies, has benefitted from the political 
philosophy of its rulers: non-interventionism during the years 
that the citizens of China have had to adapt to government which 
gained more and more control over all aspects of the lives of 
individuals. 
VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Because of events of 140 years ago and because of present 
economic realities, sovereignity over an established, prosperous 
community of 5,500,000 people will be transfered by a democratic 
country to a country governed by a one-party, repressive system. 
This transfer poses problems for Hong Kong; to retain any of their 
present social and economic advantages they must seek ways to 
merge with the PRO and so adapt to its needs and goals that they 
become useful to it, while not threatening it. The PRO and the UK 
have guaranteed, in the terms of the Joint Declaration, that the 
present lifestyle will be preserved, out the people of Hong Kong 
nave generally viewed these guarantees of the PRO and the UK with 
concern. 
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The Basic Law is being written to provide a constitution and 
Hong Kong Residents hope tnat the Basic Law will resolve the 
issues of the Law, Human Rights, and also outline the political 
reiationsnin which will exist between HKSAR and the PRC. Despite 
the facts that Hong Kong has been a British colony for 140 years 
and that China has undergone profound social , economic and 
political upheavals during that period, relationships witn tne PRC 
have never been completely severed. Although there are significant 
differences in their economic and political systems, strong 
economic and cultural links remain. 
In conclusion, tension has arisen because of uncertainty 
about the various issues involved in transfer. These issues, which 
have been become highly prominent in this decade, will be resolved 
by interaction between three separate agents. Firstly, Hong Kong 
will itself play a. significant role in tne outcome. Piers Jacobs, 
present Financial Secretary, suggests that "Hong Kong's continuing 
success...depends on the attitude of the Hong Kong people...". He 
continues that they must "...remain confident in their future and 
prepared to grasp the opportunities that the agreement 
provides"(157). Questions about whether Hong Kong can mobilize 
politically and develop local leaders by 1957, about whether it 
will be able to administer itself, and how successfully it will 
continue to attract international business are relevant. Hong 
Kong's prosperity has resulted from factors which, indeed, 
differentiate it from China its educationa, economic, social 
systems. Many question whether these systems will retain their 
integrity. In addition, worries about now many skilled Hong Kong 
residents will emigrate are often heard bro+essionais In commerce 
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and industry, public and social services, people crucial to its 
relationship with the international community and with China, 
appear to be at risk. 
Secondly, the actions and attitudes of the FRC will determine 
the fate of Hong Kong. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, 
doubts whether China will be able to keep several of the 
commitments have emerged. Uncertainty about whether or not the 
'one-country, two- systems' plan will work is a major concern. 
Although in the past, acceptance of the significant economic 
differences oetween Hong Kong and China was possible within tne 
framework of different political systems, grassroots Chinese 
tolerance for the disparity in freedoms and affluence may 
diminish(158). 
Related is the question of how well China understands the 
relationship between the free market system of Hong Kong and the 
freedoms of thought and speech which nourish it. Young is 
pessimistic about this: 	 The Chinese view of capitalism-in-Hong 
Kong Cis of] a basically economic and functional structure"(159). 
He adds that China ignores the integral political and social 
dimension of the economic life of Hong Kong. There are questions 
about whether this lack of understanding will lead to China 
feeling threatened by Hong Kong and wanting increasingly more 
control over it. 
The future of internal Chinese politics is significant. 
Although it is easily demonstrated that it is in the interest of 
China that Hong Kong prosper, doubt remains about the nature of 
Chinese policies after the departure of Deng. 
Deng has summed up his own attitude towards this question 
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when responding to Questions about the prospective durability of 
the Hong Kong policy. His response was to ask why anyone would 
cnange a policy which has proven correct. But, as early as 1983, 
the FEER sounded a skeptical note about the consistency of the 
current modernization policies of the Central People's government, 
and nhred that since the majority of mainlanders lacked confidence 
in their durability), there is reason for Hong Kong residents to 
have some doubts about those policies(160)(161). 
The third role will be played by the international business 
community. Although the conditions described in the Joint 
Declaration are encouraging, and Hong Kong has proven itself 
capable of generating considerable profits, confidence is very 
fragile. Some major Hangs have already, or are in the process of, 
establishing overseas headquarters and plan to begin diversifying 
their portfolios outside of Hong Kong. There is a great deal of 
speculation that these moves indicate a lacK of confidence in the 
colony among the major Hongs (162). Unless foreign and local 
investment in Hong Kong continue to grow, tne best efforts of. the 
Hong Kong people combined with stability and committment from the 
FRC will not be enough. 
This complex political and economic transfer, as well as the 
events surrounding the drafting of the terms of transfer, i.e. the 
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, have been given extensive 
media coverage in Hong Kong. The public discussion of all these 
issues has had two effects on Hong Kong. Firstly, it has made the 
issue highly visible to residents. Secondly, from this salience 
has emerged a more politicized society, more convinced of need to 
explore metnoos of ensuring their personal futures in a 
potentially limiting situation. 
This chapter, then, has identified the increasing salience of 
the public 'problem of merger and nas sketched, in the penultimate 
section, some of the structural sources of the public problem. It 
is now time to develop a more systematic and more deeply analytic 
definition of the contradictions, convergences and divergences of 
Hong Kong and the PRC. This is the task of Chapters Two and Three. 
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making future absorption of Taiwan back into the motherland more 
Justifiable. It is believed that Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution 
was written as a model for resuming sovereignity over Taiwan, and that 
Hong Kong was the first to accept the concept purely because of the 
fact of the expiry of the lease. (FEER, 24.7.86, p. 23.) Although 
Taiwan was a province of China from only 1885 until 1894, and of the 
present population only 15% were born in China, the PRC has 
consistently worked toward its aim of 're-unification' of Taiwan and 
the mainland. Hong Kong is seen to be a 'test case' for absorption of 
Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER II 
'ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS': HONG KONG CONTEXT 
I PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT OF CHAPTER 
The broad purpose of this chapter is to describe the socio-cultural, 
economic, and educational systems of Hong Kong. Within that description, the 
chapter attempts to highlight those areas in which Hong Kong society has 
diverged from the traditional Chinese cultural patterns, and from the 
present socio-economic and political systems of the PRC. The chapter will 
note examples of adjustment by Hong Kong residents to previous changes in 
their socio-economic environment. 
The argument of this chapter is that Hong Kong residents have developed 
a socio-cultural and economic environment which differs in some aspects from 
that of the PRC. The chapter attempts to demonstrate that these differences 
in ideologies and in institutional patterns have evolved because of the 
combination of Chinese, colonial and Western influences on society, and 
because of the impact of considerable economic development andihe ensuing 
rapid expansion of educational opportunities. These differences between Hong 
Kong and the PRC, it is argued, comprise the socio-cultural and educational 
contexts in which the interaction of the transfer is occuring. In these 
contexts, because of the institutional differences between Hong Kong and the 
PRC, uncertainty and tension about the outcomes of interaction have 
developed. Furthermore, the chapter introduces the subordinate argument, 
dealt with more fully in Chapter 4, that problems arising from interaction 
in these socio-cultural and educational contexts will be dealt with by 
utilizing the pragmatic response patterns which have enabled selective 
adaptation to previous new contexts. Examples of such adaptation are 
suggested. 
88 
The chapter is, therefore, organized broadly as a survey of the 
economic, social and educational systems of Hong Kong as they have evolved 
since the end of World War II. However, there is a detailed level of 
organization which particularly reflects the argument of the chapter. Within 
this detailed level, categories had to meet the criterion of testing the 
argument that structural contradictions exist between Hong Kong and tne FRC. 
The categories economic ano social, cultural and political, formed the basis 
of comparison oetween Hong tong and the PRC in Chapter 1. The economic and 
social categories were selected because they are contexts in which Hong Kong 
and the PRC have strong historical ties. In addition, they, as weil as the 
cultural and political areas, are contexts in which merger w311 ha\,e, to 
occur: economic, because of the interdependent nature of the existing and 
future relationship; social and cultural , because of the necessity for each 
side to understand the other in order to achieve one country, two systems'; 
and political, because of the future subordinate relationship of Hong Kong 
to the PRC. The contradictions which exist within these areas are important 
to the argument of this thesis and therefore these categories define the 
organization of this chapter and chapter 3. 
The analysis of the education system is emphasized as compared with 
tne surveys of the economic and socio-cultural systems) for two reasons. 
First, this stub./ is within tne field of education, and secondly because tne 
analysis later closes in on a specific example of adaptation in Chapter q - 
the changes in educational choices and career plans being made by young 
people. 
II HONG KONG ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS 
This section on the economic system has two purposes. The first is to 
provide an overview of the various parts of Hong Kong's economic system as 
transfer approaches. The economic system has become more differentiated and 
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modernized in the past three decades. These developments have affected 
society and education, neither of which can be understood without knowledge 
of such developments in the economic system. 
The second purpose is to analyze those parts of the Hong Kong economic 
system which are relevant to the argument of the chapter. The line of 
analysis is that the complexity of adjustment facing Hong Kong cannot be 
fully understood without investigating the structural differences in the 
economic systems of Hong Kong and the PRC. These differences have resulted, 
in part, from the rapid and successful diversification of the Hong Kong 
economy. The argument is a double one. Firstly, the development of the 
economic system differentiates it from the economic system of the PRC, 
resulting in structural contradictions which participants will attempt to 
resolve. Secondly, diversification and modernization in the economic system 
have affected the social systems, including education, differentiating them 
from those of parallel systems in the PRC and further complicating the 
process of preparation for transfer. 
The detailed categories in this section are: Hong Kong Government 
economic policy, the history of the economic system, its major components, 
and the nature of the labour force. Discussion of each category shows the 
scope of the economy's diversification and modernization. 
History and Government Policy.  
Discussions of the economic system of Hong Kong generally begin with a 
comment on its success. Against the odds of a geography with very few 
natural resources, a population which, in the period from 1947 to the 
present, increased by almost 4 times, and the pervasive sense of 'living on 
borrowed time', the people of Hong Kong have experienced an increase of 
around two hundred percent in per capita income at constant value during the 
past 40 years(1). Hong Kong has become the most affluent society in Asia 
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after Japan and Singapore with a agr capita income about ten times the level 
of the FRC, and predicted to exceed British levels within a decade - 
assuming stable internal political conditions. 
Many phrases describe the particular characteristics of Hong Kong's 
economic system which might account for its "miraculous economic 
development"(2), for example, an "export-propelled economy"(3), a "classic.. 
laissez-faire system"(4), and "entrepot-handler society"(5). The work force 
is traditionally described as resourceful, energetic, industrious, innately 
capitalistic, flexible, the second asset"(6). The prosperity which has been 
achieved is a result of all these factors, producing a dynamic and, in many 
ways, a unique society. 
Until WWII, Hong Kong's means of supporting itself was an active and 
successful entrepot trade, with agriculture and fisheries lesser 
contributors to the system(7). Hong Kong was "primarily a pure trading 
port"(8), with some labour-intensive industries"(9). It served "...as a 
staging post and trans-shipment centre for trade between China and the 
Western World"(10). 
Within three decades, however, the industries were transformed into 
"skill- and technological-intensive"(11), and Hong Kong had become a city 
economy, which, in the period from 1965 to 1968 alone, lost 30% of its 
farmers to the cities and emigration and one, in which, in 1984, less than 
two percent of the inhabitants remained farmers(12). 
Two historical events set the stage for this rapid change. Firstly, 
after the second World War, Hong Kong experienced a massive increase in its 
population. Following the Japanese surrender, the citizens of Hong Kong who 
nad left for China during the war began to return — at the rate of almost 
100,000 a month. Many had left Hong Kong during the Japanese occupation 
hoping to find better conditions on the mainland, and returned only after 
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the re-establishment of British rule. Then, within a few years, at the 
conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, a second surge of approximately 750,000 
refugees entered the colony. Hong Kong was forced to abandon its reliance on 
its entrepot trade and industrialize quickly as the population increased 
from half a million at the end of the war to nearly 2.4 million in 1951(13). 
Secondly, much of the trade between China and the Western world which 
was handled in Hong Kong was cut off. A United Nations embargo was placed on 
the export of strategic goods to China during the Korean War. At the same 
time, China's newly Communist Government began turning to the USSR and 
Eastern Europe for more and more of its trade relationships. Faced with 
economic stagnation because of the rapid decline of potential in its 
entrepot capacity, Hong Kong turned to developing its manufacturing 
capabilities, and eventually to offering financial services. 
These developments were turned to advantages for Hong Kong. Although 
much of the basis of the entrepot trade had been withdrawn, Hong Kong turned 
the commercial expertise developed through its entrepot experiences to 
developing its financial services. In addition, the massive immigration was 
both a source of surplus labour for the new industries and a source of skill 
and capital. Three quarters of a million refugees fled to Hong Kong, some 
from Shanghai who brought with them millions of dollars in capital as well 
as expertise in management and an entrepreneurial spirit. The existing 
non-interventionist political framework provided an excellent backdrop, and 
Hong Kong's period of rapid growth began(14). 
Edward Chen has stated that Hong Kong's "economic transformation was 
achieved without planning or even premeditation"(15). However, policies of 
the Hong Kong Government contributed to the prosperity. Hong Kong has almost 
complete autonomy in its domestic financial affairs, with the ultimate 
authority for the government's revenue and expenditure proposals resting 
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with the Legislative Council. Their policies are often characterized as 
being laissez-faire , generally a policy of complete non-interference by 
government in the economic dealings of the society. Hong Kong has a free 
economy in which there is a "basic recognition and respect for private 
ownership of property"(16). Individuals are free to make contracts between 
themselves: there is freedom to sell, to purchase, to employ, to work 
without interference from government. 
The term 'positive non-interventionism' is also used to describe the 
government's policies. The role of government is seen to be one of creating 
a climate and providing an infrastructure which are conducive to economic 
growth. Government apparently does not believe it is useful for it to plan 
the flow of resources, and in Hong Kong, private enterprise has control over 
the allocation, stabilization and distribution of wealth. The government 
appears to worry only about growth and permits many other concerns to be 
dealth with by market forces. 
The policies of the government include a system of very low taxes - low 
even in comparison with other market economies. The income tax and estate 
duty taxes are very lenient, and there is no land value tax. Very low taxes 
on business profits coupled with a consistently balanced or surplus budget 
have attracted considerable foreign investment into the colony. 
Other significant aspects of the policy are free trade and free 
movement of money and capital, which, the government maintain, increase the 
competitiveness of Hong Kong products and increase Hong Kong's 
attractiveness as a centre of entrepot trade(17). Although most other free 
economies have developed a system of contract regulation in order to prevent 
exploitation of the labour force, in Hong Kong there are very limited 
protections offered the worker(18). Perhaps, as Cheng Tong Yung has noted, 
this is perhaps because "there has been belief...that victims of fraud are 
93 
themselves willing to be trapped, and thus do not deserve protection from 
their own gullibility and greed"(19). 
Underlying these Government policies is the belief that the most 
effective allocation of the resources in an economy results from the 
mechanism of free competition(20). Although it has been suggested that Hong 
Kong's "...economic success owes nothing to...central economic 
planning"(21), Government policies, such as the above, and the few wage 
regulations and the few impediments to the entry of new firms into the 
colony(22), plus the attitude that economic growth is more important than 
full employment(23) have contributed greatly to the establishment of Hong 
Kong as one of the most successful economies of the past three decades. 
These historical factors and forces, and governmental economic policy 
have combined to ensure an influx of labour and capital in an environment 
conducive to unrestrained pursuit of individual wealth and social mobility. 
In the Hong Kong economic environment, the individual is free to utilize 
available resources to attain personal goals, and it is argued that this 
constitutes a crucial difference between Hong Kong and the PRC society. 
Preservation of the capacity for growth is an area of concern for all 
potential participants in the HKSAR economy: the PRC, Hong Kong, and the 
international business community. The latter two parties can Justifiably 
assert that individual freedom has been a cornerstone of Hong Kong's past 
success in this area. The PRC, however, has exhibited considerable 
ambivalence in formulating a similar policy for its own economy. There are 
tensions which arise from this contradiction between practice in Hong Kong 
and persistant philosophical ambivalence in the PRC. 
Major Components of the Economy 
The Hong Kong economy is based mainly in a diversified combination of 
industry, trade and financial services. Each will be discussed separately. 
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1. Industrialization 
industrialization is regarded, not only as an end in itself, but also 
as "...a means to national wealth and power"(24). Hong Kong has been an 
excellent example of the validity of this statement. Industrialization has 
taken place very rapidly(25), and the economy has evolved from one based on 
highly labour-intensive industries such as ship-repair and ship-building, 
rope-making and cement-production (26) which had a Total Export Value of 
HK3,716Million in 1950, to one based on textiles, sophisticated electronics 
of HK44,833Million less than 30 years later(27) employing sixty-seven 
percent of the work force in 1981(28). The rapid industrialization process 
has made the residents wealthier, and the accompanying urbanization and 
prosperity changed their values and expectations in ways which differentiate 
them from their PRC counterparts. 
The particular confluence of factors which produced such development 
appears to be unique to Hong Kong. The events of the late 1940's are 
important(29)(30). To repeat, the conclusion of WWII and the conclusion of 
the Chinese Civil War three years later brought an influx of skilled and 
unskilled labour and capital into Hong Kong. Much capital was brought by 
wealthy refugees from Shanghai. In 1947 it was estimated that US50Million. 
had already been brought into the colony by these refugess. With this 
capital , many of the new industries were established(31). Capital has, since 
then, always been in adequate supply(32). A recent survey indicates that 
81.4% of the small factories responding to the survey had their own 
capital(33). Indeed, 90% of the industrial workforce is employed by fellow 
(local) Chinese(34). 
Another contributory factor to the rapid industrialization is suggested 
by A. Y. C. King and Peter J. L. Man(35). They comment on the "...fast 
adoption of and adaptation to changing technological development by the 
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small industries...". They continue "...the small industry in Hong Kong, 
unlike most of its Asian counterparts, has taken a modern form"(36). It has 
been suggested that due to intense competition from Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Singapore whose industrial workforce received lower wages, Hong Kong was 
impelled to turn to the production of higher quality and more sophisticated 
products(37). An example is found in the electronics industry: in 1961, it 
had recently entered the industrial 'picture', listed behind 'food, paper 
and printing, metal , plastics, leather, rubber, and chemicals'(38). It is 
now second in earnings in exports(39), and employs 90,000 workers. 
The Hong Kong Government lists other factors that contribute to Hong 
Kong's status as a leading industrial centre. It writes of "...consistent 
economic policies of free enterprise and free trade; an industrious 
workforce; a sophisticated commercial and industrial infrastructure; a 
modern and efficient seaport..., one of the world's largest container 
terminals, ...and excellent world-wide communications"(40). 
2. Trade 
Increased industrialization has been the basis of the expansion of the 
trade component of Hong Kong's economy(41). The government's policy of no 
exchange controls or costs, and of maintaining the open port, combined with 
the policy of the Four Modernizations, have led to the re-emergence of the 
entrepot trade as an important contributor to the growth of the economy. 
There has been significant increase in trade with the PRC, and since 1983 
the PRC has been both the largest supplier and receiver of goods re-exported 
through Hong Kong(42). This factor, and the recent decline in exports of its 
own goods, have suggested that Hong Kong may revert to its initial role as a 
trading entrepot between China and the rest of the world(43). 
3. Financial Services 
Hong Kong is considered one of the world's leading financial centres, 
96 
and, indeed, this sector of its economy contributes about two-thirds of its 
GNF(44). The founding of the Chartered sank in 1853, followed by the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank in 1864 - their primary function being the financing 
of the entrepot trade - established a system which now supports one of the 
highest densities of banking services and related support industries in the 
world. A wide range of organizations such as foreign exchange markets, stock 
markets, pension funds, insurance compani_es, etc., are served by a highly 
modern world-wide communications and transportation network. As pointed out 
by A. J. Youngson(44), even geography has worked to Hong Kong's advantage in 
that it is located in the centre of a region of growing economies, and its 
time-zone position gives it an advantage in conducting transactions with 
Western Europe and North America. 
The success of industrializAion, the emergence of the trade and 
financial sectors have meant rising incomes, international contacts, and 
financial security for the residents. Industrialization has also helped 
bring about increasingly complex social structures(45), and, correspondingly 
education has developed and diversified to be able to supply the skilled 
workforce that the sophisticated technology and research and development 
require. The workforce is the topic of the following section. Education is 
dealt with later. 
Labour Force 
Obstacles have been described as geographical: the lack of natural 
resources, limited habitable areas; as historical: the extraordinary surge 
of refugees housing themselves in gravely inadequate housing and squatter 
areas built from refuse with minimal access to fresh water and electricity. 
Other obstacles have been political: lack of government regulations on 
wages, working hours, and conditions; and as the result of rapid 
industrialization: the pressure to produce competitively, i.e. quickly and 
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cheaply. However, all types of obstacles were surmounted by the Hong Kong 
labour force in an atmosphere of 'no time to 	 The labour force has 
demonstrated the kinds of reactions which this thesis argues will be applied 
to the challenges posed by 1997: a pragmatic and adaptive attitude toward 
problem-solving. 
Reports about the SOeCl-i1C contributions of the labour force, and about 
their working condition and wages are very general, pernaps, as J. England 
has noted, because "Despite international accusations of sweated labour 
leveied at Hong Kong for 20 years, there has been no iarge-scale study of 
working conditions and poverty"(48). Indeed the 1961 census the first since 
1931) asked no questions about income and earnings. Information, therefore, 
is fragmented, which led the same author to write that "Before 1967, and 
some time after, official policy was characterized by smug satisfaction with 
indicators of economic growth and by a vast disregard for the human 
consequences of industrialization"(47). Indeed, there was no minimum wage 
requirement in Hong Kong as recently as 1986, and, although wages have risen 
with the degree of industrialization, labour productivity has risen also, 
and significantly faster(48)(49), leading Keith Hopkins to write that 
"...labour's share of profit has declined.."(50). Arthur Hinton noted that 
"...the profit motive is allowed to operate comparatively untrammelled by 
government restriction. This—has meant inadequate snaring through the 
community as a whole of the profits made.."(51). 
Despite the inequalities in distribution of the rewards, tne Hong Kong 
labour force has acquired a reputation for its industriousness. There are 
studies which demonstrate their willingness to work long hours in order to 
improve their financial situation. For example, Youngson reported in 1982 
that, in the textile industry, the average hours worked per spindle has been 
higher in Hong Kong than in any other country since 196P(52). Other studies 
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have shown that the Hong Kong worker consistently places a higher value on 
the opportunity to earn money over other choices such as an increase in 
leisure time, job stability, prestige etc.(53). 
The male head-of-household has not been the single contributor to the 
success. The 1971 census showed that 65% of children between 10 and 14 were 
economically active. Later in that decade, it become illegal for children 
under 15 to be employed(55). Women have always made up a unusually large 
part of the labour force, comprising more than half of the employment in the 
manufacturing industry(56). The 1981 Census revealed that there has been a 
decline since 1961 in the participation rate for males and females in the 
labour force for the age groups 15-19 and 55 and over(57). This is 
attributed to both the increased availibility in post-primary school places 
and the higher incomes which enable people to retire earlier. At the time of 
the most recent census, 97% of the work force were employed, and 67% (82% 
men, 50% female) of the population were economicailly active(58). 
There have been several explanations for these trends. M.Topley 
observed that most of the workforce at the time of her writing in 1969 had 
come to Hong Kong to improve their standard of living, and suggested that 
the economic miracle had simply been a case of their 'getting on with 
it'(59). Youngson feels it is "...plausible to say that Hong Kong society is 
permeated at all levels with the idea of working and making money, and that 
there is not much sympathy or public support for those who cannot or do not 
work"(60). England states that "Hong Kong itself provided an environment 
within which economic gain has long been accepted as a major social 
end"(61). 
As a result of the effects of history, official policy, successful and 
rapid industrialization followed by development of an infrastructure of 
financial services, and the willing workforce, Hong Kong was reshaped from a 
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two-tiered society: a very wealthy and powerful elite, and masses of 
unskilled, ill-housed, uneducated coolies, to the present society: a 
three-tiered system with a new and educated middle class, which enjoyed 
annual growth in real income rates during the last decade of 6.4% as well as 
an increase in the education attainment levels of their young people. They 
are able to enjoy a more sophisticated, varied life-style than their 
South-East Asian neighbours. 
Th 7,:s new, Hong Kong-born, middle-class is comprised of people with a 
wide range of skills and as their lives have been most transformed by the 
economic miracle, so is their future closely tied to 1997. Writing about 
this middle class, T.Y.Cheng warned that "... the morale and enthusiasm for 
socio-economic development of the vast majority who cannot afford to 
emigrate will no longer be guaranteed...[if they are dissatisfied with the 
arrangement for the futureP(62). He also found that a majority of them 
would prefer to emigrate, not from lack of satisfaction with life in Hong 
Kong but because of the present uncertainties and lack of confidence in the 
future(63). He and others have written that the young middle class are, when 
possible, establishing links overseas, and when this is not possible, as is 
the case for the majority, are sitting back to 'wait-and-see'(64). 
Hong Kong Economy Poised for the 1990's 
The purpose of this subsection differs slightly from that of the 
previous subsection. Its aim is to suggest that recent economic events have 
increased tension in the colony. Any such tension will affect the social 
context of the decolonization and transfer process. 
In the mid-1980's Hong Kong seemed to have recovered the 'stability and 
prosperity' which appear to be the main strategic goals of the PRC and Great 
Britain. Among the favourable signs were the recovery of the property market 
after the three year slump. In addition, Hong Kong received full membership 
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in GATT which is very important as it guarantees full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations, to contract as a separate 
party. It will retain this status after 1997. By 1987, however, the economy 
had slumped again - partly in reaction to the world-wide stock market 
uncertainties. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Hong Kong and China have 
traditionally been interdependent economically and this interdependence has 
increased since the open door policy of the Four Modernizations and the 
signing of the Joint Declaration. Most analysts consider the new economic 
links with the PRC as potentially, the most useful in determining a 
favourable future for Hong Kong(65). The Hong Kong Government has 
acknowledged their importance by stating that the top domestic governmental 
priority is to improve the infrastructure as "Hong Kong is becoming a major 
entrepot for China under our eyes"(66). 
However, the predictions are not all optimistic. Warning of a trend 
toward appeasement of the PRC, an analyst indicated that "...special deals 
for China have been all too frequent in recent years, notably cheap land for 
the Bank of China and a billion-dollar rescue for China and its local 
private-sector partners from a failed, speculative land transaction"(67). 
Another commentator warned investors: "Be careful of some pragmatists, 
especially in the business community, showing signs of sycophancy towards 
Beijing"(68). 
There are other negative trends which seem to stem from the uncertain 
political status. Firstly, capital values on property are not up, reflecting 
the reluctance of local investors to make long-term commitments despite 
China's promise of recognition of recognition of leases to at least 
2047(69). A sustained bull market in Hong Kong is driven by a property boom, 
and analysts believe that "Hongkong is a long way from another property 
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boom"(70). Since property sales have traditionally financed much of the 
government's capital programmes, this decline in sales has another 
potentially destaoilizing effect on infrastructure improvement in the 
colony. 
The scale of manufacturing has been shrinking, due, it is reported, to 
the difficulty in obtaining venture capital from previously-generous 
banks(71). There are worries about continued Hong Kong access to up-to-date 
information technology. China has been subJect to more stringent controls on 
such access, and Hong Kong is concerned that the HKSAR will have reduced 
access to these commodities which are necessary to its survival as a 
financial centre(72). 
Clearly, uncertainty surrounds the economic future of Hong Kong, and 
the confidence of both the local and world economic community in future 
political stability and potential for economic growth is crucial. For this 
reasons official reports from Great Britain, Beijing, and the Hong Kong 
government are unfailingly reassuring and optimistic. 
Reassurances and rescues have been necessary to counteract the trend of 
ousiness people 'voting with their feet'. Jardine Matheson stunned the Hong 
Kong business commumnity in 1984 when it announced it was moving its 
headquarters to Bermuda. it "...was seen to have abandoned the colony after 
playing a principal role in its creation out of the odium Wars in the 
1840's..."(73). A second major Hong announced a similar move and New 
York-based Citibank transferred its Asian investment banking Asian 
headquarters out of Hong Kong, a move wnich the Rinancial Times described as 
'...symptomatic of a trend whicn some see as ominous for Hong Kong"(74). 
Funds have been leaving the colony since 1982 at an (estimated minimum) rate 
of US3Billion dollars a year, and this has also been attributed to the 
unknown political future of the colony(75). 
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There are four other factors on which future economic growth 
depends(76). Firstly, the degree of compliance by both Great Britain and the 
PRC with the terms of the Joint Declaration is important. Events of the past 
two years support this view. On those occasions when either the PRC or Great 
Britain expressed displeasure with the manner in which the other party was 
complying with the terms of the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong experienced 
marked economic reversals. Further support is found in the Asian Business 
profile on Hong Kong for 1986 which concluded with the advice: "Expect 
continuing tremors through the colony and stock exchange as China continues 
to elucidate its interpretation of the Gino-British agreement"(77). 
Secondly, growth depends on the maintainance and improvement of the 
existing infrastructure. This will be possible only in an environment of 
growth and international confidence in the independence of Hong Kong. 
Thirdly, J.Bembridge says that the 
total system must provide incentives to 
Hong Kong's entrepreneurs and business people. 
Hong Kong's whole economy depends on increasing 
external trade: this in turn required the 
maximum possible freedom for those involved with 
appropriate framework of laws and 
regulations(78). 
This seems to depend on the intentions of the PRC. Lastly, Hong Kong 
will require 'prudent freedom', which is 
the ability to operate fearlessly within 
sound and independently administered law, the 
possibility of self-improvement for the 
successful and the certainty of sensitive 
treatment for the unsuccessful. Above all the 
burden of direct taxation must remain moderate 
and public sector expenditure must be 
constrained(79). 
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In conclusion, this overview of the Hong Kong economic system has 
attempted to show that it has diversified and modernized in areas in which, 
as will be shown in Chapter 3, the PRC has not yet achieved success. The 
institutional differences which emerge complicate the transfer by producing 
contradictions and tension. In an effort to ease the tension, residents have 
attempted to begin to prepare for transfer, but their preparations are 
accompanied by public, and often conflicting, interpretations which 
exascerbate concern and cause further, and more frenetic, economic activity. 
The discussion has also shown that the rapid growth and development of 
the economic system was assisted by the contributions of the residents. The 
essence of this contribution, it is argued, is their ability to respond to 
social changes in a manner which enhances the positive aspects of the 
emerging situation. 
In the final analysis, the economic signals and activities suggest that 
the main post-1997 economic certainties include the availibility of the 
skilled workforce who are better trained than their counterparts in the PRC; 
and that the economic probabilities include the further tightening of the 
link between the health of the PRC economy and the prosperity of Hong Kong. 
III THE SOCIAL SYSTEM AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS 
The preceding section on the economy traced the development of a Hong 
Kong economic system which differs from that of the PRC. It also suggested 
that, in the past four decades, Hong Kong residents have successfully 
adjusted to an evolving economic situation which consisted of negative and 
positive aspects. This section on the socio-cultural system attempts to 
highlight those social, cultural and political structures of Hong Kong which 
differ from the PRC. It continues the argument that contradictions existing 
between the systems of Hong Kong and the PRC partially define the context in 
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which the transfer will occur. 
Although ninety eight percent of the people of Hong Kong regard 
themselves as Chinese and speak one of the Chinese languages, many have come 
to value the freedoms associated with rule by English law, and to "...place 
great stress on rights and freedoms of individuals as being of basic 
importance"(81) - which is not a traditional Chinese attitude. They have 
shed, rapidly, expediently and without compulsion, many traditional values 
in favour of many of those of the West. Not all of the traditional forms of 
behaviour have been eclipsed by the process, and elements of the two coexist 
side-by-side(82). 
Certain characteristics of the Chinese culture facilitate adopting some 
Western behavioural patterns. As T. Geiger has noted, both cultures share a 
practical and rationalistic approach to problem-solving, and both are 
achievement-oriented(83). Therefore, given the opportunity to become wealthy 
by engaging in Western-style economic activity, the psychological switch was 
eased because their own tradition had prepared them to think and act in ways 
required for economic success in Western-ruled Hong Kong. 
Social and Cultural Orientation 
Changes in the economic structure of a society are usually followed by 
adjustments in the social system(84). Industrialization, for example, causes 
over time immense accomodations in systems of social stratification and 
mobility. The technological advances which accompany it must be met with 
higher educational standards, which in turn raise achievement levels and 
eventually, increase expectations in life-style. Measuring these shifts is 
difficult in any situation, and particularly in Hong Kong, because 
comparatively little research has been done on its social system. Review of 
the material on Hong Kong shows that "Hong Kong's economic statistics are 
excellent, as one would expect, but its social statistics are sparse"(85). 
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This observation is a common one(86). Attempts to describe and explain 
various social phenomena are, therefore, based on the limited empirical 
research that exists. 
Another difficulty encountered when attempting to describe Hong Kong 
society is that, as England has noted, Hong Kong is a society in transition 
in more than the economic sphere(87). It retains a traditional Chinese 
aspect in some of its patterns of behaviour which are sometimes resisting, 
sometimes accomodating, the pressures of industrialization. The society 
which is emerging has been described as "...still in the process of 
evolution"(88), and "neither modern nor traditional Chinese"(89). J. Cheng 
describes this cultural duality: " The people of Hong Kong have been 
"...caught standing with one foot in the West and one in the East,...(and) 
do not seem to have a firm purchase in either"(90). This section attempts to 
draw on existing research and suggest some general social characteristics 
relevant to the argument of the chapter. 
A characteristic which is readily associated with traditional Chinese 
societies is that of familism: the status of the family as the most 
significant unit. In the family, the individual's sense of identity was 
shaped and, undoubtedly, the early immigrants to Hong Kong brought the 
traditions of the family, as an economic and social organization, with them. 
In early Hong Kong, a whole lineage lived together in one village under the 
control of the father or grandfather, and was self-sufficient economically, 
politically and socially. On the other hand, in Western societies, the 
individual is the significant unit, and "...the aim of the learning process 
... is to develop 'free-standing' adults capable of ... assuming 
responsibility for their own actions"(91). 
Research has suggested an erosion or adjustment in the original 
strength and focus of the orientation of the Hong Kong individual toward the 
.I. 
family's welfare. The suggestion made in 1969 that "Family life in 
particular seems to be turning more and more on the western-type 
significance of the nuclear family and less and less on the Chinese-type 
significance of the extended family and its strong ties"(92) has been 
supported by current research. Only ten years later studies of types of 
families showed that only 1.6% of families had other than a married couple 
(with or without unmarried children) , and the parents of the husband living 
together. Three quarters of families were nuclear families(93). This study 
also revealed that "...[some traditional] rules had been slackened with the 
increasing trend toward the nuclear family structure"(94). Practices such as 
passing on inheritance to both sons and daughters, accepting the mother's 
relatives as kin, and newlyweds setting up their own independent family 
began to emerge at this time(95). These represent a moving away from 
traditional Chinese arrangements and toward practices more associated with 
Western society. 
Analysis of the relationships within the family show the same trend. 
Wong Fai-ming wrote that 
The relationship between the husband and 
the wife has been moving toward a companionship 
type... . The parent-child relations have been 
closer and more intense as the family moves 
toward the smaller nuclear type(96). 
This contrasts with the traditional view of these relationships: 
patriarchal and oriented toward the older members rather than toward the 
children. Indeed, by 1983, a comparative study of attitudes of ethnic 
Chinese young people living in the United States found that the recent 
immigrants from Hong Kong held less strongly to the view that offspring 
should be responsible for the care of their older relatives than did any 
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other group of Chinese immigrants. The Hong Kong subgroup supported the 
suggestion that government and other agencies should assume more 
responsibility for caring for the elderly(97). This differs considerably 
from the traditional attitude that "...the emotion most highly valued was 
the feel ing of respect by the younger for the older..."(98). 
J. Cheng suggests that a combination of both industrialization and 
westernization have brought about these changes(99). He lists four factors. 
First, large factories have taken the production process outside the family 
and members now working away from the family have less reason to live with 
it. Secondly, he suggests that the rapid urbanization and land shortage have 
created an enviroment to which the nuclear family is more adaptable. He also 
argues that the families have been influenced by the western value of love 
between a husband and wife, displacing perhaps filial piety on the part of 
the children as an essential value. Fourthly, children, as a consequence, 
feel less morally obliged to support their parents, and the nuclear family 
becomes more popular. 
There are, however, signs that the traditional values exist side by 
side with the modern characteristics. Despite having abandoned many of the 
traditional attitudes about the family's organization, the family remains 
the centre of people's emotional and social lives. H. Baker noted that, in 
Hong Kong, It is the family which provides the comfort and human warmth ... 
and to which a person turns when in trouble"(100). In fact, it was recently 
shown that eighty six percent of respondents stated that they spent most of 
their free time with their families(101). 
Hong Kong family life has retained another important feature of the 
traditional-style family. T. Geiger in a description of Chinese 
socio-cultural backround noted that "...the interests and the sense of 
loyalty to the family generally took precedence over commitments to...the 
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welfare of society as a wh-ole"(102). It has recently been reported that in 
Hong Kong only 13.5% considered society to be more important than their own 
families(103). The same report, however, continued: 
On the other hand, when asked about their 
felt responsibility to elevate the status of 
their families, a substantial percentage of them 
(47.8%) took the rather uninvolved stance of 
'having some responsibility'. Hence, contrary to 
the ideal in traditional China, the status of 
the family in society is not of much concern to 
the average Chinese in Hong Kong(104). 
Material success is of great importance to most immigrants to Hong Kong 
and the Chinese immigrants have not ignored the potential for the quick 
accumulation of wealth upon which Hong Kong has prospered. Again, it is 
possible to cite studies which comment on the emergent materialism of the 
Hong Kong Chinese. Lau Siu-kai noted that, in an investigation of criteria 
for the choice of jobs, only 19.6% were "...definite in not using salary as 
the only criteron for the acceptance of a a given job"(105). 
Examining this characteristic against the concept of a 'society in 
transition' is helpful. Although the poor of China were 'allowed' to show 
concern about their economic status, traditional Chinese teachings regarded 
the accumulation of wealth as harmful, and the elite in China were not those 
who had accumulated great wealth, but those who had become members of the 
ruling classes through mastery of the Chinese classical writing. This system 
of social advancement was not transferred to Hong Kong for two reasons. 
Firstly, most of the immigrants who came were peasants and other 
ill-educated groups. The scholars were not represented in very large numbers 
and therefore were not available to teach the traditional attitudes toward 
materialism(106). In the environment which existed in Hong Kong at the time 
of the mass influxes of immigrants, the newcomers simply absorbed the 
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prevailing philosophy, which was materialistic ,:ind which, anyway, had 
immediately apparent value. 
Secondly, the route to prestige and power has always been different in 
Hong Kong compared with in China. No longer was proving mastery of the 
Confucian classics important as a sign of ability to rule; in fact the 
immigrants found themselves in a society in which they could never hope to 
rule(107). "Wealth and the ability to command wealth ...[have 
relplaced3...the traditional methods for acquiring status and 
leadership"(108). 
England cites several studies done over the past two decades in which 
income is consistently ranked as more important than free time, job 
satisfactions, job prestige, job stability, or regular work hours in 
determining job satisfaction(109). Lin found that the people of Hong Kong 
are no different from people in all societies in demonstrating a positive 
relationship between life satisfaction and material well-being(110). 
However, J. Cheng describes a study done in 1982 in which questions 
were asked about the things liked and disliked about living in Hong 
Kong(111). Only thirteen percent of the respondents answered that they liked 
the fact that one "...can buy or do anything you like when you have money", 
while forty percent listed the "freer life" as the significant factor in 
their attitude toward Hong Kong. So that, although the Hong Kong people have 
been able to profit from the opportunities for material advancement, they 
consider the liberal atmosphere in Hong Kong as being more attractive than 
the opportunity for quick wealth. 
In conclusion, Hong Kong residents appear to be flexible in adjusting 
to their social environment. On the one hand, they have chosen to follow the 
Western model of individualism in economic and career decisions and in some 
social areas, for example, the nuclear family pattern, but, on the other 
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hand, they retain some traditional Chinese values, particularly in areas of 
responsibility and emotional connections. Differences between Hong Kong and 
the PRC in the means of achieving goals and in the route to social status 
emerge from the discussion. There are also contradictions in the area of 
decision-making: citizens of the PRC generally do not make career decisions 
themselves or within the family unit, whereas, Hong Kong people look to 
themselves and their families to fulfill this function. 
The following section on the Political Orientation of Hong Kong people 
suggests additional structural contradiction between the social systems. 
Political Orientation 
The colonial status of Hong Kong has persisted for a hundred and forty 
five years. In an era of almost universal decolonization, there have been 
few calls from within Hong Kong to join the international community of 
former colonies who now practise self-rule. The structure of the government 
is typical of British colonies. Power is vested in the Governor who is 
assisted by an appointed Executive Council and advised by an Legislative 
Council. Until 1984, members of the Legislative Council were appointed, 
providing for indirect elections of 24 of the 50 members. The rest are 
appointed by the governmor or are civil servants 
Although not accountable to the Hong Kong public, the British have 
governed without serious resistance, and as far as the Hong Kong people have 
taken note of them, the British have been considered a beneficient 
authority, quite, it might be noted, in keeping with the long-accepted 
Confucian concept of an ideal government of order and hierarchy. 
Hong Kong has been very free to determine its internal matters and 
"... the actual exercise of British (i.e. London ) rule has become 
increasingly minimal in recent decades"(112). The Government has provided a 
high degree of personal liberty and freedom of expression and communication, 
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but has not encouraged the establishment of a political system in the 
conventional sense. The Governor appoints top officials and formal public 
advisors from prominent spokespersons of business and professional 
interests. There is an elected body, the Urban Council, but their elections 
attract little interest(113). The politics that has existed are described by 
A. Kuan: The Hong Kong brand of politics has relied in the past on a 
certain measure of confidence and understanding between a benevolent 
Government and cooperative social-economic elites"(114). 
Hong Kong residents have had a reputation for being indifferent toward 
government. C. F. Emmons summarizes the reasons in three categories(115). 
Those that are structural: arguments such as the non-interference by the 
colonial government in Chinese lifestyles, and the dramatic increases in 
their life-styles made possible by government policy(116). Although both 
communists and non-communists are well represented in the communities of 
Hong Kong, these affiliations were often historical and sentimental rather 
than aspirational, and neither group attempted to gain nominal control of 
the government there. They accepted the colonial system, perhaps as the 
'best bet'(117). 
Those reasons that are situational: as many residents are refugees from 
China and are likely to avoid government and politics. J.Cheng describes 
immigrants from China as not liking to be involved in politics, content to 
be in a stable political and economic envirAent(118). Cultural reasons are 
suggested: 'Chinese traditional bureaucratic paternalism and passive 
acquiescense among the public'. Cheung Tak-shing found that ideological 
responses were 'conspicuously absent' in an exploratory study he did of the 
self-concepts of school children(119). 
England has noted, and is supported by Cheung(120), that an important 
characteristic of Hong Kong residents is that they generally plan only for 
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the short term(121). As political activity often involves long term goals, 
it is consistent witht their reports that residents prefer to spend their 
time on activities with more immediate reward. Political activity also 
requires both channels for communication and power, but power has always 
been in the hands of the richest entrepreneurs(122), and the credibility of 
the existing channels of communication is low(123). Therefore, until 
recently, the society exhibited few signs of politicization. 
Such lack of political development in an industrializing economy was 
unusual, especially in one noted for large gaps in standard of living 
between wealthy and poor. Turner finds it remarkable that no 
internally-oriented political labour movement has developed in Hong Kong as 
in other industrial democracies(124). It has been argued that the existng 
system has worked because both parties have believed in and enjoyed the 
freedoms guaranteed under the rule of law(125). Until this decade, the Hong 
Kong people have been confident that the government would not deviate from 
this rule, and, significantly, the first, serious, local moves toward 
establishing representative political institutions have begun only in this 
decade as "... the credibility of Government [began] slipping away and the 
consensus of the people [began] disappearing..."(126). 
In conclusion, some socio-political characteristics of Hong Kong 
society have been discussed. They have included examples of local 
adaptability to the demands of changing circumstances - which are like the 
adaptations made to changing economic circumstances. It is suggested, then, 
that, where tension in the socio-political structures developed, change 
occured. This change, which evolved from and in the special social, economic 
and political context of Hong Kong, had the aim of increasing the benefits 
obtained by individual members from society. 
The section then described a society, in which, until the present 
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political developments, neither polit cal conditions nor socio-cultural 
factors encouraged local people to participate in Government on more than a 
token basis. This pattern contradicts the highly politicized environment of 
the PRC, in which a sense of both national and Party commitment is 
encouraged by the socialist government. 
Hong Kong Politics Poised for the 1990's 
The preceding subsection has described the lack of political activity 
during the past decades, but, as is now suggested, lack of activity did not 
signify lack of awareness or interest. In the past two years, many Hong Kong 
residents have matured politically. They have witnessed the emergence of the 
Gino-British negotiations and the related events as a public issue, the 
increasing PRC influence in local politics, and the emergence of local 
'grassroots' political organizations campaigning for local support and 
power. In addition, they have have been drawn into the political arena with 
two dramatic issues: political reform in Hong Kong and the building of a 
nuclear plant by the PRC close to the Hong Kong border. In both issues they 
positioned themselves for direct confrontation with the wishes of Peking. 
Political activity on the second issue has ended in defeat for the 
population of Hong Kong. The PRC, with the consent of the Hong Kong and 
British governments, decided to proceed with the building of the plant 
thirty miles from Hong Kong despite the facts that 1 million signatures were 
gathered supporting a petition to halt building (a display of dissent 
'unprecedented in Hong Kong" (127) and that seventy percent of the 
population were against it. However, twenty four of the fifty six indirectly 
elected legislators joined the majority of legislators in voting not to 
debate the question before signing contracts, apparently ignoring the voice 
of the people. 
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This defeat appears to have strengthened the resolve of leaders of the 
opposition on the issue. Martin Lee, QC, member of the BLDC and spokesperson 
for political reform, wrote 
if any good has come of this initial 
political failure, it is this It has now become 
clear that Hong Kong must go further than 
indirect elections. ...(only a government with 
an elected legislature and an executive 
accountable to it), with a wide base of public 
support, will give Hong Kong a means of 
resisting any attempts by China to intervene in 
its adminstration(128). 
Lau Siu-kai comments that the "battered [British] government now has to 
share its decision-making power with a number of joint Sino-British 
groups"(129). Therefore, he reasons, "...political reform with the purposes 
of increasing popular participation ... has to be introduced fairly 
speedily"(130). 
Hong Kong political activists in the mid-1980s have attempted to 
accelerate the transition toward democracy during the years leading up to 
the handover, and despite the combined efforts of both the PRC government 
and the colony'_ capitalist leaders, "...there are signs of growing public 
insistence that the people of the territory must be allowed to develop a 
more coherent political voice before China assumes sovereignity"(131). 
Independent polls suggest that the majority want a direct vote for their own 
representatives(132). 
The PRC itself has accelerated the process of political maturity. 
Following the controversial selection procedures for members of the BLDC, 
the performance of the Hong Kong members at the initial meetings was widely 
reported and drew generally favorable comment from Hong Kong residents. An 
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article entitled "Agressive tactics pay off"(133) described a 
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'no-punches-pulled attitude in presenting cases' by some of the Hong Kong 
members which enabled them to 'finally get what they wanted'. Although the 
senior PRC member commented that the thinking and working styles ...were 
considerably different" (134), Hong Kong commentators supported the 
asssertive tactics and suggested that the assertive behaviour of its 
delegates should give Hong Kong 'solace'(135). 
The PRC has announced that any political reform must be linked to the 
Basic Law, effectively preventing change until 1990 and establishing the 
political supremacy of the members of the BLDC during the transition. It is 
believed that, over the next few years, the influence of existing Government 
bodies is likely to be overshadowed by the BLDC and BLCC(136), although the 
PRC is likely to be careful to maintain appearances of equilibrium. 
In conclusion, Hong Kong is experiencing decolonization from a 
traditional colonial relationship with one country and subsequent transfer 
of internal authority to a another style of government, the characteristics 
of which are unknown beyond the guarantees of the Joint Declaration. Under 
the colonial government, there was a minimum of local political activity and 
overt indifference toward 'government'. However, residents enjoyed a high 
degree of personal freedoms in a pluralistic society. These characteristics 
differ (from those of the PRC) and the degree to which Hong Kong residents 
will be allowed to retain them is unknown at present. 
116 
IV THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS 
The following sections will describe the Hong Kong education system in 
detail. One purpose is to provide an overview of education in Hong Kong as 
the issue of 1997 is beginning to affect the social institutions of the 
colony. Another purpose is to present additional information related to the 
third sub-argument of the thesis: that Hong Kong people will react to the 
contemporary dramatic and unfamiliar social and political events with 
established, adaptive behavioural patterns. This section traces examples of 
effective, pragmatic behaviour by Hong Kong residents when faced with social 
change. The overall aim, however, of this part of Chapter 2 and the 
corresponding part of Chapter 3 - the education system in the PRC - is to 
enable comparison of parallel structures in which, the thesis argues, 
contradictions between the two systems exist. 
Following an introductory section, the discussion continues with a 
brief history of education in Hong Kong, emphasizing the post-War period 
which has been the period of greatest economic growth, thereby enabling 
expansion and restatement of aims of the education system. This period also 
coincides with an era of upheaval and realignment in education in the PRC. 
The section includes a description of the structure of the school system 
which has evolved. Discussion of the aims of the education department 
follows, with emphasis on those aspects which relate to the argument of this 
and the following chapter. 
Backround 
The children in secondary school in the mid-1980's will be young adults 
at the time of the handover. The education they are receiving is preparing 
them for a lifestyle which will probably differ from the one which they now 
have. Some efforts have been made to begin adaptation to this new lifestyle. 
For example, left-wing schools in Hong Kong report a ten to twenty percent 
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increase in applications and attribute this to the "...farsightedness of 
parents"(137). Many Hong Kong academics and students have been invited to 
visit Chinese schools, and vice versa, ostensibly to encourage closer 
understanding and cooperation between the two systems(138). 
There has also been a steadily increasing number of Hong Kong students 
studying at PRC universities. There is the attitude that, although the 
qualifications are not recognized in Hong Kong, what was learned in the PRC 
will be useful - and there is the possibility of making potentially valuable 
contacts. In 1985, for the first time, the Hong Kong Higher Level 
Examination results became valid for admission to PRC universities, and 
since 1984 graduates of Hong Kong secondary schools have been accepted to 
PRC universities on the basis of recommendation from the local school. They 
need not sit for the PRC entrance exam(139). The Hong Kong Polytechnic, 
among other institutions, has fostered closer ties with universities in the 
PRC through technological and student exchanges because of their perception 
of the great potential for business in China and their students are advised 
to equip themselves for careers related to this potential(140). 
Despite these individual responses, the issue of the effects of 1997 on 
education has not become a public issue, as have the effects of 1997 on the 
economy or on the political system. The media and journal articles tend to 
emphasize the potential economic and political fall-out, and education has 
received only passing review. A Hong Kong University conference on 1997 
convened after the Joint Declaration was published was able to attract only 
two papers (of twenty eight) on the topic of 'education and 1997', although 
they "...tried hard to solicit [more]"(141). The editor describes the 
relative scarcity of papers on social changes in general (a further two 
within the twenty-eight of the papers offered) as 'regrettable' and 
'striking', and, tentatively, explains that social changes will take time to 
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manifest themseives(142), even though it is widely agreed that "... in the 
future, China's development will inevitably influence our [educational] 
development'(143). 
A review of the literature and media coverage of the early period of 
the transition uncovers scattered exhortations, from leading political and 
education figures to Hong Kong residents, to study carefully current events 
in Hong Kong in order to contribute to the future. In the middle part of the 
decade, however, specific themes and issues began to emerge in the 
literature, and it has become possible to identify educational problems 
about which some members of the local community are concerned. Language of 
instruction is the leading issue in this decade. After many years of neglect 
of Chinese studies by the local population, it now appears to many pragmatic 
to acquire some skills in the language. Students at Hong Kong University, 
long a symbol of colonial values, called for the university, "...given the 
impending political reforms, to recognize Chinese as an official teaching 
medium, along with English(144). 
Questions about who will make educationpolicy are arising. Since there 
is little indication of what policies or language Peking has in mind for the 
post-1997 period, many spokespersons are treading gently indeed and parents, 
at least, seem to be waiting for clearer signals before switching their 
preference from English language school to a Chinese language school. 
Cheng Kai Ming, sums up the complex situation: 
in different unsatisfactory areas. However, 
two points distinguish education from the other 
sectors. Firstly, it seems difficult for people 
in education to find anything good enough to be 
preserved or improved upon. They worry more than 
others about the no chaue implications in the 
Joint statement. Secondly, few new items are 
found on the agenda - medium of instruction, 
JSEA, adult education, and all that. 
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Introduction of a political component in the 
curriculum could be the only exception(145). 
History 
The purpose of this section is to provide an example of the link 
between interaction of government policy and assertive public demands, with 
its effects on the structure of education. In other words, the aim is to 
decribe the emergence of contemporary Hong Kong education out of the 
interaction of various social agents. The resulting system, it will be 
argued in Chapter 5, continues to interact with social agents even as the 
agents themselves are transformed by the transfer process. 
The detailed history of Hong Kong education begins with the 
establishment of the colony. Gail Schaefer Fu describes the original system 
as a combination of the upper and middle class children being educated in 
China and the poorer children being educated in Hong Kong, largely by 
voluntary agencies(146). The new colonial government was content to 
encourage such missionary efforts to educate the poorer children, and 
maintained a policy of non-interference. The first Education Committee 
Report in 1848 supported the existing policy of allowing the traditional 
Chinese curriculum and methods, with the exception of permitting the 
introduction of Christian teaching(147). By the mid-1850's a need was felt 
to include the teaching of more English in order to create a 'bond' between 
the 'many thousands of Chinese and the handful of Europeans who rule them'. 
The inclusion of the western language also offered the opportunity to 
introduce western standards to the workforce. This dual goal persisted 
throughout the century. During the 1860's, a central government school was 
opened, meeting a call for a shift from religious to secular education in 
government schools(148). 
An 1878 Conference on Education called for "...the teaching of English 
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as the primary concern of government education" and proposed that five hours 
per day should be given to English instruction, and two and a half hours per 
day to Chinese lessons: "English lessons being compulsory but Chinese 
lessons optional"(149). It was not long until the now-frequent criticism was 
recorded for the first time that English was being learned for its 
commercial usefulness to the neglect of Cantonese, the mother language of 
the students(150). 
However, the Hong Kong Chinese of that period established a practice 
which has persisted to this deLada,, and which it is hypothesized will 
persist into the next periods of Hong Kong history: that of selecting 
schools on the basis of the 'money value' of the curriculum. Schools 
established in the 19th century which emphasized English language 
instruction were successful in attracting students despite the fact that the 
quality of the language instruction was often low. Fu describes a 1901 
petition to the government from British parents which "...expressed 
particular dissatisfaction with the Chinese attitude of studying not for the 
sake of acquiring knowledge but for the sake of money"(151). 
Only half of the Hong Kong Chinese children were in school at the turn 
of the century. Wealthier Chinese attended either the Anglo schools or 
private Chinese schools. Those missionary and voluntary schools which taught 
in Cantonese were less prestigious and served generally the poorer peoples. 
The latter group, particularly, often had difficulty meeting prescribed 
standards for government funds and although they were educating the majority 
of Chinese in their own language quickly acquired an inferior status which 
nas persisted(152). The government continued its policy of "concentrating on 
the upper classes and of emphasizing the importance of English until at 
least the 1920'"(153). 
The establishment of Hong Kong University in 1911 had two significant 
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goals: to aid in maintaining good relations with China by "...supplying 
[its] needs in its move toward modernization and industrialization" and to 
educate the Chinese population in western learning and in the English 
language(154). Local parents proved themselves able to adjust to the new 
social context created by the opening of Hong Kong University and it almost 
immediately affected the nature of the secondary schools. There was a sixty 
percent increase in the number of pupils in English medium schools while, in  
the same period, the Chinese language schools experienced only a ten percent 
increase(155). 
In the 1930's government began moving toward a more equitable system of 
provision of education in the vernacular and toward the development of 
technical education. Official reports began to criticize the emphasis on the 
provision of English at the expense of Cantonese and attempts were made to 
extend education into the rural areas and to provide for giris(156). During 
World War II, however, no progress was made in any of these areas(157). 
At the end of WWII educators were faced with the ruins of both the 
physical and intellectual resources of the education system in Hong Kong. 
Immediately upon beginning to reconstruct, they faced the massive 
immigration from China which necessitated massive expansion as well as the 
rebuilding which was already occuring. The events in China also forced 
qualitative adjustments in policy: students who wanted a Chinese language 
education had traditionally studied in China(158); with access denied, Hong 
Kong had to develop its own resources to meet this increased need for 
education in Chinese. 
The 1950's were a period of extensive building programmes, at one point 
adding 45,000 primary schools places each year(159) The 1935 Burney Report 
was finally adopted and there was widespread commitment by government, 
voluntary bodies, business and individuals to widening educational 
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opportunities(160). By 1965 the goal of free, universal primary education 
was the • mmediate aim' and was achieved in 1971. In 1974 the goal of free, 
compulsory junior secondary education was set, and was achieved in 1978. The 
overall target was nine years of a common course, with expansion of the 
senior places. 
Planners did not ignore the place of English language learning during 
the period of reform. The 1964-67 Triennial Survey described the aim of 
schooling as to provide a broad general (academic) education in English. 
Chinese will also be taught so students leave with a reasonable knowledge of 
both cultures..."(161). 
In 1963 Hong Kong's second university, the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, was inaugurated. It was established to meet the demand for higher 
education in the Chinese language. However, as Fu has pointed out, mastery 
of English has proved to be a pivotal factor in gaining in place in many of 
the faculties there also(162). By this decade, mastery of English has 
further increased in importance due to new admissions systems(163). In 1972 
the Hong Kong Polytechnic was established which signalled the beginning of 
an expansion in the provision of places in vocational and technical 
education. 
The 1970's were years of tremendous growth in Hong Kong, and education 
reflected this. The economic success of the last decades gave to more 
Chinese the money to educate their children in Anglo-Chinese schools, and 
eventually eight percent of children were being sent to schools whose main 
language of instruction was English. The dual goals of free, universal 
primary education and free, universal and compulsory secondary education 
were achieved within 7 yeras of each other in the 1970's, and primary and 
secondary curriculum development committees were established in 1972. As 
private consumption figures grew, as the sophistication of its exports grew, 
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as the service industry developed, as Hong Kong people were able to visit 
other countries, the demand for corresponding improvements in education 
reflected these widening horizons. As Hong Kong people oecame more confident 
and assertive, there were calls for more challenge and depth in eduction to 
prepare youth for greater social mobility as well as for jobs requiring more 
skill and responsibility. Hutche,,on writes: In education, this called not 
just for more free places and for more openings in pre-primary and secondary 
schools, but for better teaching, a far greater variety of courses, the 
lifting of the lid on senior, technical and higner education and the 
expansion of adult education"(164). 
In summary, from its early years until the years before the economic 
doom, education in Hong Kong was effectively directed toward well-to-do, 
bilingual, Chinese families. The purpose was to train civil servants and 
local mercnants in the linguistic competency and cultural experiences needed 
to govern the colony and guarantee economic prosperity. Mastery of English 
became very important in achieving prestige in the colony, and desirable 
school places were available only to a few. However, education in colonial 
Hong Kong eventually developed from the provision of 'links' between the 
colonized and tneir rulers to a complex system, comprising 2 universities, 2 
doiytechnics, providing places for all children up to the age 15. Much of 
the growth occured after WWII and paralleled the economic boom of those 
years. 
This description has attempted to demonstrate the link between the 
interaction of colonial government policy and the demands of an ambitious 
public and the effects of this link on Hong Kong education which, in turn, 
is part of the context of the new interaction and transfer prnrePP. The 
following section describes the structure of the system which, it is 
suggested, refects the values of the colonial rulers, the local culture and 
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the effects of 20th century modernization. 
Structure of School System (165) 
The purpose of this subsection is to describe the organization of the 
school system, the Hong Kong context of the interaction process. The 
argument is that the wider availibility of education in Hong Kong affects 
the social context of the transfer by adding contradictions in expectations, 
assumptions, as well as in interests and values between the two societies. 
1. Kindergarten 
The Hong Kong child can attend two to three years of Kindergarten 
between tne ages of tnree and five. In 1985, 87.4% or 230,000 chilcren in 
this age group were in pre-primary schooling. Since primary schools expect 
that Primary 1 children will have already had some schooling, Kindergarten 
has become 'compulsory', at least in practice, and for this reason it is 
included in this description of the structure of education in Hong Kong. 
Kindergartens are ail private institutions, although supervised by the 
Education Department(166). Due to a relative shortage of specialists in 
Early Childhood Education in the department and a lack of formal attention 
and of financial aid, supervision and guidance was, until this decade, 
minimal (167). 
Official inattention contrasted sharply with public attitudes. 
Competition to acquire a Glace in Kindergarten has been fierce because 
places in the desirable Kindergartens (i.e. those with a strong and 
proven-successful academic orientation) are limited and these places are 
considered the best gateways to better primary schools(168). Some 
prestigious Kindergartens require testing for admission, and, therefore, 
children are often taught basic Chinese characters and the English alphabet 
at very young ages with the hopes of passing such entrance tests. 
Kindergarten has traditionally been regarded as toe period of preparation 
for Primary 1 entrance examinations, and the Education Commission noted tnat 
...many kindergartens are still teaching difficult and formalized curricula 
through rote learning"(169). The Report by a Visiting Panel describes 
Kindergarten examination papers as containing more than ten different 
subjects (including one on linguistic competency in English) and lasting two 
hours(170). 
2. Schools 
a. Primary education 
Kindergarten is followed by six years of primary education. There is a 
free place available for each child (sometimes necessitating a school to run 
on a double session programme), altnough a minority still choose to attend 
the 94 private primary schools. Government states that, in 1985, 58% were 
alloted places in schools of their choice, and the remainder alloted places 
in schools in their own districts, also based on parental choice(171). 
However, there are several aided primary schools which are extremely 
sought-after, again because they feed into the desirable secondary schools 
and competition to get into them is intense. 
Teaching is generally done in Chinese, and English is taught to all 
students. A small number of primary schools use English as the medium of 
instruction, and the Report by a Visiting Panel notes(172) that functional 
literacy in English in primary school leavers is confined to children wno 
have attended these schools. Primary schools in Hong Kong follow the same 
curriculum, but their treatment of it varies considerably. Many still follow 
the formal subject-matter approach to teaching, but some are gradually 
adopting, with the encouragement of the Education Department, less-formal, 
child-centered approacnes(173). However, the pupil-reacher average ratio of 
28 to 1(174) and the desire of the community for highly formalized 
instruction are obstacles to innovation in this area. 
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Primary school leavers are ailoted places in junior secondary schools 
on tne basis of the Secondary Schools Places Alliocation System (SSPA). This 
system is Paseo on district nets and internal school assessments scaled by a 
centrally adminstered Academic Aptitude Test. Allocation strives to take 
account of parental choice(175). Because of the use of a quota system in 
allocation, the system benefits those children who have attended the 
preferred primary schools, and depresses tne chances for the less privileged 
children(176). 
b. Secondary schools 
Secondary Schools in Hong Kong can be either an Anglo-Chinese secondary 
(a seven-year programme with instruction mainly in English, serving eighty 
five percent of the population in 1985, or a Chinese Middle school , a 
six-year programme with instruction in Chinese with ESL) or a secondary 
technical school(177). 
At present, places in senior secondary school are awarded according to 
tne 3SEA, and after two years in senior secondary education a student is 
awarded the Hong Kong Certificate of Education (HKCE), According to tneir 
results on the HKCE, some are able to continue to either one or two years of 
sixth-form education. The existence of the two categories in sixth-form 
education is an unresolved situation from the former system in which the 
Chinese Middle schools and the Anglo Secondary scnoois were organized 
differently. The two types of schools were partially fused in order to 
ensure that graduates entering the job market at the end of Form V were 
competitive, at least in numbers of years in the classroom. It also 
corresponds with the differences in admissions requirements to the two 
universities, and has proved 'convenient' in that sense. 
3. Post-School Education 
Post-secondary education in Hong Kong is open to all students, 
47.7 li! 
regardless of economic backround, who meet academic admissions requirements. 
A system of. Government grants and loans, introduced in the late 1960's, 
removed the elitist aspects of universities, in particular, by providing to 
any intellectually qualified candidate an opportunity for a place. However, 
the supply of places is severely limited, and university places are 
available for approximately three percent of the relevant age group. 
Although limited in supply, tertiary education is diversified in mode, 
comprised of six technical institutes, three full-time Colleges of Education 
and the full-time Technical Teachers' College, the Institute 09 Language in 
Education, and two universities. There are two approved post-secondary 
colleges operating diploma courses: the Hong Kong Polytechnic, a 
degree-awarding institution, and the City Polytechnic which awards diplomas. 
The Hong Kong Baptist College will become a degree granting institution in 
this decade(178). 
There are two universities, Hong Kong University and the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. The Chinese University was established to serve 
students from Chinese middle schools, but only a minority of students come 
directly from middle schools. Competency in English is a hidden requirement 
of success at CUHK also, and this has affected the profile of entering 
students. Its four-year programme differs from the three year programme at 
HKU and students can, therefore, sit for the entrance exam after one year of 
post-Form V education. Planning for a third university which will emphasize 
science, technology and business has begun. 
Until this decade there has been little consultation between tertiary 
institutions and Government to decide how to develop the institutions in 
ways that would meet the manpower needs of the community. Universities and 
other institutes have been free to plan their programmes as they believed 
appropriate to both the manpower needs and the cultural welfare of the 
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community, and generally attempt, through their curricula, to support the 
colony's economic, social and cultural growth(179). 
4. Teacher Education 
The issue of teacher supply and quality is prominent in both Hong Kong 
and the PRC as both societies have recently attempted to expand and upgrade 
their education systems. Teachers in Hong Kong fall into four 
classifications: trained or untrained university or equivalent graduates, 
and trained or untrained non-graduates. Less than thirty percent are 
university graduates, or equivalent, and less than two-thirds of the total 
force have had any teacher training. These statistics must be evaluated 
against the fact of the rapid expansion of school places which has occured 
in Hong Kong. 
Also, statistics relating to teacher quality must be evaluated with the 
knowledge that teachers in Hong Kong are expected to be competent in two 
languages. Because of the variety of, and conditions in, schools, the 
shortage of trained teachers, and the high expectations of the Chinese 
society, the issues of teacher preparation and credentials, salary, and job 
description are complex indeed. 
There are, in short, qualitative and quantitative problems to be solved 
by teachers in Hong Kong schools. At present, given the high teacher/pupil 
ratios in classroom, it is difficult to solve the qualitative problems. The 
best teacher, with 40 students in his or her class, will find it difficult 
to experiment with different ways of putting the material across. 
Additionally, the number of teachers available who have the skills to teach 
creatively is small. 
Teacher education in Hong Kong is provided at the non-graduate level by 
the three-year programme at the Education Department's three Colleges of 
Education, and at the graduate level by the Schools of Education at the 
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universities. The colleges are small with limited resources and are often a 
second choice for the students as a diploma from one of them does not carry 
a great deal of status in Hong Kong. Teaching, especially in the primary 
schools, is not a prestigeous position. Teachers who have graduated from the 
universities are often in teaching as a second choice occupation, and are 
waiting for another opportunity to arise in other professions. 
5. Administration 
Education in Hong Kong is administered by the Education Department 
which was only very recently (1981) set up as a separate policy branch of 
the Government Secretariat. The Education Department is adminstered within 
the civil service as a strongly centralized system under the Chief 
Secretary, and the supply of educational facilities is almost entirely 
controlled by government. This department adminsters the "...schools, 
Colleges of Edcuation, the Hong Kong Technical Teachers' College, and the 
Institute of Language in Education. It also advises schools in teaching 
method and curriculum development; allocates school places; plans and 
develops education, including the building of new schools; conducts 
educational research; and provides adult education, special education, 
educational television, careers educationm, student guidance and other 
miscellaneous services"(180). The Government maintains tight controls over 
many aspects of schooling. Government-aided schools, for example, must 
adhere to a prescribed staff structure and report all expenditures. There 
are criticisms that such a system has led to a decline in flexibility and 
creativity in schooling(181). There are, however, few controls over 
curricu)um. Schools do submit curriculum layouts and textbooks for approval, 
but these are matters of quality rather than matters of content(182). The 
Government does occasionally affect the content indirectly, as in the case 
of computer studies, by the introduction of a new subject in the public 
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schools curriculum. 
Since 1984, priorities for allocating education funds have been set 
according to recommendations from the Education Commission, who have stated 
that "...the balance between public and private expenditure on education, 
rates of return on educational investment and the balance of expenditure on 
different sectors of education" are the issues which must be addressed when 
determining priorities(183). 
They have noted that these judgements "... have become difficult 
questions of relative priority and affordability"(184). They also note that 
"...as our work develops, the judgements which have to be made as to what 
extra commitments the Government can undertake will become increasingly 
complex"(185). Apparently 1997 affects many of the financial decisions the 
Commission is making: later they describe their position as planning 
financial strategies while "...assessing the consequences of changing 
circumstances"(186). In this complex political and economic environment they 
have decided that the most urgent financial issues are the future of the 
JSEA and 'positive discrimination' in favour of those schools which choose 
to use Chinese as the medium of instruction. They have justified the great 
financial impact of these priorities in terms of "...very strong educational 
and social reasons"(187)(188). 
Major Aims 
The Hong Kong Education System has articulated a set of aims which 
demonstrate their practical philosophy of education(189). In 1963 the chief 
concern of the policy makers was " ...how best to secure value for 
money..."(190). Almost 20 years later, despite a considerably sounder 
economic climate, increased expenditure on education was Justified as 
"...essential to the economy of Hong Kong"(191). The Hong Kong Education 
Commission in 1984 described the task in terms of "...developing the 
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principal asset of Hong Kong:...its human resources", and of 
"...accomodating the needs of the individual as far as possible, [but] 
within the constraints of the needs of the community"(192). Cheng Kai-Ming 
found "At a macroscopic level, the planning of schooling seeks legitimation 
from manpower forecasting and the planning of higher education is hardly 
geared to the social-economic context"(193). Equality is mentioned by the 
Board of Education in the same sentence as the desire to achieve greater 
efficiency, and both of these aims are listed after apportioning investment, 
harmonizing the needs of the community, and making the most of available 
resources(194). Accountability seems to be evaluated in economic terms. 
In 1981 an overall review of the Hong Kong Education System was 
commissioned by the Hong Kong Government in consulation with the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The terms of 
reference were, in summary, "to identify the future aims of the education 
system, to consider the coherence and effectiveness of the service, to 
identify areas which need strengthening and to make recommendations for 
priorities in its further development" (195). The Report by a Visiting Panel 
and the suhsequent reports from the Government provoked debate in Hong Kong 
and are the basis for the following discussion. 
The Visiting Panel wrote of a "strong attachment in government circles 
to what might be called 'technical' planning - for example, trying to assess 
manpower requirements and making consequential adaptations to the system..." 
(196). The traditional emphasis of planners has been on using resources to 
an economic advantage first and foremost, and, in fact, is consistent with 
the values of many residents: educational choices made almost exclusively on 
a pragmatic basis. 
The Panel criticised this approach of 'technocratic planning 
techniques', and noted a recent move toward participatory governance. They 
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encouraged this trend by suggesting that "...strenuous efforts should be 
devoted to raising the level of parent and community involvement in 
policy-formation and to engage as much expertise as possible (not only from 
within the bureaucracy) in planning"(197). However, the following is added 
to this recommendation 
Any move toward greater participation in 
education decision making and policy formulation 
would add to existing pressure for the 
democratization of the territory's government 
generally. This of course is connected with 
nationalist sentiments but is also an essential 
pre-requisite to sustaining community 
development. Thus even the most well-intentioned 
reforms to educational governance have to be 
temaered bv broader considerations"(198) 
(under)ining added). 
The second area of major criticism in the panel's report was 
concerned with the need for reforms to streamline the bureaucracy of 
policy-making. The Report criticized the 'we/they' attitude throughout 
the school system, i.e. the feeling that "responsibility for and 
knowledge about what in happening lies elsewhere"(199). They suggest 
that the reason for this is an absence of clearly set out and easily 
understood aims in the 'over-adminstered' education system, and they 
recommended establishment of a co-ordinating body, the Education 
Commission, to review the views of the Board of Education, the 
University and Polytechnic Grants Committee (UPGC) and the Vocational 
Training Council. The Commission would then advise the Governor on the 
issues and suggest policy. 
This recommendation was adopted by the Government and an Education 
Commission was set up in 1984 to co-ordinate and give consolidated 
advice to the Governor on educational policy. The Commission, itself, 
has described its ideology as pragmatic and grounded in an attempt to 
meet the changing needs of Hong Kong society, as well as meet the 
growing individual aspirations, but their first set of major policy 
guidelines, which were accepted by the Governor, did not address the 
issue of 1997 directly. They included, rather, recommendations for 
reforms in the examination system, improvement in standards of language 
teaching, advancement of Chinese as a medium of instruction, upgrading 
the teaching service, promotion of open and adult education and 
promotion of researcn and development in education(200). 
Major Contemporary Issues in Education 
The purpose of this subsection is to present an analysis of four 
major issues in contemporary Hong Kong education. These are language of 
instruction and the examination system, the relationship between school 
and work, and the definition and introduction of Civic Education to the 
curriculum. The line of analysis is that each of these issue represents 
an al_ignment of interest groups in the colony, who, it is argued, are 
participating in the process of transfer. 
1. Language of instruction 
The issue of the language of instruction in Hong Kong schools has 
been debated for over 100 years. To many educators, the practice of 
instruction in a language which is foreign to both teacher and student 
is questionable. The results of this practice are readily observable in 
Hong Kong: graduates of English language secondary schools whose 
competency in English varies widely, whose mastery of the remainder of 
the curriculum has been negatively affected by instruction in a foreign 
language, and who are said to be less than literate in both spoken 
Cantonese and written Chinese. Yet, the choice of English language 
schools has been made by eighty percent of parents and has been 
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defended as being a pragmatic reaction to the economic and social 
realities of the colony. The Visiting Panel wrote of Hong Kong 
parents: 
They criticize a teacher for lack of 
English competence rather more readily than for 
teaching of English or Chinese above the level 
of the student's comprehension. This proves the 
trevgbous drive of the Hong Kong people for 
advancement and their realization that formal 
educational qualifications and good knowledge of 
English are important factors in determining the 
chances of advancement(201). 
English has been the language both of the government and of the major 
white-collar jobs in Hong Kong; parents have responded to these social 
realities while the schools have not met the challenge. Complaints about the 
standard of English of school-leavers are common both from employers and 
from teachers in tertiary education. The supply of teachers with competency 
in English falls far short of the demand, and many with competency seem to 
be clustered in the prestigious schools, putting children who are attending 
the other schools at an educational disadvantage. The time given to language 
instruction crowds out other subjects, forcing students to be assigned 
excessive hours of homework after a difficult school day - to compete and to 
prepare for the next examination (which will usually be given in the English 
language.) Language competency affects not only the school-leaver in the 
workplace, but also has a profound effect on his or her progress through the 
school system and can be the determining factor in gaining a place in the 
universities. Students succeed in the system only as well as they can 
express, in English, what they have learned. 
Recommendations from the locally-appointed Education Commission have 
been made about the promotion of Chinese as tne medium of instruction in 
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Hong Kong schools on the grounds that teaching and learning are more 
effective in the mother tongue. However, despite these recommendations and 
other calls for change from local educators(2O2) , based on the perceived 
need for Government to formulate a language policy which attempts to 
anticipate the social changes brought about by 1997, no comprdnsive language 
programme has been announced by Government which meets these 
recommendations. 
2. Examination System 
Education in Hong Kong has been described as no more than a means to an 
end: a highly utilitarian experience which offers economic and career 
advancement to successful students. Being successful , however, requires 
compromises over personal development and over the sense of personal 
fulfil,ment, especially because the number of places for whicn the students 
are competing is very small. Fu has written: "There is a tenseness about 
Hong Kong students. They are aware, subconsciousy at first and then very 
consciously, that families, prestige, and even existence itself depend on 
how much they "study" and how well they do on their exams"(203). She has 
described the "...massive stream of centrally organized examinations... a 
constant stream of internal course examination (even kindergarten children 
have 'mid-term' and 'final' exams) but there are also the government and 
university exams which decisively affect the students' options and 
possibilities"(204). 
Most agree that some form of selection is necessary in a developing 
economy in order to rank students systematically for assignment to the 
preferred educational places. However, it has been suggested that the 
intensity and frequency of examinations in Hong Kong are not defensible 
conditions in a society with as successful an economy as Hong Kong 
enjoys(205). 
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The Visiting Panel enumerated several important factors in the 
examination issue. These are the frequency of exams; the significance of 
each examination result for determining educational options which remain 
open to the student; the constricting effects that non-school based 
examinations have on curriculum and the character of individual schools, 
and, lastly, the risk inequality of life chances arising from great 
differences in quality among schools, and arising also from the fact that 
examination success often depends not only on competence in that subject but 
also on fluency in a (foreign) language(206). 
These factors are discussed in the following section. 
a. the frequency of exams 
The examinations occur with unsurpassed frequency. In the course of a 
school career, a child may sit eight sets of exams which are not diagnostic 
classroom tests and which are significant in opening up or closing off 
educational, and ultimately life, options for the student. As noted in the 
previous section, a child may be tested and interviewed to determine 
'suitability' for certain feeder kindergartens. More formal testing can be 
required for certain preferred primary schools, and towards the end of 
primary school there is a period of internal and official testing as the 
basis of the junior secondary school places allocation scheme. 
During Form III, students are evaluated according to the Junior 
Secondary Education Assessment (JSEA), a series of procedures which lasts 
from November to May, and on this basis are awarded places in Form 4. The 
JSEA attempts to allocate students on the basis of an internal assessment, 
consisting of performance in mid-year and final examinations in Form 3 and a 
scaling test in Mathematics, English, and Chinese. The results of the 
scaling test are used to compare schools and calculate differences in 
standards of marking between schools. Students are eventually allocated 
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according to performance on the internal examinations and parental choice. 
In Form V, students sit for the Hong Kong Certificate of Education 
Examnination which serves as a general record of attainment and as admission 
to Form VI or other advanced/technical education depends. After taking that 
examination, students can follow either a two-year sixth form course in the 
Angio-Chinese Schools leading to the Advanced Level Examnination to compete 
for entrance to the HKU, the more advanced courses at the polytechnics, the 
Baptist College and Lingnam College; or else follow a one-year sixth form 
in a Chinese Middle School) leading to the Higher Level Examination for 
entry to the CUHK and She 'fan College. The Chinese University has recently 
introduced a Provisional Acceptance scheme which permits entrance at the end 
of Form 6 on the basis of performance on the HK Advanced Level Examination. 
Experience has shown that the demand for senior secondary education has 
been 85% of the 15 year old population. Thus at the post-Form V level there 
is no comprehensive curriculum, but two different courses, leading to 
different sets of tertiary opportunities. Many students who have been 
successful to this stage maximize their chances of a place in higher 
education by taking the two sets of examinations which have little 
relationship to each other. 
The most recent policy is to phase out the Junior Secondary Education 
Assessment (JSEA) in 1991 through a progressive expansion of subsidized 
full-time post-Form 3 educational opportunities. The policy on the issue of 
Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education since the 1978 White Paper The 
Development of Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education has been to expand 
the number of subsidized places to provide enough places for those students 
to meet the standards of advanced education, and to eliminate the need for 
this examination. 
b. the significance of each examination result for determining 
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educational options which remain open to the student 
Some inequality of provision of school places might be defended as 
inevitable after a prolonged period of intensive expansion of services, as 
Hong (ong has exper enced. Hong Kong has moved towards equality of provision 
in the last decade(207): more places have been provided and the allocation 
system has loosened up so that secondary schools are required to accept 
students from a broader pool of schools(208). However, performance of 
schools still varies widely and, there exists wide disparities in the amount 
of public resources children in different types of schools receive(209), The 
competition to obtain a place in the better funded schools is, therefore, 
intense. At the upper end of the system, there is an extreme shortage of 
tertiary level places. For example, the Chinese University notes that "over 
20,000 students sat the ... public examinations held in 1985 and 1261 were 
admitted to first year studies in the university"(210). 
c. the constricting effects that non-school based examinations have on 
curriculum and the character of individual schools 
A recent example of this is that when the three JSEA-related 
examinations were introduced, schools responded by putting greater emphasis 
on these three subjects at the expense of other concerns(211)). Examinations 
have a constricting effect on school curricula and the character of 
individual schools. The Visiting Panel noted that(212) public examinations 
dominate the style and content of learning in the classroom in Hong Kong. 
Cheng is more direct in stating that "...public examination is the only 
ruler of curriculum in Hong Kong"(213). 
At the post-Form V level, this domination of examination content over 
curriculum has wider effects. Firstly, those students hoping for places at 
Hong Kong University tend to choose arts subjects because of the nature of 
the entrance examination, whatever their individual ability might be. 
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Secondly, the vast majority of students do not obtain places at the colleges 
or universities but have not had the benefit of a broad education to prepare 
them for the workforce(214). 
d. the risk inequality of life chances arising from great differences 
in quality among schools, and also from the fact that examination success 
often depends not only on competence in that subject but also on fluency in 
a (foreign) language 
Those who pass successfully through the examination process and attain 
a place at university can expect to earn, as a starting salary, over 200% of 
the colony's median salary (irrespective of length of service), while a 
graduate of the Polytechnic earns about 140%, calculated on the same 
basis(215). Hsia found that households headed by university graduates earn 
two to three times more than households headed by middle/secondary school 
graduates, and that the latter in turn earn twice as much as primary school 
leavers(216). 
3. School and Work 
Society expects its school system to meet several demands vis a vis its 
labor needs. Firstly, schools should prepare the student for a life of work 
by giving them basic skills, attitudes, and a common core of information. 
Schools should also assess and counsel these students, performing a sifting 
and sorting operation to help youth place themselves in work appropriate to 
their perceised abilities. In Hong Kong, according to the 1984 Education 
Commission Report, the expectations beyond the basic ones are that the 
schools should provide courses related to the needs of industry by helping 
meet the demand for skilled manpower, and an earlier report (1981) writes of 
the needs to " develop adaptive human capital"(217). 
The issue of the ties between school and work has only been publicly 
debated in Hong Kong in the past 1O-12 years, due probably to emphasis first 
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on the goal of providing 9 years of free, universal education. 
As recently as 1977, T. Y. Cheng wrote that the utilization of manpower 
in Hong Kong was seriously handicapped by the fact that most workers were 
products of a secondary school system with an academic emphasis(218). At 
that time, for example, of a quarter million students in secondary schools, 
only ten thousand were studying vocational courses although forty eight 
percent of the school leavers would find jobs in industry(219). 
In Hong Kong, although an official bias toward vocational education has 
emerged, no schools in the system prepare pupils for a specific vocation. 
InsItutions outside the school system provide this service in the form of 
training centers, technical institutes providing training at the craft 
level. The Hong Kong Polytechnic, and the universitites provide training at 
the degree and technologist level and a Vocational Training Council has been 
set up which recommended provision of more places to meet industry's needs. 
Their consensus seems to be that, by improving the quality and immediacy of 
the rewards of these programmes, their attractiveness to parents will be 
increased. 
The problem of easing the transition from school to work in Hong Kong 
has been complicated by two specific factors. The origins of the first can 
be found in the unsupervised manner in which the economic system functions. 
This style does not allow for rigid manpower planning, and it has been very 
difficult for individuals making educational and vocational decisions, as 
well as for the educational system to plan curricula and enrol,ment. The 
only generalities which emerged in the most recent years from examination of 
the economic and political trends in Hong Kong were that the service sector, 
trade, banking, tourism, administration, would grow relative to the 
industrial sector, and that youth leaving school in this decade may have to 
change jobs several times because of the very rapid pace of modernization in 
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Hong Kong. 
The second problem is rooted in the belief held by most parents that an 
academic education is the best kind for their children to have. In Hong 
Kong, ninety eight percent of the population is Chinese who have 
traditionally valued the study of the Classics, literature, history, and an 
'elitist' education. Parents in Hong Kong appear convinced that every child 
is suited to this kind of education, and therefore, despite recent increased 
availability of public places in technical and vocational schools, private, 
academically-based schools continue to proliferate. 
In the last decade, the public has begun to understand the purposes of 
technical education, and there is an increase in the number of technical and 
vocational students over five years ago. However, :t is still regarded as a 
second class education and, despite government attempts to raise the status 
by including vocational courses in all junior secondary curricula, it 
remains a consolation prize in the opinion of most. 
4. Civic education(220) 
In the political atmosphere of 1984(221), the government was called 
upon by local educators to compels schools to include a non-examinable 
curriculum component which would raise the political awareness of the 
pupils(222). In August 1985, the "Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools' 
were issued by the Education Department, the purpose of which was to assist 
schools to "...renew their commitment to the preservation of social order 
and the promotion of civic awareness and responsibility"(223). The 
Guidelines define Civic Education as "...synonymous with education for 
citizenship"(224), but add that Civic Education is not synonomous with 
education for democracy because this term (democracy) is "difficult to 
interpret"(225). The Guidelines assert that Civic education in Hong Kong is 
a method of political socialization, i.e. " ...a process through which ... 
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members of a society are induced to accept and conform to traditionally 
established ways of life"(226). Critics of this philosophy, in the words of 
the Guidelines, "...would prefer to see young people grow up with reforming 
zeal , prepared to question established authority and introduce radical 
changes"(227). The Education Department, and the Government, have chosen, 
instead, to "... {emphasize] civic education as a politically socializing 
force for promoting stability and responsibility"(228). 
An evaluation of the Civics curriculum guidelines was carried out to 
determine what actions were taken by schools and to determine school views 
on the useflness of the Guidelines. The Report on the evaluation noted that 
"A fair numbers of the lessons observed in secondary schools included some 
aspects of civic education"(229). However, further reports indicate that, up 
to the time of the survey, approximately only a third of the schools had 
discussed general school policy on civic education. Teachers reported 
several problems in the implementation of the Guidelines(230). Among them 
are that the heavy commitment, to teaching the subject syllabuses, left 
little time for introducing civic education, - and there were difficulties 
experienced in rousing pupils' interests. (Chapter 4 discusses this point 
with regard to survey findings on student perception of need for skilled 
professionals in the areas of law and government). 
In conclusion, the preceding analysis suggests that the interest groups 
aligned around these issues consist of parents representing students, local 
educators, local employers, and Government and school adminstrators. Each of 
these participants in the Hong Kong education situation, at present possess 
an identifiable resource, either expertise, power, or wealth. As Archer has 
argued, change in education is the product of the exchange of these kinds of 
resources and the nature of the change is determined by the relative 
strength of each participant(230). In the rapidly evolving Hong Kong 
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situation access to some resources by some participants may eventually be 
limited, thus making speculation about eventual resolution of these issues 
difficult. 
V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Political events which occured approximately 40 years ago, in Asia 
generally and in China especially, set off in Hong Kong a period of 
tremendous population increases, significant,economic growth, affecting many 
of its socio-cultural systems. The millions of Chinese who have emigrated to 
Hong Kong since the end of World War II arrived, for the most part, with no 
capital assets, but they, and their children, today comprise the new middle 
class in the colony. Chapter 2 described the contemporary Hong Kong 
socio-cultural, economic, and educational contexts which emerged from this 
social upheaval, and which now comprise the Hong Kong context of the 
decolonization and transfer process. 
The analysis of the economic system suggested that its successful 
modernization and diversification resulted from the interaction of these 
historical forces, governmental policies, rapid industrialization, and the 
availability of an ambitious workforce. In addition, this section suggested 
that many important links with the PRC economic structure are already in 
place. 
The description of the socio-cultural systems emphasized the 
adaptability and pragmatism of the people, illustrating how they have 
accomZdated Western influences, colonial government and, yet, not lost 
certain traditional values of their Chinese heritage. In addition, the 
political system was discussed. The issue of why the Hong Kong people have 
not yet developed an effective political infrastructure at the grassroots 
level was examined, especially as this issue is affecting the transfer 
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process. 
The final, expanded, section on the education system traced its history 
and structure, and concluded with discussion of the aims and contemporary 
issues facing the system. The education system reflects its British 
influences - comprising a mixture of state, aided, and private schools, 
universal primary and secondary education with school certificate 
examinations, and optional and separate preparation for university. It has 
also been influenced by the value systems of Hong Kong, in that it is 
utilized by the population as a means to economic and social advancement. 
Overall, the chapter described the socio-cultural and economic systems 
of Hong Kong as still evolving from its history, location, as well as from 
its ethnic and political characteristics. Within the systems, there are 
areas of contradictions with systems of the PRC. These contradictions, it 
has been suggested, are likely sources of tension during, and after, the 
decolonization and transfer of sovereignity. Identification of 
contradictions is extended in Chapter 3, which, although focused on the 
socio-cultural and economic systems of the PRC, will refer to those Hong 
Kong systems, which not only differ from, but also contradict, systems in 
the PRC system. 
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Commission Report No. 2, p. 24, endorsed the recommendation of the UPGC that 
an open university not be established in Hong Kong. They, however, 
recommended that open education should be developed at the secondary and 
post-secondary levels, and in the area of management education (see 
Education Commission Reqort No 2, 1986, op. cit., for a detailed 
discussion of this issue). 
Lastly, increased Research in Education. The continuation of existing 
educational research effort and the coordination of educational research 
activities for the purpose of planning and formulating educational policies 
was recommended. At present, the Educational Research Unit has been 
primarily concerned with the issue of medium of instruction. Research has 
also been conducted in the areas of academic standards in Primary school, 
and on aptitude testing for students seeking admission into pre-vocational 
schools. 
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CHAPTER 3 
'ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS': THE PRC CONTEXT 
I PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
The broad purpose of this chapter is to describe the socio-cultural, 
economic and educational systems of the PRC. Within that description, the 
chapter attempts to highlight specific areas in which the PRC differs from 
Hong Kong. The chapter also attempts to demonstrate that there are areas of 
economic and educational development for which the PRC does not have the 
resources needed for its continued progress. These are areas in which Hong 
Kong, as a more advanced economy, could contribute to continued development 
in the PRC. 
The argument of this chapter is that, within the PRC, there are 
special socio-political and economic institutions which have evolved 
because of the impact of a socialist ideology on the Chinese culture, and 
which, therefore, are very different from their parallel institutions in 
Hong Kong. As suggested in Chapter 2, these differences, or contradictions, 
between the societies help to define the contexts in which the societies 
will be required to interact in order to achieve successful merger. The 
chapter also argues that because the PRC has not achieved economic success 
equivalent to Hong Kong, Hong Kong gains negotiating power in the transfer 
process. 
This chapter is organized, like Chapter 2, as a broad survey of the 
economic, socio-cultural and political systems of the PRC. Within this 
organization, subcategories were chosen to highlight those PRC institutions 
and ideologies which contradict aspects of Hong Kong's situation. 
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II THE PRC ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS 
This section on the economic system has two purposes which are similar 
to the corresponding survey of the Hong Kong economic system. The first is 
to provide an overview of the PRC economic system as the time of merger 
approaches. The economic system of the PRC has attempted to modernize and 
diversify since the founding of the State in 1949. A combination of 
political , geographic and demographic factors have slowed development, with 
subsequent negative effects on social and educational progress. Therefore, 
to understand social contradictions, the economic system, and its component 
parts, are included in this discussion. In other words, analysis of 
selected parts of the economic system is relevant to the argument of the 
chapter about structural contradictions between the PRC and Hong Kong. 
The line of analysis pursued in this section is to demonstrate that 
the complexity of the problem facing Hong Kong cannot be fully understood 
without investigating differences in the economic systems. It argues that 
these differences cause structural contradiction between the societies. 
The detailed categories in this section are history and government 
policy, and major components of the economic system. 
History and Government Policy 
The Chinese Communist Party which assumed control over the Chinese 
nation in 1949 had been since its origin a Marxist party. It was officially 
founded in 1923 in Shanghai by a group which had been profoundly impressed 
by the Russian revolution. They saw Russia as providing the best model for 
modernizing China and for establishing an international position and the 
declared aim of the Party was to create a fully socialist state in 
China(1). The economy that they had to contend with, when they came to 
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power, was as it had been for 2,000 years: an agricultural, iron-age 
economy(2) with three quarters of the population directly engaged in farm 
work and four-fifths dependent on the land(3). Farming techniques were 
primitive and yields low. In the cities were the remnants of a 
semi-colonial economy "...characterized by extra-territorial rights, the 
treaty ports, and various spheres of foreign influence (which had been) 
decisive in both the growth of the factory system and in the establishment 
of state-controlled enterprises" which had distinctly western 
characteristics and ties(4). 
Most modern industry had been destroyed by wars: three years of Civil 
War, preceded by resistance against Japanese occupation which lasted from 
1937-1945, and which in turn had been preceded by twenty five years of 
civil wars. The industry remaining was mainly handicraft production. The 
situation was critical: industry, agriculture, communications and transport 
had all been seriously damaged, inflation was widespread, and floods in 
1949 affected over a third of the arable land. The immediate task was to 
restore, as much as possible, normal processes of economic life(5). 
However, the Party was united in its intention to undo the damage of 
the previous wars. A new, regional, organization was quickly established of 
six economic and military administrative zones which were administered by 
local functionaries. These officials were chosen as much for their 
political reliability and class backround as for administrative 
expertise(6). Local government structure was paralleled by, and not always 
distinguishable from, a network of CCP officials(7) and their overall 
responsibility was to establish a basis for a collective economy in the 
countryside. 
Their immediate tasks, however, were more basic. Cities, and much of 
the countryside were experiencing severe shortages of necessities and the 
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major priority was to restore agricultural and consumer goods production 
and secure freer movement of commodities. Communications had to be restored 
and the marketing networks for foodstuffs had to be re-established. 
A second urgent task was to stablilize the currency. Depreciation of 
previous currencies had been one of leading causes for the downfall of 
earlier governments and the CCP wished to avoid the same error. 
In the course of 1949, therefore, the Party attempted to stabilize the 
economy by making widely available food and other necessities and by 
controlling inflation. As new areas were occupied by the Red Army, a 
network of large monopolistic trading companies were formed. These 
facilitated the desired price controls, and provided a two-directional flow 
of necessities: they mobilized food for the cities and then sold, directly 
to the peasants, commodities from the cities. After the official foundation 
of the new State, state trading companies were established from these 
companies thereby giving to the government the complete control of the 
wholesale trade which it wanted in order to prevent exploitation and 
inflation(R). 
By the 1950's, the CCP had managed to achieve a steady annual growth 
rate, and had begun to "...[transform] the structure of ownership in 
industry and agriculture and(bring) about far-reaching changes in the 
material and social livelihood of [the people]"(9). However, the economy 
was growing increasingly overcentralized and the bureaucracy was becoming 
ponderous, resulting in disputes between 'rightist' and 'leftist' elements 
within the CCP. Opposition to the collectivisation policy was developing 
within the rightist faction of the Party, which opposed it on the grounds 
that total collectivisation was undermining the existing production 
base(10). Opposition was also developing among the rich peasants, who were 
losing their early enthusiasm for production under the new system(11). 
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The Great Leap Forward Movement was begun under the leadership of the 
leftists in 1958 to address the problems of overcentralizat on and the 
inefficient bureaucracy. People's Communes were 'formed which would take 
over all the administrative functions of the member villages, assign work 
and production quotas and be responsible to the State in meeting quotas. 
They were "... viewed as decentralized and self-reliant units of state 
power run and adminstered by the peasants"(12). In real ity,  the Party and 
its bureaucracy continued to dominate at the local level (13). 
This programme was, in turn, defeated by a series of major set-backs 
which occured in the early 1960's. Agricultural output dropped over several 
harvests. Even though the Soviets had withdrawn their aid and bad weather 
had affected several harvests, opponents of collectivisation took the 
opportunity to attribute the poor performances to the policies of the Great 
Leap Forward movement(14). They were able to gain power and install a more 
centralized and flexible system of control over the peasants which 
de-emphasized the class struggle and rewarded efficiency and initiative. 
These rightists represented an "urban-oriented, educationally elitist" 
strategy which stood in opposition to the "rural-oriented, mass-mobilizing" 
strategy of the Maoists(15). 
By 1962, after the first successful harvest for several years, the 
rightists were confident enough to take credit and openly to criticize Mao 
for damage to the Chinese economy "... due to the loss of 'material 
incentive' and 'individual initiative' which resulted from a 'hasty process 
of collectivisation"(16). 
By the mid 1960's, despite years of consistently excellent harvests, 
the leftists regained sufficient political support to inaugurate the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In the countryside, most of their hostile 
activity was directed against those who had al„   gned themselves with the 
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rightist wing of the Party. The movement to dismantle the commune system 
was reversed, and politics and class struggle replaced production as the 
major concern. Material incentives were eliminated in favour of the 
'collective interest'; individual initiative was discouraged in favour of 
mass-mobilization. 
In the early 1970's, the rightists began to re-appear. The authority 
of factory managers was gradually rehabilitated, the Chinese foreign policy 
began the moves which led to the present 'open door'policy, and some purged 
leaders began to be heard in positions of authority(17). At the time of the 
agreement with the United Kingdom on Hong Kong, many al' these leaders were 
in power and were, once again, imposing their particular interpretation of 
the aims of the CCP on the economy of China. 
The reforms occuring at the time of the signing of the Joint 
Declaration were rightist. An article in the China Daily , a newspaper 
which represents the Party's viewpoint, demonstrates how the CCP laid the 
philosophical groundwork, through the media, for the reversal of policy and 
the current economic reforms. Describing the dangers of obstructing the 
development of the new structure by clinging to old ideas (such as the 
practice of price-freezing and aiming for absolute egalitarianism in 
distribution), the Party called upon the people to get ideologically and 
psychologically ready to accept the changes. Such concepts as the 
importance of 'class struggle', the 'purity' of public ownership, and other 
'various leftist ideas' are described as hampering the reforms : "...the 
goal of a socialist-commodity economy can only be realized when the 
concepts generated in a ... natural economy are put aside. ... [people who] 
refuse to recognize that producing for market is an innate 
characterstic of a socialist economy, and not necessarily capitalist, 
hamper the reforms"(18). 
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A Chinese economist indicated that China is in the "historical stage 
of transition from a natural and semi-natural economy to a commodity 
economy"(19). Also referred to as a 'socialist-market economy', the new 
system "... is a network of economic policies which have led to the 
expansion of market forces co-existing with diminished state-planning of 
distribution(20). Zhang wrote that the goals are "to enliven the economy, 
expand the role of the market and of private entrepreneurship in city and 
country by raising wages and bonuses, stepping up production of consumer 
goods and propagating the new consumer ideology"(21). More specific goals 
are to quadruple production by the year 2000 and to modernize China in 75 
years(22). Analysts believe that success rests on China's capacity to 
industrialize, increase its exports, and to attract foreign investment(23). 
Within the Party, the leftists have criticized the present regime for 
abandoning the goal of socialism. The response of those promoting the 
reforms was that the commodity economy is an interim goal on the road to 
socialism and that "amassing profits and making foreign investments are 
necessary to achieving socialism 'with Chinese characteristics"(24). 
Advocates of the present policy have also attempted, through the media, to 
win public support for the programmes. As part of this campaign to bring 
peoples' thinking into line about the relative worth of material vs. moral 
incentives, Zhang compared getting money to winning a medal for heroism on 
the battlefield: it is gained in the struggle to achieve a communist state 
in China. Therefore, he adds, people must change their attitude towards 
money: money is the wheel of social movement; it must not be looked upon 
with hatred. He carefully adds that it is necessary to control one's 
attitude toward money and avoid corruption(25). On this theme Deng has 
commented that Marxism is flexible and capable of absorbing such 
innovations. He continued: "China's developing a commodity economy is a 
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great breakthrough in Marxist political economics"(26). 
In order to retain political power the present government must 
maintain that the new market-economy plays a relatively minor, controlled 
part in the national economy, and that the Marxist ideology is still the 
guiding principle. Indeed, at present, privately-owned enterprises cover 
less than two percent of industrial production and the highest government 
projection is twenty percent of GDP one day(27). 
The following subsections describe two major components of the 
economic system of the PRC, industry and agriculture. The overall 
principles of modernization policy are the same for agriculture and 
industry: to offer material incentives for work, to reduce admininstrative 
interference, and to open a role for market forces. However, although these 
most recent policies are consistent with established practices in Hong 
Kong, economic policy since the founding of the State has been 
characterized by lack of prolonged commitment to individual economic 
programmes. As the following subsection will show, the lack of consistent 
policy has undermined chances of successful modernization in these areas. 
Major Components of the SiEtem 
1. Industrialization 
The industries of the PRC employ a workforce of approximately one 
hundred and twenty three million. Ninety percent of PRC industries are 
relatively small in scale but these provide fifty percent of the country's 
industrial output(28). The new policy emphasizes making factories 
profitable and gearing output to market demand, rather than attempting to 
follow the guidelines of a central plan. Factories were recently given 
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greater autonomy in personnnel and production planning and by the next 
year, 1985, industrial growth had soared by twenty three percent by mid 
year(29). 
In order to guarantee success for China's economic reforms, factories 
must modernize. Lack of modernization has left them generally inefficient 
and unprofitable, and they have also ignored the factor of market forces in 
their decision-making and planning(30). These factors are considered 
significant in holding China's total modernization effort back, and the 
upgrading of industrial plants, retraining the workforce, and a rational 
system of wages and prices are necessary improvements. 
In an attempt to solve some of these problems, the latest policies 
have tied income to effort. The iron rice bowl for workers at state 
enterprises, which was introduced by Mao and guaranteed everyone a job and 
an equal standard of living, has been eliminated. Formerly, workers were 
assigned to state enterprises, which then arranged their housing, medical 
expenses, child-care services, cultural activities, pension, and also gave 
preferential hiring to other members of the family(31). This commitment to 
universal employment resulted in over-staffing, depressed productivity, and 
hoarding of skilled workers by factory leaders(32). New work rules, from 
October 1, 1986, introduced work contracts for all new workers which 
describe the worker's Job and permit firing the individual if the job is 
not done. Under the new system, skilled and qualified workers are able to 
change jobs and be head-hunted by industries needing their skills. Until 
now, large industries have attracted better technicians and engineers 
leaving the smaller firms, which are in the majority, without sufficient 
skilled advisors. Scientists and experts are now being encouraged to leave 
the bigger factories and work for the smaller(33) and under the new system, 
this move is easily carried out. 
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However, problems with these most recent industrial reforms are 
already emerging. As yet there is no system to help those wokers made 
redundant to find new work, and no system to provide the housing, medical 
and other services which the workplace had provided(34). It has been 
reported that as much as thirty percent of the staff and workers in urban 
enterprises are redundant and there are one hundred and fifty million more 
surplus workers in the countryside, nearly three times the current 
industrial workforce(35). Limited unemployment insurance has been 
introduced with the new regulations, but generally employers have proven 
reluctant to fire anyone because the consequences are so harsh(36). 
The Party itself is proving to be a significant obstacle to the 
reforms(37). Traditionally, the party secretary and the plant manager 
shared decision-making. The government directs that the local Party must 
stay out of management and concern itself with the workers' ideology, but 
the local cadres are resisting giving up their power and are slowing the 
pace of reforms. Local officials do have the responsibility to make sure 
plans developed at the management level are properly executed, but 
criticisms of these local officials are widespread(38). They have been 
accused of '...paying only lip service to the need to give enterprises more 
decision-making power [because of their] entrenched self-interest and 
corruption"(39). 
2. The rura economy 
The present reforms in agriculture represent a partial reversal of the 
collectivization model. The sale of land to individuals is still 
prohibited, but other assets, such as trucks, and machinery, have been 
dispersed to individuals. Rural problems have been the most persistent in 
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every attempt at national development in China. The present regime 
initiated in 1978 major social and economic rural reforms, known as the 
Rural Responsibility System (RRS) which has spread rapidly. The communes 
have been abolished and replaced by small townships. It is primarily a 
system of allocation of fields to individuals who agree to meet quotas. 
Family farming has again become the norm. These farmers may keep everything 
above the quota for private sale. The coercion techniques of previous 
reform attempts have been replaced by incentives(40). 
In addition to reforms concerned directly with agricultural 
productivity, others are aimed at revitalizing the surrounding areas to 
encourage revival of small towns. To attract population to work at 
non-farming ocupations in the new townships, workshops and plants have been 
built. By 1983 the RRS had been adopted by over ninety eight percent of the 
rural production teams. It appears to have brought considerable wealth to a 
few and some improvement in the income of many. 
That some peasants have benefitted is not in doubt. Their annual per 
capita income has nearly tripled to US107.00 Dollars. However, the new 
prosperity has not yet reached everyone and the old inequalities have 
increased. Again the coastal peasants are benefitting sooner than those in 
remote regions it has been suggested that those coastal peasants were 
already advantaged, and that the reforms are not helping the more needy. 
Furthermore, quota problems are arising as farmers prefer to raise the more 
profitable crops over the necessary grain. Modernization of the farming 
techniques has left many farmers unemployed and they often migrate to the 
cities - where there are already problems over providing employment for 
many urban people(41). 
There have been a rush of articles in the Chinese press reminding the 
eight hundred million rural population of the dangers of feudalism and the 
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need for farmers to "up-date" their beliefs(42). Criticizing the concepts 
of small-scale farming and of patriarchal clanship as standing in the way 
of modernization, the Party aims to "nudge people out of the 'narrow' 
mentality of paternalism and factionalism which slow down progress toward a 
commodity economy"(43). Farmers are criticized for looking down on business 
people. Acknowledging that this is a long-held attitude, further 
strengthened by the 'erroneous political guidance' of the leftists, the 
Party suggests that farmers should put it behind them and recognize the 
importance of profits and begin to "seek profits by all legal means"(44). 
In conclusion, the degree to which the PRC has achieved successful 
diversification and modernization of its economy falls short of its needs, 
and, when compared to the experiences of the Hong Kong economy over the 
same period, far short of the degree of success which Hong Kong has 
experienced. The PRC remains largely dependent on an relatively simple 
economic base in agriculture and industry. The following subsection 
attempts to show that, despite attempts to modernize and place economic 
growth as the major national goal, the economy is confronted with serious 
problems. The State is attempting to cope with accelerated growth rate, 
regional inequalities, unemployment, emigration to the cities - all 
situations which have been exacerbated by its economic programmes. In 
addition, the Party has ideological problems brought about by the 
discrepancy between many new policies and socialist principles. 
PRC Economy Poised for the 1990's 
As noted, the economy has yet been able to achieve significant 
diversification. However, the modernization reforms in the PRC have shown 
progress - which has led to other problems. On the one hand, the 
agricultural reforms have turned China from an importer to a net exporter 
of grain and cotton, and enabled it to feed itself. But, on the other hand, 
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the resulting moderate increase in prosperity led to severe problems with 
foreign exchange and excessive annual growth. The new wealth led to a 
splurge in buying of foreign goods by individuals and by firms, and the 
drain on the country's foreign exchange reserve alarmed the officials. The 
average growth rate during the past five years has been more than ten 
percent, which the government is attempting to slow down, through 
restrictions on purchasing foreign goods, to around seven percent, a figure 
they believe best for their economy(45). 
Differences in income between the traditionally prosperous areas and 
the poor areas are now greater than at any time since 1949(46). The Party 
is attempting to use this information as an incentive to the poorer regions 
and it refers to a survey which demonstrates that those areas in which 
economic reform began, and in which the door has been opened to the outside 
world, are already enjoying a higher standard of living, including annual 
income, chances of employment, and a better diet(47). However, the same 
wealthier areas experienced double-digit inflation for the first time in 
1985 and the party leaders themselves admit to "...many comments and 
complaints from the masses" about the reforms themselves"(48). 
Unemployment seems certain to increase particularly in cities as they 
are being flooded with job-seekers. Economic indicators suggest that 
finding employment will become even more difficult over the next five years 
and S. Rosen suggests that, therefore, the Party must prepare the 
population for an era of limits(49). Although the government has been 
making attempts to overcome the youth unemployment problem in particular, 
their basic policies work against these efforts: as the state cuts back by 
closing inefficient enterprises and reducing the size of the bureaucracy, 
umemployment rises. In 1980 the state was able to absorb forty percent of 
all new workers, in 1981, under thirty percent, and in 1982, only twenty 
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percent of all new workers(50). These newly unemployed are being urged by 
the state to use initiative and create individual enterprises in the 
non-state sector of the new economy to solve their problems. 
Emigration of peasants to the cities is a serious problem for economic 
planners. Recent statistics about the cities of the PRC highlight the fact 
that this situation is at crisis point as the PRC enters the 1990's. There 
are estimates of from fifty thousand million to one hundred thousand 
million emigrants from the rural areas already in the cities. An additional 
three hundred and fifty thousand million peasants are expected to leave the 
land over the next fifteen years(51). The danger of these emigrants 
becoming a permanent underclass causing political or social problems 
undermines growth in the overall economy. The present regime will be aware 
that during the Cultural Revolution it was just such groups that provided 
manpower for the revolt against the more privileged groups. 
The PRC has responded to this situation with a plan to develop more 
small cities to ease pressure on the existing large cities. It has been 
reported that there were one hundred ninety one city governments in 1978 
and that there will be approximately six hundred in the year 2000, with an 
additional twenty thousand smaller cities (townships)(52). This, and other 
announcements by the Party, have begun to reverse the official line about 
cities. Previously, the official line was that urbanization was an 
undesirable consequence of capitalist production methods and, especially 
during the Cultural Revolution, there were mass transfers of people from 
the urban areas to the countryside(53). The present government, however, is 
pointing out that ninety percent of China's intelligenia live in cities 
and that cities were the origins of modern civilization. Marx has been 
included in their defence: his remark that the London of his time, with two 
and a half million people working together, created far greater wealth than 
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if they each worked alone is often cited as support for their position(54). 
Political leaders are having internal Party problems also. The 
adversaries of rightist reformation, although agreeing that modernization 
is desirable, believe that the new policies, including westernization of 
some techniques, will result in "an unplanned economy, regional 
inequalities, corruption and possibly even hunger - all of which will, in 
turn, lead to social disorder"(55). These opponents believe reforms are 
going too far. They have focused their complaints on public anxiety over 
prices, the drop in grain production, and the huge foreign-trade deficit, 
plus the rising incidence of economic crime and corruption. And, although 
it is possible to explain credibly the economic set-backs they list, they 
insist that the idea of the "primacy of the planned economy and the 
subordinate role of the market is not obsolete"(56). 
Despite an unstable economic period at the beginning of 1987 which 
caused criticism of recent freedoms, the Party continued with the campaign 
- under the slogan "Don't worry, get rich" - to assure people that the 
capitalists of yesterday are the models of today. The experience of the 
past thirty years, according to a senior Party official, Bo 'fib°, has 
taught that State, collective and private enterprises are need to build a 
socialist country 'marked by Chinese characteristics'. Adding that this 
policy will not change, Bo assured private business people that getting 
rich will not cause them trouble(57). 
China's leading and most influential economists examined the recent 
problems with economic reforms and reported through the media "that it is 
not enough simply to place the state enterprise into a market enviroment - 
it must have full autonomy to act, extensive and reliable information on 
which to base its actions, and finally the enterprise must be able to 
articulate and act in its own interests as distinct from the interests of 
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either that state or its own personnel"(58). 
In conclusion, this section on the economy of the PRO has attempted to 
show that, although there are ongoing attempts to modernize and diversify, 
the economy remains based in agriculture and small industries. The Party 
has had to cope with severe economic and ideological problems brought about 
by the reforms. The relative undiversified Chinese economy contrasts with 
the complex Hong Kong system which is based in financial services, trade, 
sophisticated technology-based industry, and tourism. The Hong Kong economy 
also functions autonomously, in an environment of free and rapid access to 
information and technology, whereas the PRO system is burdened with a 
formidable bureaucracy, causing delays and obstacles in transactions, and 
with many uninformed, unskilled officials and managers(59). 
In addition, the successful Hong Kong economy has provided greater 
individual wealth and higher expectations of educational opportunities and 
upward social mobility. The thesis argues that these structural 
contradictions create social contexts in which adjustment by Hong Kong 
people will have to occur. The unregulated Hong Kong economy permits 
participants to pursue exclusively self-serving goals, whereas, within the 
terms of the ideologically-controlled PRO economic system, the collective 
interest predominates as the goal of economic development. The 
profit-oriented Hong Kong economic system has encouraged a competitive 
business style. The tensions arising from these differences will have to be 
resolved by Hong Kong residents. In this context, Chapter 4 argues that 
Hong Kong can identify the resources needed for solution, i.e. the 
expertise developed in the context of its modernized and successful 
economic system, and begin its adjustment process by initiating the 
exchange. 
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III PRC SOCIO-CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS. 
This section has the purpose of discussing the the socio-cultural 
institutions and ideologies of the PRC. This section highlights those 
socio-cultural and political areas in which the PRC society differs from 
Hong Kong, and which will be the context of social interaction during the 
transfer process. It is argued that the dominant political institutions 
combined with the traditional Chinese cultural patterns have created social 
structures unique to the PRC, and at variance from those of Hong Kong. The 
comparative element is extended through references to ideologies and 
institutions of Hong Kong, and the argument of Chapter 2 - that these 
structures will conflict and define the context in which the transfer will 
occur - is continued. 
The subcategories are contemporary socio-cultural institutions, the 
political system and political issues. 
Contemgorary Soc o-cultural Institutions 
A major obstacle to a comprehensive understanding of the nature of 
Hong Kong society is the lack of research by social scientists there. In 
the PRC a similar problem existed, caused by the "closed-door" policy of 
the past decades. "China-watchers" had access only to newspapers and a few 
magazines. Since the official repudiation of the Cultural Revolution and 
the shift away from the class struggle in favour of modernization, the 
activities of intellectuals and social scientists have been encouraged. 
Foreign social scientists are allowed greater access to the country as 
well. Data are more available(60). 
The first goal of the CCP was to create from the Chinese peasant a new 
socialist man for the new socialist society. The Cultural Revolution took 
this goal to extreme and irrational limits, and created, instead of the new 
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socialist man, economic, political and moral confusion in which the 
peasants were forced to try to exist. A new class (CCP members) was 
created, social order and law broken down, the education system was almost 
destroyed, and the former socialization process of parental and teacher 
authority was undermined(61). 
In order to function in this bleak enviroment, individuals had to 
adjust and redefine many of their attitudes about relationships, and, it  
has been suggested, revive some of the traditional patterns because "... 
they are [so] effective for muddling though"(62). So that, although data 
are more available, making conclusive statements about the nature of 
socio-cultural institutions in the PRO is problematical because of the 
profound impact of the events of the past years on the citizens. 
T. Gold presents a discussion of several contemporary "dimensions of 
personal relations" in the PRO which he argues are evolving from the 
effects of recent historical events on Chinese cultural traits. The 
following discussion borrows its framework from Gold's discussion. He has 
written: The CCP has been able "...neither [to] sustain one consistent set 
of values to replace those handed down over centuries, nor [to] provide a 
material base to support those socialist values which they have attempted 
to promulgate"(63). This resulted in a system of personal relations which 
refer to traditional Chinese behavioural norms as well as being based in 
the contemporary political and social environment. 
A pre-eminent characteristic of personal relations in the PRC - 
instrumentalism and the principle that underlies it is guanxi , which is a 
system of relationships based on reciprocity and social investments(64). 
Although not without affect, it is primarily a power relationship, based on 
the proposition that when one has a valued commodity, one has power. The 
auanxi tie is one of strongest ties of loyalty. The implicit logic is that 
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both parties shared something in the past, and now it is only coincidence 
that one is in a favoured position and the other dependent. Guanxi is 
composed of both vertical and horizontal connections and it has become, in 
the current political environment, "...extremely significant at the levels 
of power"(65). 
Beverly Hooper has also described the widespread use of 2uanxi (66). 
She writes The use of private 'connections' and the backdoor is rife at 
all levels to obtain everything from urban transfers to overseas 
trips"(67). She comments on the "continuing importance of high-level 
connections and influence in university enrol„ment" that exists in the 
highly elitist educational system(68). 
Instrumentalism appears to have become dominant because of the 
economic disarray following the Cultural Revolution. The shortage of 
necessities and the unrelenting control of the bureaucracy over production 
and allocation of goods made it necessary to acquire a wide network of 
channels to acquire necessities, and to defer to authority. 
A second dimension of personal behaviour in the contemporary PRC is 
commoditization : emphasis on the economic aspect of everyday events and 
relationships(69). This 'cash nexus' is becoming more important as the 
economy improves and commodities become more available. The government has 
encouraged this, indirectly, through its admonitions to people to work hard 
for modernization and its material rewards. The RRS, in reviving the 
household as a economic unit, necessitates contractual relations between 
individuals, households and the state. The individual now has an exchange 
relationship with the State: something which socialist transformation of 
the 1950's tried to eradicate. 
Government efforts to stimulate the urban economy have also 
contributed to the development of commoditization . Freeing of goods from 
State control and schemes for finding and creating jobs outside the state 
sector for unemployed youth have relied upon, and encouraged, private and 
collective efforts. The result has been a network of small enterprises, 
mainly commercial, whose success depends on initiative and individual 
ambition. Commoditization has extended to academics: 
Intellectuals are allowed to "moonlight" 
[and] have entered into exchange relationships 
beyond their research unit or university. Units 
have begun to pay a training fee to 
universities as part of the process of 
recruiting new blood(70). 
Commoditization also has extended to the very personal areas 
of life: marriage has become a 'commoditized realtiohsip' in the 
PRC life. Several analysts comment that although the Western 
romantic ideal is influencing some young people, marriage and 
divorce remain primarily practical activities (71)(72). 
Us and Them is a third dimension. "Us" is primarily identified 
by the shared work or study unit, and these ties function as 
entrance into auanxi ties. The unit regulates most daily 
activities, including contact with the larger society. Transferring 
units, even visiting other units, is very difficult, resulting in 
severe limits on both occupational and geographic mobility, which, 
in turn, results in this practical and emotional affiliation to 
one's group. Current economic reforms have encouraged the 
reemergence of the import of particularistic ties, based on family, 
kinship, native region, school mates, and army unit. 
The traditional Chinese attitude toward individuals was to 
evaluate them in the context of their social, especially familial, 
relationships. The family remains the strongest primary connection, 
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especially in the countryside where the bonds are being 
strengthened as a production and consumption unit(73). Originally, 
the Party intended to replace the family with the Party bonds in 
this pattern. According to Hooper(74), government authorities now 
urge young people to return, particularly, to the traditional 
family and kinship ties - despite the criticizms by past regimes. 
This discussion of contemporary PRC society concludes with the 
topic of the problems of contemporary youth in the PRC. The varied 
problems facing today's youth are attracting a lot of attention and 
conern. The present youth of China have grown up in traumatic 
times. They were born during the Cultural Revolution and were 
attending schools which had been widely discredited when the Gang 
of Four fell. They are entering adulthood in a time in which many 
political and economic principles have become controversial and are 
being reinterpreted. The effect on youth has been to both widen 
their horizons and increase their frustrations. Therefore, 
discussion of some of the their concerns and how these concerns 
might affect the transfer process follows. 
Amidst reports of rapidly increasing juvenile crime(75) and 
dissatisfaction, the Party has called for the whole society to work 
towards preventing and eliminating juvenile delinquency. They 
report that the crime rate in Peking, for example, is increasing 
and the age of the criminal is getting younger. The Party has 
responded through stepping up the work of the Beijing Discipline 
Inspection Committee of the CCP in order to clear up crimes and 
violations of Party discipline"(76). 
The present leadership puts the blame for the youth problem on 
both the Cultural Revolution and the influences from the West(77). 
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It is widely agreed that the primary legacy of the Cultural 
Revolution is a 'lost generation'. Everyone who experienced the 
anarchy and disorder of those times was profoundly affected, and 
the residual influences of lost years of schooling and stability 
are apparent today. It is feared that the open door policy is 
admitting, into China, images of capitalist lifestyles and ideals 
which are at variance with those of the 'new socialist man'. 
There is a third explanation offered for the rise in juvenile 
crime and disaffection. In most cultures, any gap between 
aspirations and realities can lead to frustration and a breakdown 
of moral certitude. Youth in the PRC today, while officially 
assured that the standard of living is rising, observe that many of 
their group are not benefitting. As Theresa Munford has summed it 
up :"The picture which emerges is one of a generation being 
promised a lot, but getting little"(78). Although the party 
maintains that the meaning of life lies in doing your job well - 
whatever that job happens to be, youth see a contradiction between 
this message and the party's actions: becoming rich brings honour, 
and material reward goes to those who contribute to modernization. 
In addition, young people are aware that those who actually benefit 
from the new prosperity have often done so through use of Ellanxi 
rather than because of superior talent. 
A new code of behaviour based on the construction of socialist 
spiritual principles was announced by the Central Committee in 
September, 1986(79). It lists the "...country's basic tasks as 
helping people become well-educated and self-disciplined socialist 
citizens with lofty ideals and moral integrity, and raising the 
whole nation's ideological ...standards as well as its educational 
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and scientific levels - all in the interests of socialist 
modernization." (Aside from noting the recognition it gives to the 
need for official attention to the behavioural standards, it is 
interesting to note how the need for this is seen in terms of the 
new, pragmatic aims of the Party rather than in terms of communist 
ideology.) 
Many of these social trends exist in Hong Kong also. For 
example, youth unrest in Hong Kong has concerned local social 
investigators, although the origins of unrest are different. 
Whereas it has been suggested that the 'youth problem' in the PRC 
is caused by dissatisfaction about the lack of economic prosperity, 
in Hong Kong the origin appears to be different. With economic 
prosperity and compulsory school attendance, local sociologists 
argue, a new age role has arisen: youth who occupy an intermediate 
role between childhood and adulthood are "cut off from full 
participation in the life of the larger society [and] lack the 
sense of belonging and are therefore forced to satisfy themselves 
with conspicuous consumption patterns which signify their own 
cultural identity"(80). A contradiction exists in the fact that 
although both societies have a youth problem, one emerged from 
prosperity, and the other from lack of prosperity. Further, the 
dimension of guanxi has been examined in the Hong Kong and found to 
exist there. Lau Siu-kai has written 
The Chinese society of Hong King —[is] 
blatantly utilitarian in inclination. 
Utilitarianism and instrumentalism ... 
influence relationships with outsiders, the 
government, and society as a whole(81). 
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He and other social scientists(82) describe a society whose 
members are generally utilitarian in outlook, who "... shun 
involvement with [groups] so long as involvement does not 
explicitly gratify their own private interests"(83). 
Lau Siu-kai has also written that "Materialistic value is the 
primary criterion for the evaluation of any intrinsic good in the 
world ... Land influences] behaviour in one way or another"(84). 
Whether it has become commoditization, i.e. a cash nexus as the 
basis of every relationship, is not the focus of this section. The 
suggestion here is that Hong Kong people have been described as 
materialistic, and although the trait may conflict with the 
socialistic ideology of the State, it appears not to conflict with 
the attitudes and practices of the PRC citizenry. 
In Hong Kong, like the PRC, the primary "Us" is the family, 
but this tie is eroding among the young people(85). Sociologists 
argue that identification with the family plays a strong positive 
social role(86), and its erosion could lead to social problems as 
Hong Kong youth are set free from the control of family authority 
with no apparent replacement(87). The question has been posed 
whether the PRC will fill the vacuum of allegiance, or allow the 
impersonal forces of capitalism, which are bringing about this 
breakdown, to continue to operate(88). 
Political System  
With "Marxism still the guiding principle"(89), the most apparent 
change that will occur in 1997 is the political status of Hong Kong. For 
this reason, descriptions of the two political systems are essential to 
understanding what type of system the Hong Kong residents have had, how it 
has contributed to their economic success and changed their society, and 
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what political adjustment is facing them in the HKSAR. 
The early leaders of the CCP found the rationale for their revolution 
in Marxism. Sixty years later Marxism remains the "... basis of the 
leadership given by the Party"(90). All official speeches and interviews 
maintain that it there has been no weakening of commitment to the 
principles of Marxism. However, there has been the addition of the phrase: 
"socialism with Chinese characteristics", which is based on "...not using 
fossilized concepts to interpret life"(91) but rather on proceeding from 
the reality of the new problems China is experiencing. 
Although the CCP maintains that the legitimacy of its government 
derives from the participation of the masses in government, they have, by 
making participation the crucial criterion for social and economic 
advancement, used it to discipline and to manipulate the participants. The 
governed are permitted the right to access to political processes, but 
denied the right to determine the nature of the processes. A. Nathan has 
described the present Chinese system of Socialist Democracy as 
"participation without influence"(92). 
Like communist countries, the PRC has had separate and distinct party 
and government structures. The party's role has been to hold all power and 
make all policy decisions, give ideological guidelines and provide 
organizational guidance. The task of government has been simply to 
administer according to the party directive(93). Current reforms have not 
effectively diminished the prominence of the Party, but respond to the 
perceived need to rectify the image of the Party after the Cultural 
Revolution. The preamble to the current Chinese constituion contains 
references to the Chinese people being "...under the leadership of the 
CCP"(94). There is little question in the minds of China's leaders as to 
the supremacy of the CCP. Deng has stated that the CCP is the "...core 
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force uniting the whole country"(95). Therefore, although political reform 
is currently being debated, from the government's point of view, the 
peoples' faith in the Party is still necessary because the Party is the 
apparatus of both political control and government. 
1. The Issue of Political Reform 
Discussion of the political system continues here with an expansion of 
the topic of political reform, because political reform is a leading 
contemporary issue in the PRC. A recent Resolution of the CCP Central 
Committee on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society with 
and Advanced Culture and Ideology stated "The major ... lessons to be drawn 
from [the history of] China's socialist development are, first, that we 
should have mustered all our resources to develop the economy and, second, 
that we should have substantially extended democracy"(96). 
Accordingly, the basic goal of reform is to "...strengthen the 
people's sense of responsibility, give full play to their initiative and 
make all developments benefit the people and conform to their will"(97). 
The article describes the first step in reform as being the improvfient of 
the system of electing people's representatives. The Party has stated that 
a 
high degree of democracy is one of great 
goals of socialism, and there can be no 
socialist modernization without democracy. 
Therefore the Party has taken effective 
measures to democratise its political life, the 
political life of the State, economic 
management and the life of the entire society. 
Democracy cannot be separated from socialist 
legality and work discipline. [However,]It must 
be remembered that the use of the word 
"democracy" in the context of a Chinese 
socialistic system is different from the 
accepted meaning in Western democracies. The 
width and breadth of CCP democracy are always 
determined by the overriding aims of 
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maintaining and strengthening the leadership of 
the Party while pursuing modernization(98). 
The reforms appear to be a response to the pervasive sense at the 
grass-roots level of wanting to be free of politics after the trauma of the 
Cultural Revolution. For example, Rosen has noted that the majority of 
government-directed research into student activities have investigated 
student motivation and ideals in the aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution(99). The results of this research generally suggest that present 
students have a strong distaste for the most radical slogans and 
acti. 'vi ties of the 1970's. Other recent research into student opinions 
shows that students have "... a distaste for politics courses, and indicate 
the Deng leadership has been unable to convince students that politics has 
any relevance to their future"(100). 
A second reason for political reform is to remove the party apparatus 
as art obstacle from the progress of economic recovery. For example, Party 
leaders hope to raise work efficiency by removing the present highly 
centralized bureaucracy, which they describe as having the effect of 
...concentrating political power enabling abuses of privilege for personal 
gain and permitting low efficiency"(101). Deng described the need to 
separate the functions of the party from those of the government and to 
decentralize administrative powers in order to restore authority to local 
officials(102). 
Contemporary rightist Chinese politics is seen as pragmatic - rather 
than ideological, which was the hallmark of the leftist regimes. The view 
is that, in so far as this reform frees the population from the "heavy hand 
of dogmatism" and encourages the use of reason to make social and economic 
choices, it can aid economic development(103). 
However, if, as Lucian Pye argues, politics "...has to be based on 
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some shared assumptions that stem from a combination of cultural norms and 
unarticulated ideological perspectives", the Party must attempt to change 
the old concepts in favour of an ideology conducive to achieving its goals. 
Examples of such an effort are common in the Chinese press. The concept of 
'pragmatism' is being defended at seminars and meeting organized to 
re-evaluate the concept of pragmatism: the official policy is that 
pragmatism is no longer considered an 'import from imperialism'(104), and 
that the population should remember Marx wrote not simply about class 
struggle, but also about the growth of society's productivity(105). 
Pye points out the "extraordinary flexibility of Chinese pragmatism 
which has permitted breathtaking turns of policy that have astonsished the 
world"(106). He discusses the nature of Chinese pragmatism which permits 
both leaders and followers to accept all manner of change as though there 
were no such thing as friction, inertia or tension. Chinese pragmatism has 
great potential: it benefits from cultural predispositions which make 
totally acceptable (that) behavior which is guided by the logic of the 
existing circumstances and which allows for unsentimental abandonment of 
past commitments and outdated rationalizations. It benefits also from a 
culture which emphasizes the here and now. Optimism about the future is 
more acceptable than articulation of doubts and negativism, therefore, 
leaders do not need to fear being penalized for inconsistency as 
contradictions are easily tolerated(107). 
2. Obstacles to Political Reform 
The Party itself admits that the leading obstacle to its reforms comes 
from within the Party. The China Daili writes that "...although 
decentralization of power has already begun, party cadres have proven 
largely unwilling to yield their power and have prevented in many instances 
government representatives and technocrats from installing new reforms on a 
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local level"(108). This, plus "...confusion in Party and government about 
the limits of each other's power and functions, are likely to be difficult 
obstacles to overcome"(109). 
A foreign analyst comments that "... the basic political issue in the 
PRC is the succession and the potential revival of the power of the 
left"(110). The present leaders cannot be assured that, among the younger 
members of the Politburo, there are not leftists with less than 100% 
commit. ment to Deng's reforms. "The presence in influential posts of the 
Cultural Revolution cadres now in their late 30's and 40's is considered a 
problem. They are mainly poorly educated and their reputation for 
corruption, self-indulgence and guile is widespread, and Deng went so far 
as to propose freezing their political careers"(111). 
PRC Society Poised for the 1990's 
The 'key link' economic and political reform discussed in previous 
sections cannot alone suggest what kind of a society the PRC is becoming. 
Other information is needed about the extent and nature of actual reforms 
in areas such as human rights, equality of educational opportunity, and the 
reinstatement of social and cultural freedom. In addition, information 
about the current regime's philosophy about rule of law, independence of 
the press and the role of the Party in society is also crucial to analysis 
(and will be discussed next). Without such information, present 
interpretations of future Chinese political and social institutions are 
very tentative. In addition, other changes are affecting the character of 
Chinese society. It seems unlikely that the Chinese have been unaffected by 
the turbulence and violence, the political, social and economic 
disintegration and reintegration of the past century. The PRC society is in 
transition as much as that of Hong Kong. 
1. Status of the Party 
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One goal of the current reforms is to rehabilitate the Party in the 
eyes of the people. The emphasis of Mao's Party on class struggle disturbed 
most of the country's social , cultural and ethical life and resulted in 
great hostility toward the Party. Deng has attempted to regain some of the 
pre-Cultural Revolution legitimacy of the Party by scaling down the 
totalitarian policies of the party and emphasizing its pastoral 
responsibilities and its role in improving the lives of the people. He has 
instructed the Party that it has an "...unshirkable responsibility to 
promote a new culture"(112) and that it should concern itself with the 
[socialist] 'spiritual civilization' of the Chinese people. It has been 
suggested that Deng regards one primary role of the party as being the 
ideological watchdog of public morals and cultural values, and 
re-establishing the standards of comradism(113). 
Deng has described other, but as yet unimplemented, roles for the 
Party(114). Among them is acting as an ombudsman in cases when civil 
authorities fail. The Party is to step in to redress grievances and to 
protect rights of workers. Despite the campaigns of the past few years to 
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improve its status, the Party is still in such disar'ay that people no 
longer fear its power so much. Although membership still confers power, its 
status has been damaged by bureaucracy, individualism, favouritism, 
cliques, and abuse of power by cadres(115). 
2. Human Rights 
The Human Rights situation in the PRC is not clear to many analysts, 
nor has the PRC played a significant role in the international human rights 
movement(116). Although there are many references to rights in the 
conSktution, the differences in interpretation of the principles, combined 
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with the present evolving nature of Chinese society, mean that clear 
understanding of current practices is difficult. In traditional China no 
concept of individual rights existed. The PRC has only progressed as far as 
describing the key CCP precept: the individual's rights are always 
subordinated to state. Socialism itself represents a focus on and a 
commitment to the well-being of society as a whole(117), and the 
"...commitment to socialism permeates the constitution and its conception 
of rights"(118). 
Jonathan Mirsky, in an analysis of Human Rights in the PRC, concludes 
that the record on human rights is 'dreadful'. Since the Cultural 
Revolution, he writes, many people who would not be considered criminals in 
the West have been deprived of their rights. These people have been accused 
of being counter-revolutionaries and 'reactionaries' who engage in 'feudal 
supersti.wous acts'. In 1983, heavier sentences, including the death 
sentence, were reintroduced (after having been removed in 1979) and a 
round-up began of 700,000 suspected 'hooligans, counterrevolutionaries, and 
trouble makers'. There appears to have been, also, a shift from punishment 
and reform through labour toward more severe penalities such as life 
imprisonment and execution: since that round-up, 6000 (other sources say 
10,000) have been executed. 
The response to international appeals has been to describe those 
arrested and executed as 'evil members of the herd whose executions were 
welcomed by the masses'. Mirsky continues that these activities have 
continued into 1986 with assurances from the CCP that more is to come as 
part of 'party rectification'. Prospects for any letting up of the program 
are slight. "The Party believes in capital punishment as a deterrent, an 
educating force"(119) 
The prosecutor at the trial of Wei Ching-sheng, the Peking-Spring 
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activist found guilty of 'counter-revolutionary crimes of a serious 
nature', stated: "It is decreed in our constitution that there is freedom 
of belief. You can believe or not believe in Marxist-Leninism and the 
thoughts of Mao Tse-tung as you wish, but you are absolutely not permitted 
to oppose them.... If your power has the power to seize our power 	 what 
power would our nine hundred million people have left to speak of?"(120). 
Mirsky continues that "...to achieve the economic goals and and to 
realize Deng's other goal - a strong state, require not only better 
education but a disciplined orderly, compliant society. There was no 
foundation for democracy in traditional China, and there is no place for it 
the PRC"(121). 
B. Hooper has pointed out the PRC "...remains a highly controlled 
society by Western standards [with] strict censsorship..., little choice of 
where [one] lives or works, ...and even the personal lives of individuals 
are subjected to a level of official interference that many Westerners 
would regard as intolerable "(122). To cite a specific example: the 
official status of women is being changed by the Party. Early in the 
Revolution, they were encouraged to do whatever men could do and were 
guaranteed economic and social equality in the new State. However, as in 
Western societies and in Hong Kong(123), legal guarantees were not 
accompanied by changes in attitudes and, although progress was made in 
their status, women still occupy a second class position in PRC society. As 
a new method of coping with the unemployment problems, the present 
government has apparently determined that women should be encouraged to 
return to the supportive role at home to manage the house and family. 
In Hong Kong, although there are no special safeguards for the 
fundamental rights of the individual , liberties have been guaranteed by 
Parliament(124). This is an area of social contradiction between the 
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societies. The rights of the individual have never been a leading issue in 
the minds of the local Hong Kong population, probably because individuals 
in Hong Kong have been able to live and speak freely with minimal control 
from government. The possibility of loosing these liberties contributes to 
the nervous and apprehensive attitude of Hong Kong people in this decade, 
for the Hong Kong resident has come to view him or herself as an agent - 
who makes choices from a plurality of social and economic possibilitites. 
Within the PRC, individual choice is limited by the existence of a single 
valid economic and political system. Behaviour is, therefore, caused rather 
than chosen. 
3. Hundred Flowers Movement: Spring 1986 
The CCP announced the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom, a 
hundred schools of thought contend" in a resolution from committee meetings 
in September 1986. 
This resolution encourages and supports 
all efforts and debates that are based on 
scientific theory and are necessary to 
stimulate research on Marxist theory. It also 
ensures academic freedom, discussion, criticism 
and freedoms which are guided by Marxist 
principles. The purpose is to create political 
stability and unity(125). 
The Party acknowledged that modernization requires a certain amount of 
individualisation of lifestyle and thought. The controls that enforced 
conformity are beginning to be relaxed(126). Many in the PRC remain 
cautious and unconvinced that the reforms would survive another shift in 
ideology at the top(127). Jasper Becker recalls that it was Deng who first 
encouraged, then ruthlessly suppressed the Democracy Wall after it had 
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outlived its political usefulness to him(128). 
The present movement is different from the Peking Spring in that it 
relaxes restrictions mainly on speech about technical and academic issues. 
It is different also in that it appears to be motivated less by a wish to 
loosen control than by a need to stimulate discussion about cultural 
foundations for the New China and to help integrate the reforms into 
Chinese society(129). 
Writers and artists particularly have a profound distrust of the new 
reforms. Wang Ming, an author, was denounced during the Cultural Revolution 
and was recently appointed Cultural Minister in an apparent attempt by the 
government to prove that the liberalizations can be trusted. Wang, when 
asked how artists and writers could feel that they dare 'plant a hundred 
flowers', answered "What do you do when you see the green light and the 
red light at the same time?"(130). 
4. Rule of Law 
The law in the PRC is inextricably linked with politics: "...the law 
and the country are the same"(131). The Party imposes its will through the 
forty two million Party members and its secret service who function at 
every level of Chinese society(132). Although the legal system has been 
liberalized, making the individual more responsible for his/her actions 
without the excuse of class backround or envir&ent to fall back on(133), 
the system is hampered by a critical shortage of lawyers. The Party 
announced that in 1985 less than 9% of criminal trials were conducted with 
lawyers present - and less than that for civil cases(134). There are only 
twenty thousand lawyers in the whole country, two hundred in Shanghai and 
one hundred in Peking, and the effectiveness of their training has been 
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questioned by the Party itself(135). The problem arises from a combination 
of a low social position and poor pay and benefits(136), and until the 
situation is corrected the Party seems likely to continue to rely on fear 
and severe punishment to quiet potential trouble-makers, and to demonstrate 
to the public that it is serious about removing individuals who threaten 
the success of the moderization. 
On the topic of education and the law in the PRC, Wu Yan has written 
that that educational laws will be stressed, and that, in the future, 
educational development is to be be controlled and regulated by laws, 
which define clearly the jurisdiction and competence of educational 
inaitutions "...so that our educational work will be carried out according 
to laws and regulations"(137). 
In the opinion of educators in Hong Kong, this type of state 
intervention in education can be both advantageous and harmful to the 
present Hong Kong system(138). In discussions of the possibility increased 
state intervention in educational policies, Hong Kong educators have noted 
that there appears, for example, to be a need for governmental 
'legitimization' of needed changes, such as language of instruction, which 
individual schools cannot easily effect -a problem which has been 
exacerbated by the Hong Kong policy of government non-intervetionism. On 
the other hand, educators are equally hesitant about inviting government 
"control" over introducing a political component in the curriculum(139). 
Chapter 5 argues that the dilemma would best be solved by Hong Kong 
educators addressing and developing strategies for the solution of existing 
problems while they have relative autonomy. 
On the other hand, lawyers in Hong Kong appear to be more pessimistic 
about the changes 1997 will bring because they believe that restrictions on 
their activities and/or the abolition of various characteristics of the 
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English system which contribute to the quality of life in Hong Kong would 
be harmful (140). Among the many factors which cause concern are the facts 
that the judiciary in the PRC is not independent, and that the overall 
interpretion of the social function of the judiciary varies widely from 
that of Hong Kong. Without the British-style legal system, Hong Kong would 
diminish in attractiveness as a financial and commercial centre. 
There is little reason to believe that the present system would be be 
continued under the HKSAR because the Basic Law is being written under 
strict control by Peking. The most likely scenario is that the PRC will 
engage in a prolonged period of evaluation, almost on a case-by-case basis, 
on the one hand evaluating the effects of its stance on the economy and on 
the other hand trying to maintain its overall commitment to a socialist 
philosophy. 
5. Freedom of the Press 
Although Chapter 2, Article 35 of the 1982 constitution guarantees 
freedom of the press, the media in the PRC are not free in the western 
democratic sense, but are primarily a tool of the CCP for disseminating its 
ideas and ideology. The difference originates in the CCP understanding that 
the people have freedom of the press by virtue of the fact that the Party 
controls the press(141). There is an offical requirement that eighty 
percent of news reports be positive(142). Party leaders believe that the 
press must be the mouthpiece of the Party's central committee and, despite 
the "Hundred Flowers Movement", there has been little liberalization of 
political coverage in the media(143). 
Hong Kong has enjoyed a freedom of the press unsurpassed in the South 
East Asia region. Although there is no specific law which guarantees press 
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freedom, except in the negative sense that anything not forbidden by law is 
printable, the Government has not interfered with press freedoms. Despite 
the non-interventionist tradition of the Government, many in Hong Kong have 
been worried by 1967 events relating to this issue. In 1987 a Public 
Ordinance was passed which stipulted that "any person who publishes false 
news which is likely to cause alarm to the public or a section thereof or 
disturb public order shall be guilty of an offence"(144). Critics commented 
on the vagueness of the terms which, it was said, left wide scope for abuse 
of the law(145). There was widespread concern about the uses the law could 
be put to in the HKSAR and not least because of 1997, the press adopted an 
overwhelmingly negative stance toward the passage of the bill (146). 
6, Westernization or Modernization 
Exposure to western values has been a controversial matter in China 
since the first contacts between China and the Western world and the 
present leaders still attempt to find a method to benefit from Western 
technology while protecting what they do not wish to destroy within their 
own culture. For this reason, many policy-makers remain ambivalent about 
the effects of the open-door policy on the stability of the culture. Deng 
has attempted to silence critics with an old Chinese slogan which advises 
modernizers 'to use Chinese learning for matters of spirit and western 
learning for practical matters'. The agenda of the recent plenary session 
of the CCP(September, 1986) was headed by the adoption of guidelines for 
building socialist culture and ethics(147). The resolution stated that 
"...learning from other countries was of purely practical value" and it 
rejected capitalist ideology and society on grounds of its 
"...(indefens;b1e) oppression and exploitation, and [its] ugly and decadent 
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aspects"(148). 
The Party has blamed recent crime waves on individualism and 
increasing materialism which, it says, result from admiration for bourgeois 
liberalism and western-style democracy(149). The effects of such attacks, 
however, spill over onto the modernization programme. Private business 
people and those doing business with foreigners become cautious, and the 
government is forced to retreat and issue reassuring statements. How the 
Party resolves the dilemma of encouraging individualism and the open-door 
policy while maintaining its socialist ideals is of interest to the people 
of Hong Kong. 
Politburo conservatives have already voiced fears that socialism in 
China will be corrupted by decadent influences from Hong Kong. Hong Kong is 
the first choice of the young people of the PRC when asked where they would 
like to study outside China because it has become a source of many modern 
luxury goods(150). 
Modernizers have attempted to offset leftist concern about the 
potential spiritual pollution by demonstrating the advantages which accrue 
to the areas near Hong Kong geographically. Yu Youjun described a study 
done in Guangzhou which, in 1979, adopted special policies and flexible 
measures to "open its door". These measure included commercial activities 
with foreign countries, making products according to foreign 
specifications, and carrying out exchange schemes with foreign countries in 
culture, science, and technology. The status of ideology and culture was 
affected by the impact of foreign influence: Yu reported that "due to 
influence from outside some changes taken place in the ideology, culture, 
and social life in Guangzhou"(151). 
Yu's article, however, suggests how the PRC may Justify the existence 
of a more prosperous, liberal HKSAR. According to Yu, Guangzhou youth have 
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benefited from foreign influence in that they have a positive and 
enterprising attitude toward life, manifesting itself in a desire to 
support oneself and a keener competitive spirit. This is attributed to the 
traditional ideology of western civilization which emphasizes 
self-reliance. Second, there has been an unprecendented upsurge in the 
drive to learn science and culture among the Guanzhou youth, and, thirdly, 
the ability of the Cantonese to discriminate between the positive and 
negative aspects of foreign culture has been enhanced. In the early days, 
according to Yu, they accepted only the "shallow stuff" of foreign culture, 
but since 1982 the Party has adopted measures to resist penetration and 
combine guidance with checks, and youth have learned to discriminate 'what 
suits the conditions of China'. 
The conclusion of the report is 
With the open door policy comes some penetration; 
the point is how to understand and deal with it. 
[The Party] CANNOT present a weak and impotent front 
and allow it to spread unchecked: this is a right 
deviation and the sacred obligation of a Communist 
is to safeguard the purity of communism. But it is 
also a leftist deviation is to discriminate and 
renounce all, even to point of criticizing the open 
door policy. This must be renounced also. The people 
must believe that it is not inevitable to admit 
decadent ideology and culture with an open door. It can 
be resisted through control, vigilance and successful 
ideological education(152). 
In summary, this section had the purpose of testing the argument that 
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there are areas of contradiction which will be the context of social 
interaction during the transfer process. It has presented evidence from 
the socio-cultural institutions and ideologies of the PRC. 
It has argued that the dominance of political institutions, combined 
with the traditional Chinese cultural patterns, have created social 
structures which differ from those of Hong Kong. The discussion of the 
socio-cultural institutions attempted to show that the PRC has begun to 
re-establish an economic basis for relations, resulting in a return to a 
self-centered ethic based on instrumentalism, the cash nexus and a 
particularistic commitment to family and friends. The Party, however, 
attempts to adhere to its originial ideology that individualism constitutes 
an undesirable value, and that the interests of society are higher than 
those of the individual. This official subordination of individual 
interests to the interests of society contradicts Hong Kong ideology. 
The discussion of the political systems suggested that the PRC is 
controlled by policies based on the ideological convictions of a powerful 
minority. This does not contradict the system in Hong Kong, for the 
discussion of political systems in chapters 2 and 3 shows that neither 
place has a tradition of democratic government responsive to popular 
opinion, but rather stresses powerful controlling groups. However, there is 
contradiction in the relationship of the individuals members of each 
society to the government. Individuals in Hong Kong expect problems to be 
solved by themselves or by the family unit. Within the PRC, because of its 
dominance over all aspects of society, the Party has emerged as the 
problem-solving agency. The extent and nature of actual reforms in such 
areas as human rights, rule of law, and the reinstatement of social and 
cultural freedom is not yet determined. Therefore, it is argued, the 
contradictions in this area will persist and become an important part of 
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the context of interaction until resolved. 
IV THE EDUCATION SYSTEM OF THE PRC AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS 
The elevated status of the educated person in China was established at 
the time of Confuc,ous, who established a tradition of the superiority of 
intellectual pursuits and the desirability of scholastic success. This 
attitude persists in both Hong Kong and the PRC, despite the economic and 
political pressures in both societies which make holding the old values 
difficult. The purpose of this analysis, however, is to go beyond this 
cultural similarity and attempt to highlight those economic and ideological 
aspects of the Chinese system which are different from Hong Kong, and 
which, it is argued, comprise structural contradictions between the 
societies. The contemporary education situation in the PRC is decribed with 
a concluding reference to the Hong Kong context. 
This next section begins with a brief history of education in the PRC, 
emphasizing the ideological changes which have occured in the system. 
Following the history, there is then a description of the structure of the 
system. This is not an overall review, but focuses on those aspects 
relevant to the comparison with Hong Kong. Following the section on 
structure, the current aims and, finally, the major contemporary issues are 
discussed. 
History. (153) 
Since the founding of the People's Republic, the Party has displayed a 
high commitment to education because it recognized its potential as one of 
the greatest assets in economic development. As early as the 1920, the 
Party had already set up hundreds of schools, and later claimed that these 
schools significantly lowered the illiteracy rate in the countryside. In 
this period the political component of education was already apparent: the 
199 
readers taught hatred of the KMT and love of the Red Army along with 
reading skiils(154). 
The Common Programme of October 1949 indicated that one of the main 
tasks of education in the PRC was to "... develop an ideology of service to 
the people"(155). Since then, education has remained a key tool of the 
Party for instilling loyalty to the Party and for training dedicated 
individuals to build the new China. However, as this discussion attempts to 
show, education has continually vacillated between goals of 'redness' and 
'expertness'(156). It is argued that these rapid ideological changes which 
have characterized the PRC educational experience indicate a tight 
integration of the education system with the political system - especially 
the Party. Further, this close link between education and government 
differs from the Hong Kong system, which, although, integrated with 
Government, allows for negotiation with vested interest and local pressure 
groups. 
Education in the PRC has been involved in every major political 
campaign and there is a political component at every level of the education 
process. As described, the economic policies of the PRC have been 
influenced, alternately, by rightist and leftist management; educational 
strategies have also been influenced the same way, and have consequently 
swung between academic curricula and practical-oriented school programmes. 
For example, during the Great Leap Forward there was "...increased reliance 
on socialist education as the mainspring of economic motivation"(157) and 
the 'red' policy of 'walking on two legs' was imposed in an attempt to 
weaken the Confucian distinction between intellectual learning and manual 
labor. This policy was basic to the ideology of the PRC at that time(158). 
However, by 1960, it was being attacked by rightists and an increase in 
emphasis on academic education prevailed until the mid-sixties. The 
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Cultural Revolution followed and represented the extremes of the 'red' 
policy. Advancement in school depended purely on class identification and 
Party recognition. When it became apparent to the Party that educated 
people were more likely to take a critical view of the Party's Cultural 
Revolution activities, schools were closed(159). 
However, attempts to undermine the traditional distinction between 
intellectual and manual pursuits have had very little impact and it has 
been argued that the "Confucian intellectual tradition remains 
strong"(160). Indeed, the persecution not only failed to destroy the 
intellectual tradition, but "welded [it] together more"(161). 
The content of contemporary schooling similarly reflects the 
programmes of the incumbent regime. The new economic programmes, 
particularly, require a stable social enviroment as well as a skilled and 
motivated workforce. Deng has stressed the subordination of education to 
the process of economic development in order to meet these goals. Higher 
education, particulary, is "geared toward the formation of an elite army of 
[experts] for China's [modernization]"(162). This contrasts with the 
earlier emphasis on the political and social uses of education(156). 
Education in science and technology is seen as a component of economic 
growth, and is, therefore, a prime sector for investment. As a result, 
public expenditure on education has increased from its lowest point of 
4.24%, under the previous regime, to 5.9% in 1978, and to 10% in 1982(163). 
Funding is projected to increase by a further 72% over the next 5 
years(164). Despite these recent efforts, the PRC education system 
currently has many problems which are, in effect, obstacles to development. 
The system is highly bureaucratized and centralized. Although here are over 
180 million school children, 140 million in primary schools, 40 million in 
junior secondary schools, and 7 million in senior secondary schooling, the 
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figures from the 1982 Census indicate that there are 235M illiterate and 
semi-illiterate people, or 32% of the population over 12 years of age(165). 
Thus, although education is valued by the Chinese and by the Party, 
educational modernization has been impeded by repeated changes in Party 
policy. Current policy regards education as one means toward economic 
prosperity which is now a primary national goal and education is receiving 
increased funding and research. 
This analysis now continues at the next level of specificity - a 
description of the structure of the education system. The intention is to 
highlight areas of difference between the Hong Kong education system and 
the PRO education system. 
Structure 
1. Kindergarten 
In contrast to Hong Kong, where almost 90% of pre-school age children 
attend kindergarten, in the PRO less than 20% are in nurseries or 
kindergartens(164). In addition to the difference in the numbers, there is 
another equally important difference between the systems: the reason 
parents have for sending young children to such programmes. While in Hong 
Kong most parents fear that by delaying the beginning of a child's 
education they are endangering the child's chances for places in better 
primary schools, in the PRO the pressure arises from the needs of working 
mothers to have desirable child-care situation for children(161). 
Children often come to kindergarten aged three after having been in a 
nursery for two or more years. The experience is not regarded as part of 
formal education, but is designed to introduce both socialization skills 
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and also general knowledge, health habits, and activities such as drawing, 
music, stories(165). 
2. Schools 
a. Primary education 
The entry point into the PRC education system for most children is the 
primary school. Children generally enter the six-year programme aged 
six(169). Official statistics report an enrolment ratio of ninety five 
percent, but this is an entrance ratio, in other words, "...counting the 
percentage of children of school age who have ever attended school"(170). 
The enrolment ratio figure of seventy seven percent calculated on accepted 
international standards, however, does compare favourably with the 
developing world(171). Primary school is not compulsory, nor has the PRC 
achieved its goal of provision of a place for every child. The favourable 
figures do not represent the regional disparities in attendance nor should 
they be interpreted as suggesting that universal primary education is 
within reach(172). 
The highly academic curriculum stresses mathematics and Chinese 
language skil)s(173), and politics is introduced early in the child's 
educational experience. Ronald Price described the content of the textbooks 
as 'serious and moral"(174), and, in contrast to the Hong Kong primary 
school network whose aim is preparing the child for a place in the best 
secondary school available, the PRC primary school still aims to solve 
basic social problems such as increasing the literacy rate of the country, 
especially in the rural areas(175), finding methods to keep children in 
school , and upgrading the quality of schools. One in three entering 
children failed to complete the five-year primary school cycle, and of the 
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graduates, it is estimated that approximately three out of four go on to 
junior middle school(176), admission to which is determined by examination. 
b. Secondary schools 
Secondary school in the PRC is a six year programme divided into two 
divisions of three years each. In 1984, about thirty-five percent of the 
children in this sector attended technical-training and vocational 
programmes, and although this programme is less popular than the academic 
curriculum among parents, this figure reflects an increase of twenty-eight 
percent over the previous year(177). Such figures reflect the government's 
intention to expand the vocational sector(178), and, as Cheng Kai Ming 
wrote, is "a very good demonstration of the impact of economic reform on 
education"(179). 
The percentage of the age group of children attending middle school 
has dropped and J. Cleverly suggests that this is a result of government 
"curtailing of general middle schooling... designed to reduce the pressure 
on teritary insitutions"(180), although Cheng Kai Ming interprets it as a 
"healthy retreat from the unrealistic attendance targets set down during 
the cultural revolution"(181). 
Of the children who complete the intensely competitive academic 
programme less than five percent are selected to continue to tertiary 
education(182). The selection process is more complex than that in Hong 
Kong. Intellectual ability, physical health, and often the political 
connections of the applicant's parents, play a part in the success of an 
application(183). Political correctness is also measured and Hooper writes 
that "Even at the high school level, the path of obedience and conformity 
is the only sensible one for young people with any aspirations to get ahead 
in China"(184). 
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c. Post-School Education 
Tertiary Education is made up of over 1000 universities, technical 
institutes, teachers' colleges, and other colleges and institutions, 
representing almost a doubling in numbers over 1979(185). The 41,000 
freshmen enrolled in 1987, the most since 1949, were selected by 
examinations in foreign languages, Chinese political theory, as well as 
their own major subject(186). 
After selection, students are allocated to higher colleges and 
universities by three methods, of which centralized allocation is the most 
widespread(187). Based on national production targets, admission decisions 
are made through consultations between the central and the many local 
regions. The other two methods, commissioned enrolment and self-supporting 
enrolment are being experimented with, and offer those regions and 
individuals who have prospered under the new programmes an opportunity to 
'buy' places in the higher education system(188). 
Although Rosen has stated that the most important selection criterion 
is academic achiey'ment(189), other analysts describe the continuing 
importance of 'correct socialist attitudes' and observe that university 
admissions procedures remain a major area of corruption in the system(190). 
The Party acknowledges the importance of both academic achievement and 
socialist attitudes. The Minster of Education recently pointed out the 
importance of several factors in academic programmes. He stressed the 
importance of the development of high-level specialists 
who are both socialist-minded and 
professionally competent. We demand our degree 
candidates support the Chinese Communist Party 
and the socialist system. [They] must also 
possess the commitment to serve the socialist 
cause and the people. This is where they are 
different from [students] in capitalist 
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countries(191). 
They study in a programme "...more similar to the model of more 
economically-developed western and oriental nations in order to compete 
with [them], although their programme is more structured and more closely 
controlled than in the West"(192). 
At the present time, the preferred fields of study are the areas 
directly connected with the modernization programmes. These include science 
and technology, computer studies and engineering, and English 
language(193). In most cases, fees are paid by the student's work unit or 
the State, a fact which justifies in the mind the Government its policy of 
requiring graduates to conform to the job assignments they are given(194). 
In conclusion, the preceding subsections have dealt with the history 
and structure of education in the PRC. Firstly, analysis of the history of 
education in the PRC suggested that education has been affected by the 
reversals of official political policy. Education is tightly linked with 
the powerful political agencies of the PRC, ensuring that any change in 
political ideology quickly affects educational policy. It is argued that 
this link is an area of contradiction with the Hong Kong experience. 
Although Hong Kong education is linked to dominant economic and political 
agencies, the limited negotiation which exists with local educators and 
interest groups has meant that policy remained broadly relevant to 
community needs and generally consistent with values of local educators. 
The result is that, during the past forty years, Hong Kong education has 
been guided by a generally acceptable, consistent policy, oriented toward 
the provision of places, teachers, and materials. These were judged 
necessary to serve the expanding population and economy. Only recently, as 
these educational goals are being achieved, and the political situation has 
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changed, has policy been seen to diverge widely from current needs. 
Secondly, the structure of PRC education is similar to the Hong Kong 
system. However, different assumptions about the role of education are made 
at each level of the system. The Kindergarten system, for example, serves 
the working parents' need of child-care. This contrasts with Hong Kong, 
where Kindergarten is very often an academic preparation for Primary 
School. 
In the PRC, primary school is neither compulsory, nor universal and, 
in contrast to the prepatory, academic role of the Hong Kong primary 
achools, the function of the PRC primary school is to solve basic social 
needs. 
Both societies have an intensely competitive academic programme in the 
secondary system because of limited tertiary places. Attempts to undermine 
the traditional distincion between intellectual and manual pursuits in both 
societies have had very little impact and the Confucian intellectual 
tradition has persisted. 
Despite the emphasis on academic curriculum in the PRC, the selection 
process for tertiary places includes a political component, which is not 
present in the Hong Kong process. Indeed, at a time when introduction to 
political skills and philosophy are needed in Hong Kong, teachers and 
administrators are very hesitant - often for political reasons - to 
introduce them. 
This section continues with description of the aims of PRC education. 
Although the Hong Kong and the PRC have widely different economic systems, 
the stated aims of their respective education leaders do not reflect those 
differences. The PRC describes its aims as follows: The basic functions of 
education are, firstly to pass on knowledge of nature and skills of 
production, ensure the reproduction of the labour forces and develop 
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science and technology; it is a means of promoting the development of 
social productive forces, and is therefore itself productive"(195). As 
described in Chapter 2, Hong Kong's aims have been reported as in terms of 
developing the human resources available in Hong Kong because they are 
assets essential to the economic development of the colony. 
The secondary aims differ however. The PRC expects education to 
"...impart a code of conduct and social ideology, train people to have a 
definite viewpoint and moral character; it is a means of preserving a 
definite relationship of production, political system and moral 
custom"(196), whereas the Hong Kong statement speaks vaguely of 
'harmonizing the needs of the community.' 
Maj_or Aims 
The purpose of this discussion is to show that, because in the PRC the 
aims are derived from the economic, political and cultural ideologies of 
the Party, their achie&ent is a complex process, involving change in all 
of those areas. These aims, however complex, reflect the dominant ideology 
in the PRC and, in this way, it is argued, pose a profound contradiction 
between Hong Kong and the PRC. 
In 1985 the Central Committee of the Communist Party held a national 
education conference and announced key policy guidelines for educational 
reforms which are to acompany and support the current economic 
reforms(197). The Reform Document of this conference and other Chinese 
academic publications, as well as announcements in the Chinese press, have 
been the source for the following section. 
1. Achievement of Universal Compulsory Education 
The right of all citizens to a free education has long been a 
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principle of the Chinese Communist Party, but recently the enormous cost of 
such a system has led the Party to be less explicit in its commitments to 
this target(19R) . They have avoided the "explicit undertaking by the state 
to provide all education free of charge"(199). They still, however, appear 
committed to tne eradication of ilkeracy and raising the national 
education standard. 
Universal primary education was made a national goal in 1971, and the 
PRC has set the goal of provision of 9 years of compulsory and universal 
education. The country has, realistically, been divided into three sections 
(urban, semi-rural, and remote), according to the prosperity of the region, 
each with a different target date for achieving the goal (200). Cheng Kai 
Ming comments that the present enrolment ratios at the Primary school level 
are high, even "close to 	 advanced countries"(201). There are no precise 
figures available for junior secondary level , but the ratio is presumed to 
be 'significantly )hwer"(202). 
Overall, however, it is unlikely that universal primary education will 
de achieved soon(203). Tne regional differences are enormous, and originate 
as much in economic differences as in cultural resistance. The government 
itself concedes that the goal may not be reached until well into the next 
century. 
2. Expansion of Supply of Teachers 
Potentially the most serious problem facing China's education system 
is the shortage of qualified, effective teachers, and the development and 
improvement of teacher training is regarded as fundamental to the 
achievement of recent social goals(204). Teachers were a main target 
anti-intellectual radicals of the Cultural Revolution, and it has been 
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publicly acknowledged that the majority of teachers - and not only in that 
age bracket - are untrained or ill-trained(205). It has been estimated 
that less than half the practising teachers in primary education and only 
11% of teachers in junior secondary education are qualified(206). The 
Party, itself, admits that the teachers colleges offer a poor education: 
"Some basic subjects such as education and educational psychology are not 
given enough emphasis and as a result [teachers] do not know enough about 
teaching..."(207). 
Although Deng has attempted to restore teaching as an honourable 
profession, the Party has complained that "few people want to be teachers, 
even though "teachers are the key to developing China's education 
system"(208). There is difficulty recruiting enough students to fill the 
places at teachers' colleges and many students have entered teachers 
colleges as a second choice. Other sources report comments from students 
that they applied to teachers' college because they felt they had a better 
chance of being admitted, and that they had no intention of teaching after 
graduation(209). Despite this, there were only fifty seven qualified 
applicants for eight hundred places at Beijing Teachers College in the 
September, 1986 term, and the Party suggests that society offer more 
rewards to teachers and "...stengthen the political and ideological work in 
teacher colleges"(210). 
It has been estimated that twenty five percent more teachers are 
needed by 1990 to meet the needs of the modernization programme(211). But 
college graduates are so scarce that government and business find 
themselves competing for the good students, and those assigned to teaching 
often simply do not show up(212). 
There are several reasons why teaching is an unattractive profession 
in the PRC. Teacher salaries are twenty to thirty percent lower than 
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workers, and they receive fewer supplemental benefits. In addition, 
teachers are not eligible for employee 'perks', such as housing and medical 
care, nor for the bonuses which have been implemented under the new 
reform(213). Lastly, since the Cultural Revolution, teachers have a lower 
social status than people in other trades, so that the prestige which used 
make up for low income is lost. 
3. Improvement of Rural Education 
The present reversal of the leftist goals of reducing the economic and 
social disparities between the rural and urban sectors of China has been 
criticized as possibly resulting in 'educational apartheid'(214). Although 
there is a considerable desire by the government to improve schooling on a 
nation-wide basis, regional disparities in education will not be easy to 
overcome. Cheng Kai Ming adds, on this topic, It is an accepted fact that 
disparity in school attendance is ...a reflection of a disparity in 
economic growth. If the latter were to remain, little could be done to 
remove the former"(215). 
Statistics about the differences between rural and urban schooling in 
the PRC show the disparities. John Cleverly notes that over thirty five 
percent of rural children do not complete even five years of primary 
schooling, and that, overall, the higher up the education system, the 
lower the proportion of peasants' children" - and the proportion is falling 
in this decade(216). The repetition rate in rural primary schools is over 
three times that of urban schools, which has been attributed in part to the 
increased opportunities provided by the new work schemes and also to the 
difficulties rural children have in competing on the important examinations 
with urban school children(217). The aims, therefore are still very basic: 
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The elimination of illiteracy remains the first aim and strategy of rural 
education in the Chinese countryside; there is little debate about that 
point"(218). 
There is no widely-available alternative curriculum oriented toward 
the needs of rural life. At any rate, peasants would not be likely to 
support such a curriculum because an academic education still offers the 
best chances of passing the necessary examinations and, eventually, 
improving economically(219). Until the peasant economy improves, and 
peasants perceive a direct link between the schooling available in their 
localities and upward economic mobility, their old attitudes will prevail. 
Peasants persist with old prejudices against schooling, such as the 
traditional antagonism toward the education of girls and the obligation of 
children to contribute to the support of parents instead of attending 
school (220). 
The majority of rural teachers are locally supported and poorly paid 
making the posting unattractive to better teachers(221). In addition, they 
are mainly only primary school educated, and with no materials, no status, 
no job security, and often no reliable income. Thus, normally they regard 
teaching as a step to a better job(222). The government is attempting to 
attract and keep better teachers by offering a subsidy to most 
locally-supported teachers. However, this is not paid directly to the 
teacher, but to the administrative unit which has some flexibility in 
allocating the funds. Often the money is used for other needs(223). 
4. Expansion of Vocational Education 
The present regime has had a policy of increasing the number of 
trained workers for industry(224) and, to do this, must improve the 
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vocational elements of the school system. The Party has announced that the 
policy has brought about desired increases in the number of vocational 
school students: in 1978 vocational middle and high school students were 
5%, and 18.8% respectively in 1980 of the total enrol,,ment, whereas in 
1985, they accounted for 36% (225). The goal is equal enrolment in ordinary 
and vocational schools by 1990(226). 
In some cities and provinces the prorportion is reported to be over 
60%, although many schools are vocational and technical only in 'cosmetic 
compliance with higher directives', and it has been suggested that peasants 
would leave 'en masse' if rural schools were actually converted to 
agricultural courses(227). Cheng, on the other hand, found a new interest 
among some coastal area peasants in vocational courses due to the 
prosperity to be gained from economic crops and commercial activities(228). 
Such discrepancy in observation results from the inequalities between the 
traditionally rich and the remote areas of China and serves to highlight 
the complexity of the task facing the government, not only in policy 
implementation, but at the very early stage of policy formulation. 
Understanding of this problem is important because it is conceivable 
that Hong Kong would be asked to contribute to the solution of this problem 
through provision of resources. Hong Kong has recognized the need for 
educating a greater percentage of youth in vocational skills. In this area, 
both the PRC and Hong Kong are in the reform stage, and each faces the same 
difficulty of trying to convince a population which stresses the 
superiority of an academic education for a better economic future, as 
compared with a technical and vocational education. Hong Kong authorities 
are motivated by their perception that education serves the economic 
prosperity of the colony. In the PRC, although there is also the element of 
education as a participant in economic development, there is also 
213 
accountability to the socialist principle of combining education with 
productive labour. The fact that the PRC has not yet been able to implement 
effectively such a combination has caused instability in the system(229), 
which Hong Kong can best avoid by having in place an established effective 
structure of vocational education before the merger. 
Many of these factors could benefit the HKSAR. The shortage of 
teachers in the PRC suggests that it is unlikely that an attempt would be 
made to replace teachers in Hong Kong with politically more "correct" 
individuals. It is conceivable that Hong Kong teachers, especially in the 
fields of finance, management, and technology, would be invited to teach in 
the PRC. Hong Kong and the PRC each have a shortage of well-trained, 
committed teachers, although each education authority is reacting to the 
problem in a different way. In Hong Kong the policy of market forces is 
allowed to apply to the supply of teachers, and, as teachers are relatively 
poorly paid and do not enjoy a high social status, the problem persists 
without direct intervention. In the PRC, the problem has been caused by 
similar factors, but there is a third factor, the political abuse of 
teachers. Intellectuals have enjoyed periods of official favour, but at 
other times have been victimized by Party officials. At present, they are 
in favour, and the State is intervening in the supply problem. 
5. Higher Education 
China's strategic goal in the development of higher 
education is: by the end of the century China will 
have built a well-proportionated, rationally-tiered 
system embracing a complete range of disciplines and 
areas...[which] will contribute substantially 
to China's independent scientific and technological 
development and to solving major theoretical and 
practical problems that crop up in the course of 
socialist modernization(230). 
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The best route to achieving personal goals in the PRC is through 
higher education. However, there are places for only a little over one 
percent of the relevant age group in Chinese higher education institutions 
and there are only six million college graduates among one billion 
people(231). The new modernization policies have included an expansion and 
reconstruction of the system of higher education. Indeed, during the whole 
post-Cultural Revolution reform to Chinese education, the universities have 
been particularly emphasized because of their importance to the reform 
programme(232). Universities, particularly, are regarded as links with the 
world academic community and "serve as primary channels for the 
introduction of the scientific and technological knowlftge..."(233) which 
the PRC needs to develop. 
The major tasks facing the higher education authorities are finding 
qualified teachers to cope with increasing enrolments, financing new 
projects, easing the over-crowding which has resulted from increasing 
intake, and implementing the new management policy (234). 
The last point, implementation of a new management policy, is an 
attempt to replace an "inept and inert bureaucracy" with effective 
administration working toward efficient solution of modernization 
problems(235). To this end, some "rightist" intellectuals have been 
rehabilitated and many senior positions in departments have been given to 
returning overseas Chinese and to academics trained in the West(236). Among 
other reforms which new admin;strators have introduced are: eliminating the 
iron-rice bowl system and having reviews of staff members, introducing a 
monitoring system whereby staff are evaluated on the basis of how closely 
they meet the (written) expectations of the institution, and, lastly, 
appointment and promotion on the basis of qualification and 
performance(237). Such techniques are taken for granted in Western 
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organizations but are highly innovative in both the tradiional and the 
socialist Chinese practices. They reverse, for example, the socialist 
policies of giving to the Party supervision of professionals and of 
guaranteeing security. They deviate from traditional Chinese pratices of 
valuing seniority and stressing personal relationships in staff 
decisions(238). 
An elitist system based on ninety eight key universities has been 
reinstated. These universities are considered "intellectual growth 
poles"(239) and will receive additional funding, as well as participate in 
joint programmes with foreign universities(240). Graduate (advanced degree) 
programmes have also been instituted. Dropped during the Cultural 
Revolution as symbols of Western capitalism and revisionism(241), their 
renewed positive status represents an awareness of the need for Chinese 
participation in the international educational community and the 
restoration of the research function of universities and colleges(242). 
The PRC is making use of the opportunity which the open-door offers to 
send students abroad for graduate study. At present there are about thirty 
thousand graduate students studying abroad - more than half of whom are 
children of senior cadres(243). China regards overseas training as an 
important way to produce specialists, but limited funds severely restrict 
the numbers able to study abroad. The Party recently reminded those 
iprivilegedf students abroad that China wants to be certain that the 
subjects and activities these students are pursuing are "closely associated 
with the modernization programme, and that, apart from advanced technology 
and management, they should endeavour to carefully and only [sic] learn 
what has proved to be healthy in Western culture"(244). 
This summary of higher education reforms is intended to show how 
reform is moving Chinese universities toward a pragmatic, Western model of 
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organiztion. The intent of the planners is to make the system more 
accountable to the economic planners and manpower forecasters, and in this 
way, it converges with the Hong Kong model, where tertiary education is not 
formally accountable to economic needs but where programme planners attempt 
to meet these needs. 
In addition, Hong Kong universities are organized along western 
management models and the faculties of universities and Polytechnics are 
usually Chinese who have been partially trained in the West or are Western 
expatriates. As academic exchange between the PRC and the West increases, 
the areas of shared experience, outlook and expectation between Hong Kong 
and the PRC tertiary institutions will also increase. 
The period of reformation has too recently begun to make comments on 
its political effect, or lack of it, on the Hong Kong education arena. The 
conflict which originates in the difference between the reforms on the one 
hand and traditional and socialist teaching on the other is causing 
resistance to the reforms, and as Julia Kwong notes, therefore, "... one 
has to be cautious in interpreting the scale and scope of the 
changes"(245). The PRC has begun to take advantage of the tertiary 
education insitutions in Hong Kong through arranging exchanges of students. 
However, Hong Kong students who graduate from PRC universities usually 
experience difficulty in finding appropriate employment when they return to 
Hong Kong because of the lack of recognition there of the PRC 
qualifications. 
6. Decentralization 
The state is attempting to disengage itself from adminstering 
education at the local levels and at all school levels, (although the 
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disengagement is proceeding slowly because "years of state regimentation 
have dulled spontaneity and intiative" and because of the inflexibility of 
the Party machine(246)). The disengagement is linked to the corresponding 
delinking of the central government from economic matters, and promise 
local authorities more "initiative in making use of their own advantages 
and adopting practices fitting to their own circumstances"(247). Cheng Kai 
Ming comments that the new economic enviroment, rather than central 
political decree, is influencing education reforms(248). 
Local areas should prepare to assume more of the financial burden of 
schooling as well(249). In the rural areas, financing of schools is 
gradually being assumed by the peasants, and richer peasants are even 
gradually assuming responsibility for the construction of schools(250). 
Unfortunately, a negative effect of the decentralization programme could be 
a strengthening of the rural-urban dichotomy in standards: rural education, 
dependent more and more on local resources, will 'lock' those schools into 
the poorer rural system. 
At the teriary level, the decentralization will eventually increase 
the decision-making functions of academics which, it is hoped, will improve 
the quality of the institutions. Until 1984, authority over all policy on 
syllabus, research, staff appraisal, academic exchange, and capital 
investment was held by officials of the Party(251). 
There is no suggestion that the state is completely abnegating 
responsibility for schooling. The central ministry still stipulates 
educational standards(252), and the State Education Commission remains 
responsible for ensuring that schools fulfil official policies and 
plans(253), although it is unlikely that the ministry has the resources to 
supervise or enforce its standards (254). 
The HKSAR would benefit from present PRC moves toward decentralizing 
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the education systems of the various regions of the country, if it is 
extended to Hong Kong. Although the link between economy and education, 
which the PRC is trying to achieve, exists in Hong Kong (where education is 
legitimacized more by man-power forecasts than by social-economic needs of 
the community(255)) administration of the education system in Hong Kong is 
highly centralized. As described in Chapter 2, in Hong Kong staff 
structures and accounts are controlled by a Government Department and the 
Government determines the curriculum through setting examinations. Leaders 
in the campaign for decentralization are calling for more flexibility and 
democracy in decision-making and eventual public accountability of schools. 
In summary, the recently-articulated aims of the PRC are the 
achievement of nine-years of compulsory education, a realignment of 
secondary schooling to increase enrolment in vocational and technical 
education, an increase in the quality of rural education and of teaching 
standards, decentralization of adminstration, and, finally, more 
independence for higher education institutions. Whereas these aims are 
derived directly from the most recent Party ideology of economic pragmatism 
and socialist modernization, the most recently stated aims of Hong Kong 
education have evolved through a consultative process between external 
advisors, local business elites and local educators. Their aims can also be 
described as pragmatic, but grounded in a capitalist ideology emphasizing a 
competitive, individualistic approach to problem-solving. 
Mar Contemporary Issues in Education 
The purpose of this section is to highlight those educational issues 
which the Party is attempting to resolve as they approach the merger. The 
final resolution of these issues, because it reflects Party ideology, will 
affect Hong Kong education. 
1. Reform 
a. Reform of the Political Content of Education 
In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, reform of the political 
control and content of education has been an urgent issue. The desired end 
product of socialist education is a productive labour force with a 
socialist consciouness(256), but, under the open-door policy of the PRC, 
political education largely abandoned its ideological functions, and 
narrowed political instruction to appropriate forms of social relations 
consistent with communist morality(257). These values, Hayhoe suggests, 
"include discipline, honesty, respect for law and order, social 
responsibility, patriotism, and a love for socialism and the Communist 
Party", the majority of which,as she also suggests, are more similar to 
values taught at western educational institutions than to Maoist 
values(258). However, the durability of such reforms is in doubt - within 
the Party conflicts about the role of ideology in education have recently 
surfaced again. For example, a leading Chinese educator recently called for 
colleges to resume assigning people to look after the ideological education 
of students in order to 'develop their characters'. He also recommended 
that politica) workers be assigned to students and that those students who 
miss political theory classes be criticised(259). Attempts at reform in 
higher education began with the introduction of a manager as president of 
the universities instead of a party secretary, but, unwilling to relinquish 
total authority, the Party committee has retained control over many 
non-academic matters(260). 
The Party initially encouraged the democracy which is developing at 
many universities as a 'good tendency'. It has been careful to remind 
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students, though, that many existing democracies are afflicted with 
'maladies' and China needs 'to create a higher form of democracy' than the 
bourgeois democracy (261). The Party is, therefore, advising that "students 
be helped to understand the difference between socialist and bourgeois 
democracy and understand the relations between democracy and law and 
discipline"(262). Scientists are reminded that seeking truth is their 
primary aim but that the "touchstone by which [they] must judge scientific 
truth is social practice and its effect". 
b. The Role of Education in Economic Reform 
The present government is attempting reform in all aspects of the 
education system "...to meet the needs of construction and political 
demoncratization of the Party and the state..."(263). Education is regarded 
as the catalyst for the changes the State wants and the increased spending 
is expected to "lift economic productivity, improve living standards, 
enhance China's status as a nation and ensure the right thinking of they 
young and faith in the future"(264). However, rhetorical support of the 
reforms is greater than real support. Many economists, with their own party 
backers, oppose the policy of treating education as a component of economic 
growth, which therefore ought to receive investment funds. They group 
education with 'non-productive investments' which should receive additional 
funding only after there has been an improvement in the country's living 
standards(265). 
Rosen describes two additional aspects of the funding of education 
controversy. Where should the approved funds be allocated: to higher 
education or to basic education?; and who should provide the funds? In 
addition, what percentage should come from the central government and, what 
percentage from local administrations? Officially, the government appears 
to prefer a clear division of responsibility with the central government 
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allocating most of its funds to university and post graduate education 
while local governments, production units and richer people provide basic 
education. 
The average spending on college students and primary school children 
in most developed countries is in a ratio of four or five to one, whereas 
in the PRC, the ratio has reached seventy five to one. Rosen observes that 
a "dangerous gap is opening up between the elite and the mass sector in 
education" and questions the social and political consequences(266). 
2. Key Schools 
In the 1950's a competitive and elite network of 'key schools' was 
established in which better students were more efficiently trained in order 
to contribute more to the modernization process(267). Although the policy 
was criticized during the Cultural Revolution, it has been reinstated as 
part of the new modernization programme which, in education, represents a 
return to "conventional elitist policies"(268), including the 
reintroduction of examinations for university admissions and similar 
selection practices which are consolidating a pyramidal educational , as 
well as class, hierarchy. 
The primary school curriculum is strongly academic, and is rigidly 
determined by the fifth year examinations which select for secondary school 
places, the first choice of most being the key schools. Presently, 'key 
schools' serve about 20% of students but receive a disproportionately large 
share of education funds(269). Hooper found that 80% of the parents of 
children at the key high schools in two major Chinese cities were senior 
Party or Army officials or professionals(270). 
The linkages to the better 'key' universities are well-established and 
promotion rates from 'key/schools into universities is often around 
70-8074(271). Many ordinary primary and secondary schools, denied the 
advantages that accompany increased funding, have long neglected poor 
students, misrepresented examination results, limited the number of 
students sitting for examinations in order to raise their promotion 
rate(272) which is the main criterion for judging the quality of 
schools(273). 
3. Provision of Specialists 
As the Party has implemented its policy of educating more people to 
secure a prosperous future, it has become more specific in its demands on 
the education system. 
The areas in which trained professionals 
are urgently needed are researchers for the 
development of enterprises and of new products; 
teachers; agronomists: farmers capable of using 
advanced techniques; managers; lawyers trained 
in socialist legal system and architects. 
Communication workers ..., advertising, 
publications and consulting services workers, 
workers and professionals in the service 
industry, and sociologists and psychologists 
who are needed for departments such as 
propaganda and personnel (274). 
To meet such diverse needs, educators have begun experimenting with 
different techniques: some are innovative, but others are revivals of 
practices which had been repudiated during the Cultural Revolution. The 
system of key schools has been rehabilitated and the "open-door" policy, 
although geared toward economic activities, has affected the education 
system. A 'transfer of intellectual technology'(275), particularly in 
Western concepts of economics, social sciences and management 
education(276) has been initiated. Such courses, based on the primacy of 
the individual entrepreneur, will gradually replace the traditional 
political economy courses, and "subordinate China's education system to the 
material and social requirements of international corporate 
[relationships]"(277). In adjusting the curriculum in higher education to 
meet the needs of development and reform, the PRC has de-emphasized 
traditional liberal arts subjects like literature, Chinese history and 
philosophy, and has emphasized applied social sciences(278), which Hayhoe 
has stated is precisely the focus which "could result in dependent 
scientific relations with the West"(279). She also discusses the 
dramatic changes [which] may be expected 
in a few years when younger scholars (who have 
studied abroad, return) eager to put into 
action a whole new intellectual perspective. 
This group is likely to bring fundamental 
changes to the Chinese education system(280). 
Western concepts are being introduced through bringing what are termed 
"foreign experts" into the PRC to teach in universitiies. Although this is 
a controversial policy, the policy has been strengthened recently as the 
Party attempts to reconcile the need for modern expertise with the fear of 
bourgeois liberalisation - the phrase describing any Western-style ideas or 
actions. 
4. All Work Equally Serves The Revolution 
The elitism of the key schools has presented the Deng regime with one 
of the more difficult problems - convincing young people and students that 
all work equally serves the revolution, especially as the elite segment of 
society increases(281)(282). Educators and intellectuals are speaking out 
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about the importance of education beyond production and increasing 
standards of living. However, as long as the limited privilqges are 
divided among very few and upward mobility is a reality only for some, 
tensions will continue to increase. 
Observers have described an upsurge in interest in advanced education 
in the PRC(283), reflecting, perhaps, the persistent influences of the 
Confucian self-cultivation tradition, but also reflecting the new attitudes 
generated by the reforms. The most popular courses are the most pragmatic 
(English, business management, and foreign trade)(284). Programmes offering 
full-time and part-time possibilities, home study, work/study schedules, 
along with schools of differing quality reflecting the economic and social 
conditions of those attending them, are proliferating(285). The Government 
sanctions the new diversity: "...students should be educated to a level 
determined by differences in the availibility of natural resources, of 
manpower for production, the economic conditions of the families, and 
differences in the degree of family encouragement"(286). 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the socio-cultural, economic and 
educational systems of the PRC, highlighting specific areas in which there 
are differences between PRC and Hong Kong. Because of the impact of 
socialist ideology on Chinese culture, socio-political and economic 
institutions which have evolved which contradict parallel institutions in 
Hong Kong, contradictions which are potential obstacles to successful 
transfer. 
Policy-making for the economic system of the PRC was described as 
dominated alternately by various factions of the Party, represented as 
rightists or leftists. Development has been, therefore, slow in comparison 
with the Hong Kong system, which nas been characterized by stable 
government economic policy. It has. therefore, been more successful in 
attracting the foreign and local business necessary for diversification and 
modernization. 
in the PRC, on the other hand, despite attempts to modernize and place 
economic growth as the major national goal, the economy is confronted with 
serious problems. Unstable growth rates, regional inequalities, 
unemployment, emigration to the cities, and ideological problems brought 
about by the discrepancy between policies and socialist principles impede 
steady progress toward the twin goals which Hong Kong has successfully 
achieved. 
The difference oetween the economic status of the two societies is 
reflected in the amount of of individual wealth, the expectations of 
educational opportunties and social mobility, and the degree of freedom to 
pursue goals which each society offers. These contradictions create the 
contexts in which adjustment by Hong Kong people will be required in order 
to resolve the social tensions arising from these differences. 
Comparison between the social systems is also complex. Whereas they 
differ dramatically in politics, they share an ethnic backround which 
involves strong behavioural codes. Neither society, despite the influences 
of colonialism and industrialization on the one hand, and socialism on the 
other, has completely shed these values. However, despite very significant 
similarities, the definition of success or merit in each society has 
evolved very differently. The Hong Kong group lives and works in a 
capitalistic society, regarded by many to be the purest form of capitalism 
in the world. There, merit and prestige are awarded to those individuals 
who tenaciously and skillfully are well-paid, and able to support their 
families better than the immediately preceding generation had done. In the 
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PRC, merit and prestige are awarded to those who exhibit Party loyalty and 
are able to contribute to the national development, for the PRC is 
controlled by policies based on the ideological convictions of a powerful 
minority. Further, although neither Hong Kong nor the PRC has had 
democratic government, they differ in the relationship between the 
individuals and the government. The Party, as government, emerges as the 
problem-solving agency for individuals, whereas in Hong Kong, people do not 
expect government ot fulfil this function. 
Lastly, education is a primary means to social and economic success 
for both the citizens of Hong Kong and the PRC, and, in both societies, the 
attitude toward education is highly utilitarian. Political components are 
not significant parts of Hong Kong education, whereas, in the PRC, children 
are being prepared in school for life and work in a highly politicized, 
socialist environment. The Party closely monitors democracy movements at 
universities and reminds students of the primary importance of adhering to 
socialist principles. It is possible that the PRC will want to ensure that 
Hong Kong children grow up as Chinese patriots, with appropriate and 
acceptable views of history and politics. Some, however, question how the 
PRC could accomplish such significant reform as their own educational 
resources are limited; they suggest that it is "...more likely that [the 
PRC] would utilize the resources available in Hong Kong to strengthen their 
own system"(287). 
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Chapter 4 
THE FIELDWORK: 
Survey on Educational and Occualtional Preferences 
of Secondary School Students in Hong_ong 
I. BACKROUND AND RATIONALE TO THE SURVEY 
The previous chapters examined certain issues which have arisen out of 
the agreement to transfer sovereignity over Hong Kong to the PRC. These 
issues were the the emergence of the event as a public issue and the 
likelihood of social , political and economic contradiction because of 
structural differences between Hong Kong and the PRC. The thesis argued 
that a main feature of the transfer is the wish of Hong Kong residents to 
preserve desirable characteristics of the existing systems in order to 
enhance the preservation of stability and prosperity in Hong Kong. It has 
also been suggested that Hong Kong, the less powerful party, can adjust 
selectively in order to minimize certain of the contradictions resulting 
from differences between the two systems. This selective adjustment will be 
grounded in local cultural institutions, utilizing established pragmatic 
behaviour patterns to respond to the crisis with the objective of 
preserving existing institutions. 
This chapter describes an investigation into one specific adjustment 
which has been chosen as an example of the many that, it is argued, are 
occuring. While the main argument of the thesis treats issues involved in 
transfer from a broad perspective, the fieldwork investigation chooses a 
specific application of the argument. Hence, thesis material is being dealt 
with at two levels. The first, and predominant, level (pursued in the 
earlier chapters) is a broad description of the parties and issues 
involved. The second level, pursued here, both illustrates and grounds the 
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argument. It is illustrative of the argument, and is an investigation 
comprised of a selected sample of secondary school children, a specially 
designed instrument, and data analysis. 
The Nature of Adjustment in the Context of Hong Kong Education 
Of the factors which govern the expansion of education, the labour 
requirements of development and the demands for places in higher education 
are among the most important. These economic objectives and socio-cultural 
influences are interrelated. However, it has been argued that the 
socio-cultural and economic status of Hong Kong can remain viable as long 
as the economic links between Hong Kong and the PRC continue to 
strengthen(1). Therefore, the nexus between the socio-cultural, economic, 
and educational phenomena in the Hong Kong context is complex. This 
investigation argues that the practicality of strengthening the links is 
reflected in the education choices and first-job selection plans of Hong 
Kong youth who are adjusting to the likeV,y economic needs of the HKSAR and 
of the more powerful PRC. 
In other words, as the transfer date draws nearer, awareness of and 
concern about the transfer increases. This prompts particularly those who 
will remain in the HKSAR to investigate the economic needs of the PRC. This 
investigation will lead in most cases to accomgdation. Accom,o.dation in turn 
will lead to change in the educational and occupational choices of Hong 
Kong youth. 
Studies which have recently been carried out in Hong Kong do not 
contradict the argument. The studies relevant to this discusion are of two 
types. The first are instruments measuring attitudes about the '1997' 
issue. L.E. Atwood and P.H. Cheng have studied responses to two questions: 
what people think Hong Kong will be like after China regains control over 
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such issues as living conditions, public security, economic conditions and 
political conditions, and how attitudes about the future changed - do 
people become more or less positive about life in Hong Kong? - as result of 
the initialling of the Draft Agreement(2). They reported that, although 
there was strong agreement that life would be less democratic and that 
freedom of speech would be lost, there was"considerable indecision as to 
what the future holds. Yet (there is the attitude that) one can (must) hope 
for the best, which would be the fulfil,„ment of the Agreement and 
maintenance of the status quo"(3). 
Another type of study which is relevant to this discussion measures 
the attitudes of Hong Kong people about achieSient and success. In one such 
comparative study of Hong Kong Chinese, Japanese and Ko‘,/ean students, it 
was found that the Hong Kong Chinese dominated in success orientation and 
rationality in pursuit of a goal, and that, among the factors listed by 
Hong Kong Chinese as necessary for an ideal homelife, are effort and 
planning toward achieving goals, along with diligence(4). The study also 
found them to be more oriented toward hard work and rational planning than 
toward harmonious interaction, with more focus on the importance of 
individual actions in achieving goals than the other Asian societies. 
Other studies on attitude measurement indicate that adjustment to this 
particular challenge has begun. L. Young et al. measured the positions in 
Hong Kong society of various ethnoi nguistic grouds(5). This study, 
described as exploratory only(6), suggested that university students appear 
to have adjusted, and in many instances reversed their perceptions of the 
interethnic structure to meet the demands of an international agreement and 
in ways that could satisfy their sense of positive identity"(7). The status 
of the English language within the colony declined, a reversal of the 
historical perception of English as the key to upward mobility(8). 
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In summary, residents anticipate change but, probably because of the 
unprecedented nature of the occurences, are not clear about the nature of 
that change. The Hong Kong population has been described in the literature 
as a group which attempts to achieve through rational and diligent 
planning. It has been documented that adjustments to the merger are already 
occur .ing. These factors support the argument that rational adjustment of 
educational and occupational plans might be possible, and the hypothesis of 
the study, which is described in the following section, has been formulated 
with these factors in mind. 
Analysis of the Problem 
The fieldwork of the thesis, then, investigates whether rational and 
pragmatic adjustment of educational and occupation plans is occuring in 
Hong Kong. The fieldwork of the thesis pursues this analysis in terms of 
the role residents may play in economic aspects of China's Four 
Modernizations policy. However, this is just one of two interesting and 
important areas of investigation of the adjustment problem which have 
emerged. The other area of investigation is into the nature and degree of 
political mobilization at the grassroots level which is occuring in the 
colony. The following brief section descibes this issue, and is included to 
strengthen of the argument of the chapter: that specific adjustment has 
begun in this decade. It also emphasizes the complexity of adjustment 
processes facing Hong Kong. 
I.Political Mobilization in Hong Kong 
Because of the possibility of cultural and economic clashes, and the 
wish to participate in determining the outcomes of the decolonization and 
transfer process, there is a perceived need for increased local political 
involvement in this decade. Lau Siu-kai wrote: 
Despite the resolution of the prickly 
issue of sovereignity, political changes in the 
run-up to 1997 and beyond are still perceived 
to be murky, and the possibility of serious 
political instability cannot be totally ruled 
out. Uncertainties and anxieties abound not 
only because of the vast differences in the 
political and economic institutions between 
Hong Kong and China, but also because the 
maintenance of Hong Kong's political 
individuality hinges ultimately on China's 
goodwill and tolerance. Political malaise is 
further complicated by the lack of trust in 
China on the part of the majority of the Hong 
Kong people(9). 
The development of 'representative government' is a very 
controversial issue, and, although the British indicated that 
self-government was a possibility, and the PRC has spoken about 'Hong 
Kong people ruling Hong Kong', the amount of representative government 
which will be in place in 1997 is not known. However, Lau has written 
that even the possibility_ of self-government has been an 'impetus' to 
the existing political activists who regard it as 'their opportunity to 
obtain and wield power'(10). They are opposed by others, mainly 
professionals and successful business people, who regard democratization 
of government as a threat to business stability. The two camps are now 
poised around the existing colonial government "...waiting to fight for 
the chunks of political power to be transferred downward in accordance 
with the requirements of a decolonization policy which was peculiar to 
Hong Kong"(11). Although local government is mentioned in the Joint 
Declaration, the reaction of the PRC to requests for self-government in 
other territories which it controls has been to attack local nationalism 
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by initiating intense political education to introduce approved 
concepts, and by installing cadres committed to communism(12). 
2.Hong Kong and the Economic Aspects of the Four Modernizations 
Chapters 2 and 3 highlight many of the differences between Hong 
Kong and the PRC, but also suggest similarities. As T. Gold has pointed 
out, citizens of the PRC are "caught in two historic streams": 
traditional Chinese culture and the Leninist traditions of the Communist 
Party(13). The Hong Kong Chinese are caught in two historic streams as 
well they value the traditional behavioural patterns of Chinese 
culture, but have been influenced by western values under the colonial 
government and education systems and under British laws. 
Hong Kong has succeeded as an capitalist economic entity, while the 
PRC appears to be struggling to define a policy which remains socialist 
but is conducive to material success. In this aspect, they appear to be 
very different from each other. However, this is not a clear dichotomy 
because the PRC, putting aside its earlier goal of economic 
self-reliance, has recently embarked on a course of economic policies to 
repair the break with the world capitalist system. The PRC has begun to 
support and campaign for "... the linkage approach coordinating ... 
global economic struggies"(14). Such moves could significantly narrow 
the differences, not only in the area of internal economic mechanisms 
but also between their respective roles in the world economic system. 
There are several policies which could be significant to the Hong Kong 
residents. 
The first is the new foreign trade policy which "... is based on 
the assumptions that the contemporary world economy is an interdependent 
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one [into which the PRC will] integrate the Chinese economy"(15). The 
open door policy of the 1980's represents a shift from the view that 
international trade is inherently unequal, toward the opinion that it 
legitimate and realistic in the light of the nature of the current 
global economy(16). The entry of the PRC into the global foreign trade 
system has attracted considerable interest from Western and 
industrialized countries, and, although the nature of Hong Kong's 
participation in the international trade portfolio of the PRC may 
change, (i.e from being a major market for PRC foreign exchange 
earnings, to increased PRC reliance on the sophisticated entrepot 
facilities in Hong Kong(17)), Hong Kong can use the new policy to its 
own advantage. Hong Kong has well-developed facilities for the transfer 
of Chinese goods to markets, as well as for handling the transfer of 
foreign goods into the PRC(18). 
Secondly, the strat@ly of technology transfer from industrial 
market economies to China has been adopted in order to offset the 
problems of poor product quality, productivity, and low technical level. 
Realization of the benefits to be gained through technology transfer 
will be a significant step to the PRC's goal of modernization(19), and 
the PRC recently applied for the first time for technical aid from tne 
United Nations and was granted an aid package which provided for a wide 
range of technological support. 
The strategy of attracting direct foreign investment has been 
expanded. Modern manufacturing facilities for promoting exports in the 
Special Economic Zones and coastal cities, as well as joint ventures 
have been set up. Foreign investment is being invited as a means to 
increase financial strength and thus be able to afford the new 
technology(20). The importance of this element was highlighted by the 
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announcement of a set of incentives for foreign firms operating in the 
PRC(21). The incentives appear to allow the local authorities greater 
flexibility in establishing regulations affecting foreign firms in an 
attempt to respond to the complaints by foreign investors of complicated 
bureaucracy, high and arbitrary fees, unskilled labour, etc. The need 
for decentralization of management is implicit in these guidelines. 
The SEZS serve a second function in modernization policies: they 
are seen as experimental projects to test new development policies(22). 
Apprehensive about spiritual contamination by foreign ways of thinking, 
the Chinese employ the isolated SE7.4-: to 'test' the new measures before 
exposing the rest of the country to them(23). 
The tourist industry is being expanded. The PRC is now trying to 
develop its tourism industry(24). In the SEZ's, for example, tourism has 
been placed in the forefront of [the] development programme"(25), 
because it is labour-intensive and returns high profits in a short 
period(26). Cheng Tong Yung describes the new attitude about tourism: 
"It is now treated as one of the best money spinners" of the 
modernization poiicies(27). Tourism has been a major contributor to the 
Hong Kong economy and investors there are among the most enthusiastic in 
initiating SEZ tourist schemes(28). 
Lastly, foreign culture and trends are being introduced through the 
large number of scholars and students studying abroadin industrial 
market economies, and through internally circulated Western literature 
and journals. Hong Kong has addressed this issue through centres of 
academic research concerned with the impact of Western technology 
culture on Chinese society - although in the Hong Kong context. 
If the people of Hong Kong identify the areas in which the PRC 
lacks the expertise to meet the demands generated by the new development 
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policies, the Hong Kong resioents, through skilful use of local ,,  
resourses, can prepare themselves to participate in the modernization of 
China, benefitting the PRC, while helping to stabilize their own 
economic and politcal futures. 
This chapter argues that these areas of cooperation are 
identifiaole, and, furthermore, suggests tnat Hong Kong residents will 
attempt to 'begin the interaction process by making eoucation relevant to 
the economic reality of post-1997 and will respond in the several ways. 
Firstly, acquire training in managerial and production skills; secondly, 
seek expertise in computer and lignt tecnnology; thvedly, look to the 
professional employment needs in the SEZ$ ; fourthly, aduire training in 
marketing, financial and related service, and, lastly, seek professional 
Qualifications for the tourist industry. The following section discusses 
each of tnese points. 
(1.) Ocquire traipjng in mapaggriaj and production syills. The 
success of the economic reforms in the PRC depenos as much on the 
modernization of its managerial force as on any other factor. FRC moves 
to localize decision-making in new areas such as fee-setting, 
establishing time-spans for contracts with foreign firms, admin'tration, 
lano-use, deployment of manpower, tax concessions) all require a 
managerial group as yet non-existent in the FRC: local managers able to 
make business decisions independently, innovative y, and confidently. 
M.Goidberg(29) has written that the Party is aware of this need, but 
that tne present educational system is not able to provioe managers with 
the appropriate training to function critically and creatively. He 
writes " ...economic reform can only be built on a foundation of 
sncietai reform in ... work Affifitde, learning methods and philosophy, 
and much greater appreciation of, and reward for, individual action and 
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responsibility'(30). 
The PRC also has a need for managers who know about technology and 
can negotiate with foreign businesses(31). Hong Kong residents have 
access to training in the most up-to-date-management techniques and in 
modern technology. 
(2.) Seek expertise in comatIter and light technology. Wong and 
Chu noted that 
A truly effective transfer of technology 
requires time and patience. It involves the 
training of local personnel, both on the job 
and abroad, and technical co-operation between 
foreign ... enterprises and domestic firms(32). 
Modern equipment, parts, and expertise is available in Hong Kong, 
and is already being utilized by the PRC(33). Ho Yin-ping has identified 
trends of developments in the area of technological growth in Hong 
Kong(34) and suggested that Hong Kong develop knowledge-based and 
technology-intensive industries which are "...geared toward higher skill 
levels and higher technology". Hong Kong's usefulness to China, he  
continues, extends to assisting its modernization in technology because 
its geographical proximity and cultural affinity "make Hong Kong a 
singularly convenient source"(35). 
(3.) Look to the_grofessional employment needs in the SEPz. The 
current shift to regional specialization (through SEZ's and other 
schemes) and development of a comprador links between local enterprises 
and foreign capitai(36). These SEZ's are comprehensively developed and 
foreign investment is applied to manufacturing, real estate, tourism, 
and other services(37). However, impediments to these developments have 
emerged: bureaucratic hurdles, lack of foreign trade infrastructure, and 
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a reluctant attitude by foreign businesses(38) and the Shenzhen SEZ 
depends on Hong Kong for most of its external connections(39). Hong Kong 
has expertise in all of the areas which the SEZ's hope to develop and 
could provide at least the interim pool of professionals needed to 
manage the SEZ's. 
(4.) Aciquire training in marketing, financial and related service 
. Hsu argues that, because the PRC will not be able to develop its own 
infrastrucutre of marketing and trade experts immediately, "China is 
likely to continue to depend on Hong Kong as an important foreign 
exchange earner and a gateway to the West,...so long as China maintains 
its existing outward-oriented trade policy"(40). Hong Kong posseses a 
flexible and well-developed support structure of lawyers and financial 
experts, and is therefore a natural choice for promotion of PRC 
goods(41)as well as playing a role in supporting financial negotiations 
between the PRC and foreign customers(42). The ability of Hong Kong to 
secure and develop overseas markets for the PRC is, therefore, important 
to its prosperity. 
(5.) Seek professional qualifications for the tourist industry. 
Hong Kong is a primary access and exit point to China due to its 
extensive system of international air links. Equally important is the 
nature of the industry in Hong Kong as opposed to that in the PRC. 
A.Donnithorne suggests that Hong Kong, because it is a competitive 
market economy, has developed skills which provide a better environment 
for tourism than the PRC, "...which has not had to trouble too much 
about consumer tastes"(43). 
The survey questions whether, in this decade, educational and 
occupational decision-making are affected by people's perceptions of the 
PRC's actual and potential economic development. The Hong Kong people 
have nistorically been highly pragmatic in educational decision-making, 
achieving desired practical results and max„...,imizing efficiency. If they 
continue this behaviour, educational choices will reflect a high degree 
of pragmatism, a low interest in ideological propositions and a low 
degree of confidence in the promises which have been made by Great 
Britain and the PRC. 
II. AIM, OBJECTIVES, AND HYPOTHESIS OF THE SURVEY 
A. The Aim 
The fieldwork of the thesis attempts to test the line of analysis of 
the preceding section by examining in detail the educational implications 
of the new unique Hong Kong economic/socio-political nexus. However, 
rather than presenting a prescription for the 'ideal' educational and 
occupational structure which would satisfy economic and socioipolitical 
requirements, the aim is to demonstrate the readiness of present secondary 
school children to adapt to the imminent political changes and meet the 
requirements of the new economic, political, social configurations. 
Information about the students' perceptions regarding the colony's 
labour requirements and about the demand for places in higher education is 
also generated. 
B. The Objectives 
The objectives are to obtain two sets of data from present students: 
1.their educational and occupational plans and 2.their perceptions of 
linkages between their plans and 1997. 
C. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is that Hong Kong upper secondary school children will 
be pragmatic in this decade in making educational and occupational choices. 
The criteria for pragmatism will be 
1. Educational and occupational choices will reflect the probable impact 
of '1997' on the Hong Kong economy. 
2. These plans will reflect the impact of the PRC's economic policies on 
Hong Kong. 
3. Plans will not always coincide with the personal interests and likes of 
the students. 
The focus therefore is on choice and the relationship between today's 
choices and the imminent merger. Their answers will reveal whether one 
segment of society is making decisions which will ease or interfere with 
'stability and prosperity' in Hong Kong in the coming decade. 
The following assumptions were made when setting the aims, o0Aectives 
and hypothesis of the survey. 
1. Hong Kong school children are aware of the merger. 
2. Hong Kong school children and their parents are pragmatic about 
educational and occupational choices. 
3. Hong Kong school children and their parents are aware of the impact of 
the takeover on the future life opportunities. 
4. Hong Kong people who have the option of leaving after 1997 may not have 
given priority to evaluation of the economic 'nexus' of Hong Kong/PRC 
in guiding their children's educational choices. 
6. The slogan the future stability and prosperity of Hong Kong' is 
immediately identified with the 1997 issue. 
Variables (TABLE No. 1) 
The independent and intervening variables were specified according to 
the following guidelines. 
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1. language of instruction: Chapter 2 establishes the importance of 
this variable. 
2. birthplace of parents: T. Au and J. Harackiewicz(44), among others, 
have established the effect of parental expectations on Hong Kong 
children's academic performance. The relevant question is whether the 
children whose parents were born in the PRC respond to the choices 
differently as compared with those children of Hong Kong-born parents. In 
their comparative anaylsis of parental influence on occupational choice of 
adolescents, D. Podmore and D. Chaney wrote that one change in family 
relationships that accompanies modernization is the decline of authority 
of parents over adolescent family members"(45). In the traditional Chinese 
family the parent has considerable authority, but the forces of 
westernization and industrialization tend to mitigate this influence(46). 
Hong Kong, however, has a dualistic nature, and the western economic system 
and emerging transitional social system is complemented by traditional 
behavior patterns. Therefore, differences between responses of children of 
Hong Kong-born parents and those of China-born parents might be expected 
since Hong Kong adolescents have been found to be more likely to accept 
parental authority than other groups(47). 
3. gender: Research has found more parental pressure to succeed in 
careers was put on boys than girls in keeping with traditional Chinese 
values(48), and Fan reports that students' preferences for occupations were 
consistent with local gender stereotypes(49). 
4. age/educational level: the study accepts the view elaborated in 
W.M. Williams that "...occupational choices and occupational decisions are 
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probably best regarded as largely continual processes in that they are 
often the result of interaction over a protracted period between 
aspiration, preference, self-discovery, influence, opportunity and 
experience"(50). 
5. socio-economic status: As described, the sample was limited to 
those schools in lower and lower middle income residential areas of Hong 
Kong. Housing status has been included as a measure of SES in several 
studies done there. However, greater control was over measurement of this 
variable was wanted, and biographical questions were included on the survey 
form in order to further stratify the sample. Social researchers have used 
various measures of socioeconomic status, including father's and mother's 
education, father's occupation, and family income, when investigating Hong 
Kong youth(51). There is, for example, a relationship between education 
level and social status, as well as income and social status in Hong Kong. 
Ng has cited research which revealed that youth are not knowledgeable about 
the total income of their families, or that the answer may be ca,sually 
given, which results in inaccuracies(52). The education level of parents 
was, therefore, included as an alternate measure of SES. 
In addition, the students were asked to provide their parents' 
occupations. In those cases in which the coder was confident about making a 
judgement, (e.g. where the parent's occupation was given as amah or 
cleaner, or teacher or manager) a corresponding rating for SES was given. 
In those cases where confidence was low because of imprecision in the name 
of the parent's occupation, or because students reported not being sure of 
parents' occupation, no rating was made. 
6. source of influence over decisions: Item 2 asks for the student's 
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perception of who has the most influence on their occupational choice. In 
the case of wide variation, it will be investigated as a variable. The role 
of parents in guiding decisions of their children has been discussed by 
Lee, who reports that students depend on their parents for discussing 
career plans and have a positive attitude toward accepting the family's 
wishes about schooling and careers(53). Occupational guidance in schools in 
Hong Kong was generally performed by classroom teachers(54). Recently, 
however, special 'career teachers' have been appointed by the principals or 
elected by colleagues, but they encounter practical difficulties such as 
lack of facilities and resources, and attitudinal problems such as their 
unfavourable status which impede their work(55). 
TABLE No. 1 Indeaendent, Dependent and Intervening variables 
Independent 
	 Dependent 	 Intervenia2 
1. Gender 
	 1. Educational Choice 
	 1. Language of 
2. Parental 	 2. Occupational Plans 	 Instruction 
3. SES 	 2. Source of 
4. Age 	 Influence 
C. The Instrument Items - Rationale and Description 
The instrument was divided into three sections. Following the 
biographical questions of part 1 described in the previous section, part 2 
was made up of items about education plans. Formulation of these items was 
guided by five internal instrument objectives: 
1. that they attempt to determine which choices of courses 
are most common; 
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2. that they attempt to determine which courses of study 
are perceived by students as most useful for ensuring 
a stable personal future; 
3. that they identify a discrepancy between the choices of 
'useful' subjects and 'interesting' subjects; 
4, that they identify student opinions concerning which 
courses of study are best serving the future prosperity 
and stability of Hong Kong, and 
5. that they attempt to measure tne motivation and realism 
of student plans. 
Appropriate to tne research questions I, 2, and 3, items 11 througn 13 
of the instrument asked the student to report and assess rnose 
non-compulsory subjects being prepared for sitting the Hong Kong 
Certificate of Education Examination and Hong Kong Higher Level Examination 
or Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination. Pragmatic choices will reflect the 
influence on those choices of the local economic situation. For example, 
the practical qualifications are in areas sucn as Commercial Subjects, 
Computer Studies, Technology, Economics, and perhaps Chinese Language. 
These items also asked the student to identify the subJect most useful 
to his or her future and, secondly, the most jnteresting subJect in order 
to measure discrepancy between interests and choices of subjects. If the 
examinations cnosen are also judged vseful_, and if the cnoices diverge 
from interest, tne students are being pragmatic and choosing a course 
with prospects, in their perception, as compared with studying an 
interesting area. 
in addition, which item 14 asks students to report whether his or her 
own likes and dislikes are most important when choosing courses of study, 
is included as a check on the reliability of the answers obtained in 
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questions 17. It permits comparison of results with G. Chow's results in 
her analysis of interests and choice of major field among entering freshmen 
at the university. 
Items 15 and 16 (asking whether the student believed that study in the 
PRC or in another foreign country would help the student to achieve career 
goals) attempt to measure the realism of students' attitudes toward the 
usefulness of various education credentials. For example, media reports 
have described the low status and discrimination which Hong Kong graduates 
of mainland universities have experienced upon return to the Hong Kong job 
market(56). 
Item 17 investigates the basis of choice of course of study. The list 
provided includes four pragmatic options: my own interest in the area, 
confidence I can get a good grade, steady job prospects from the area of 
study, and preparation for a high-salary job. In addition, one altruistic 
option, usefulness of the area to the future of Hong Kong society, and one 
external option: my family's advice. 
Item 18 (which asks students to evaluate secondary and tertiary 
subjects on the basis of how important it will be for Hong Kong to have 
citizens skilled in the area) is inserted to meaoure student perception of 
Hong Kong's workforce requiments. 
Part 3 asked about occupation plans and formulation of these items was 
guided by the following objectives: 
1. to attempt to determine which choices of occupations are 
most common 
2. to attempt to determine which job characteristics are valued 
3. to attempt to determine awareness of the economic and 
labour needs of Hong Kong; 
4. to attempt to identify commitment to the development 
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neeos of the PRC 
5. to measure the realism of attituoes about and confidence 
in the future of the labour market in Hong Kong. 
Item 19 asks them to indicate whicn occupation they prefer to pursue, 
and investigates whether career preferences are based on an adaptive 
response pattern. Leung et ai, report that children in Hong Kong "even at 
an early age, nave we))-developed and realistic opinions about which 
occupation might be most advantageous for them to enter"(57), and Fan has 
found that students choice of courses is related to preference for "types 
of jobs"(58). This item, therefore, is based on the assumption_ that, 
firstly, students have Pegun to consider which jobs they may want, ano, 
secondly, that responses will be represent student perception of whicn jobs 
will suit their perceived needs. Item 20 asks the student who has been most 
influerrtial in advising tnem on this choice. 
Item 21 is askeo to determine values asSociated with career choice. 
The list is chosen from two areas: opjective job characteristics "being my 
own boss", "... not all routine, is interesting", "a chance to travel', 
"good salary", "fringe benefits', ".., technical work" "reasonable working 
hours", 'offers me career stability", "good chance of getting promoted", 
and the individual or subjective perceptions of a Job "should not be too 
difficult", "friendly co-workers", "gives pride in the job", "contributes 
to Hong Kong society", "contributes to PRC development" and "helping 
people". The list was constructed with partial reference to the model 
employed by Birnbaum et al., who, in their study of .iob characteristics 
mooels in Hong Kong, refer to 'core Job dimensions' of variety, ioentity, 
autonomy and job feedback and found that this model fits Hong Kong(59). 
In order to determine awareness of the economic needs of Hong Kong, 
item 22 asks the student to rank career areas in terms of the long-term 
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survival of Hong Kong. The list was developed with reference to the 
distribution of the working population by industry(60) which lists 
manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, tourism, tranport 
and communication, financing, real estate and service industries as the 
leading categories of employment. The question is to measure the realism of 
students about the role of different industries now in Hong Kong in 
maintaining its continued prosperity. It is also an internal reliability 
check when compared with the results of Question 18. 
In accordance with objective number 5, by questioning attutudes about 
career timing and location, items 23, 24 and 25 attempt to measure the 
degree to which this generation is intimidated by the uncertainties 
surrounding the transfer. 
Item 26 which asks students to choose the three most respected careers 
in Hong Kong is a reliability check. Students whose answers deviated from 
the most usual answers were eliminated from the final sample. Item 27 
attempted to determine the advice parents are giving students about career 
choice by asking what type of work parents have suggested. 
To measure confidence in their future in Hong Kong, item 28 asks the 
student to measure the likelihood of various explanations for a Hong Kong 
student failing to achieve career goals. Students in Hong Kong often report 
that the level of competition, both during their schools year and also when 
they enter the job market, is very intense. This question attempts to 
determine whether a new factor, uncertainty over the future, is affecting 
their perceptions of obstacles to achieving goals. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS 
A. The Samale 
The selection of the sample was guided by the hypothesis: the focus is 
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on choices and the relationship between choice and merger. Hence, it was 
important to attempt to eliminate those students who would not have to make 
the choices, i.e., those who will emigrate. Hence the sample is a 
stratified one on two levels: the schools were chosen to fail into the 
pre-selected category by income level, and within the schools, children 
were selected according to their responses relating to parental SES. 
1.The Schools (TABLE No. 2) 
The fieldwork was carried out in March 1987 in 18 upper secondary 
schools in Forms 3 through 7. These schools were chosen with requirements: 
1. that they should serve those Chinese children who will probably not have 
the option of emigrating, and 2. that they should be in proportion to a 
cross-section of schools in language, grade, location, and type 
(Government, aided, private). 
To meet the first requirement, schools were limited to those serving 
lower and lower-middle income groups. The successful candidates for 
emigration are generally those with either skills and/or finances to 
establish themselves in a new country(61). It was assumed that children 
from lower-income families are less likely to have an opportunity to 
emigrate. Lower, middle-lower income status was determined at three steps 
in the setion process. Firstly, this condition was specified to the local 
school adminstrators assisting in the school seiction; secondly, the 
principals of the schools recommended by the adminstrators were questioned 
about the income level of the average family of children attending the 
school, and thirdly, questions 7-9 on the instrument attempted to obtain 
information about the socio-economic status of the students. 
Responses to inital requests for assistance in obtaining access to 
schools were not reassuring. One correspondent, a lecturer at a Hong Kong 
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university, wrote of the difficulties in gaining agreement from principals 
because of "their conservatism" in the current climate in Hong Kong. 
However, eventually entry into 18 schools was obtained with assistance from 
individuals connected with various aspects of the education system. Of the 
16 used for the final study, 14 were aided and two were government schools. 
No private schools were visited because of their reluctance to take part in 
the project. (Two other aided achools were used for the pilot study.) 
Of schools in the final study three use Chinese as the language of 
instruction and 13 use the English language. This meant that 187 Chinese 
Middle school children and 977 from English Secondary schools, yielding a 
ratio 1:5 of Chinese to English instruction in the sample. 
The geographic distribution of the schools is five urban schools on 
Hong Kong island, 2 estate schools in the New Territories New Towns, and 8 
urban and estate schools in a wide area of Kowloon (See Table 2). The rural 
areas were not included in the instrument because of lack of access. 
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TABLE No. 2 - The Type, Languaae and Location of Schools 
Schools used  n Surve.y. 	 Colony Schools (62) 
Government 	 12% 	 12X 
Aided 	 88% 	 88% 
Location : 
Hong Kong Island 	 53% 	 41.2% 
Kowloon 	 33% 	 26.8% 
New Territories 	 13% 	 31.8% 
Laagpage 
Chinese 	 16.1% 	 11.0% 
English 	 83.9% 	 89.0% 
2. The Children (TABLE No. 3) 
The attitudes of the present generation of secondary school children 
toward the takeover are the concern of this survey. Contemporary children 
are not free to make personal and academic choices based solely on the goal 
of social and financial advancement. They must consider the uncertainties 
of 1997 and the changes the territory will undergo before and after that 
date. However, the thesis argues that they have been influenced by the Hong 
Kong environment and will respond in a pragmatic, problem-solving approach 
to the obstacles to achieving their personal goals. 
a. Within the stratified sample of schools, children were allocated to 
the study by the principal according to the convenience of the school 
schedule on the particular day the researcher was invited. Principals, 
however, attempted to accomadate the wishes of the researcher in terms of 
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obtaining an overall proportionate sample of grade levels, sex, and course 
of study. The sample eventually included a proportionate number of students 
from each form with one exception. Although the distributions of Forms 
Three through Five represent the colony-wide enrolments for the 1986 school 
year, the proportion for Form Six students is higher than the colony 
proportion. 
In the matriculation courses for the 1986/1987 school year, the ratio 
between Form Six and Form Seven students was 3:2. At the time the survey 
was conducted, Form Seven students were preparing for examinations and were 
not available. (See TABLE 3.) 
Responses to the question about the level of education students wish 
to achieve showed that eighty percent wish to complete tertiary education. 
Curriculum at this level is strongly academic and is aimed at 
preparing students for higher education(63). 
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TABLE No. 3 The Grade and Gender oi the Students 
Total 
Form 3 	 22.5% 
Sample: 
Boyl 
Colony:.  
29% 
Girls 
263 76 187 
Form 4 	 28% 28% 
328 115 213 
Form 5 	 22% 28% 
254 116 138 
Form 6 	 22.9% 10% 
267 125 142 
Form 7 
	 4.5% 5% 
53 19 34 
Survey Total 43% 
501 664 
Colony Total 48.6% 51.3% 
3. The Parents (TABLE No. 4) 
As shown in Table No. 4, twenty two percent of students reported that 
both parents were born in Hong Kong. The recent census showed that of 
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people of the age group of their parents, thirty nine percent report being 
born in Hong Kong. The probability of a child having noth parents born in 
Hong Kong would, then, be about half of that number. Since the projected 
figure and the obtained figure are similar, confidence in the reporting of 
the respondents is satisfactory. 
Asked about the highest level of schooling their parents had attained, 
approximately 30% were unsure of the schooling of their mothers or their 
fathers. Of the remainder, the obtained percentages compare favourably with 
colony-wide percentages. The Question about the education attainment of 
Parents was combined with a quest on asking for the father's and mother's 
occupation. This was to increase confidence regarding the SES of the 
participants. There exists in Hong Kong a high relationship between 
education level and future income. Information from these two OUESt10113 was 
used to deselect those students whose family may have reached a higher SES 
than was wanted in the survey. 
TABLE No. 4 Parental Birthplace and Scnool Achievement 
Birthplace of Parents : 
both HK born 	 22% 
one HK born 	 51.7% 
neither HK born 	 18.3% 
unsure 	 7.2% 
School Achievement of Parents : 
Obtained Figures 	 Colony-wide Fiallres 
Father Mother Males Females 
Primary School 42% 55% 49% 44% 
Secondary School 37% 35% 26% 
Higher Education 19% 9X 22% 5% 
Limitations of the Fieldwork Project 
1. Confidentiality, in the opinion of the researcher, must be total 
because of the political environment in Hong Kong and in the PRC. The 
traditional reluctance of the Hong Kong people to participate in social 
research has been increased by the uncertainties surrounding the nature and 
degree of personal freedom to be available under the coming regime. 
Personal correspondence with educators in Hong Kong indictates the 
traditional conservatism of Hong Kong principals has increased recently and 
indicates that there could be a risk of embarrassment to those professionals 
who cooperate with the research. The political situation in Hong Kong has 
hardened the weil-established reluctance of Hong Kong residents to be 
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interviewed or surveyed. 
B. Chung and Z. Kwok describe the political fears and discuss other 
factors(64). 'People are usually suspicious when they are being 
interviewed. Usually they conclude that the interviewers are from the 
government but under disguise... . Another inhibiting factor is the 
reserved personality of most Chinese. 	 They do not like talking about 
themselves - revealing themselves to other people. All these [factors] are 
especially true when the 'other people' are strangers"(65). 
2. The researcher does not speak or write Chinese at a level 
commensurate with conducting this investigation without the aid of 
translators. To mitigate the effects of this - as indicated earlier - the 
translated survey was back-translated as well as piloted among Hong Kong 
People. 
IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SURVEY 
The project was divided into four phases. These are: Phase 1: Design 
of the Instrument, Phase 2: The Pilot Testing, Phase 3: Administration of 
the Study, and Phase 4, Coding, Analysis and Interpretation of the Data. 
Phase 1: Design of the Instrument 
It was decided to use a written instrument rather than an interview 
technique for two reasons. More students could be reached in the one month 
available for carrying out the research, and it would be possible to use 
Chinese in a written format since the researcher does not speak Cantonese. 
On the other hand, use of a written format meant that the instrument had to 
be simpler and that no additional information or clarifications could be 
requested. In addition, strict control over the pace at which the students 
responded was lost(66). 
The instrument has 30 questions of which 12 are biographical. The 
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issue of question sequence had to be addressed. The biographical questions 
were placed at the beginning of the instrument because of the desire to 
reassure the students of the confidentiality of their answers. By making 
the degree of anonymity clear immediately, reluctance to answer sensitive 
questions could be partially avoided. 
Earlier researchers commented on the difficulty respondents in Hong 
Kong experience with hypothetical questions(67). Factual questions in the 
form of dichotomized scales of three points, multiple choice and open-ended 
questions are suggested formats(68). Therefore, dichotomized scales and 
multiple-item questions have been used whereever possible. In those items 
in which a multiple-item indicator was impossible and a single-item 
question was used, retest questions have been incorporated into the 
instrument. Open questions were avoided in all but two places because of 
the need to have the answers translated into English upon coding the data. 
Ail noncognitive tests are susceptible to response set, that is the 
tendency of the individual to reply in a particular direction, almost 
independent of content. Therefore during instrument construction, steps 
were taken to control response set following the guidelines in Mehrens(69) 
that response is most prevalent on tests that (1) contain ambiguous items, 
(2) require a disagree/agree column, or (3) lend themselves to responses in 
either a favourable or unfavourable direction. 
The instrument was written in English but translated into Chinese. 
Chinese is the mother tongue of all of the participants, but it was also 
hoped, through the use of Chinese, to avoid bias because of comprehension 
difficulties or because of any negative attitudes toward English. The 
preparation of the English draft followed closely the guidelines of R. 
Brislin on the methods of prejbaring questionnaires which are to be 
transiated(70). Commenting on the importance of clear wording in the 
270 
original version, he wrote "Questionnaire wording and translation go hand 
in hand, since it is difficult for a bilingual to translate poorly written 
passages into another language"(71). 
The English draft of the instrument was commented upon by Lecturers in 
the Institute of Education. Suggestions were made on the content, 
relationship of the questions to the hypothesis, format, question sequence, 
and appropriateness of the questions to statistical analysis and 
discussions were held about the validity of the instrument. 
After translation by a paid professional translation agency in London, 
the instrument was back-translated into English. Again following guidelines 
suggested by 8rislin(72), the English instrument was revised by the 
researcher in consulation with the translator, who then translated it again 
into Chinese. It was then adminstered to 15 London-based bilingual Hong 
Kong Chinese who suggested changes in the names of some of the academic 
subjects; added several coloquialisms unique to Hong Kong, and made 
suggestions on the Chinese translation. All of these suggestions were 
incorporated into the version taken to Hong Kong. 
The instrument was then examined by a professional translator in Hong 
Kong who further adapted course names to the present Hong Kong env roment. 
A back-translation was then done which resulted in changes in several of 
the categories for answers. The instrument was then accepted in its Chinese 
version as clear and appropriate to the Hong Kong context. 
Pnase 2: The Pilot Testing 
The instrument was piloted first among a group of 15 Hong Kong 
secondary school leavers, and then in two Hong Kong secondary schools - 
reaching 100 Form 5 students. Following the guidelines in deVaus, the 
purpose of the pilot study was to evaluate(73): 
1. the sensitivity of each item to discriminate 
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2. the coder reliability and validity of each item 
3. freedom from redundancy 
4. absence of response set 
5. length and convenience of administration 
6. acceptability to the students. 
The pilot study revealed several things. Firstly, all students 
completed the instrument, apparently conscientiously but in slightly over 
the allotted time. The invigilating teachers posed questions relating to 
two sets of directions. Examination of the scores for discrimination 
resulted in two questions being eliminated because over a third of answers 
were in the 'unsure' category or left blank. Other modifications as a 
result of pilot testing were a reduction in length in order to ensure that 
students could complete within 25 minutes and a rewriting of the directions 
on two questions. No evidence of response set was noticed during the pilot 
study. 
Reliability is best ascertained by retesting with the same 
population(74). This was not possible during the period of the fieldwork, 
and therefore internal reliability checks on several key questions were 
included. Coding was carried out by one person which minimizes the element 
of unreliability introduced by coder differences. 
Phase 3: The Survey 
Fieldwork took place during March, 1987 and lasted four weeks. Details 
of this phase follow in section V. After the pilot testing and revision, 
the instrument was administered in 16 additional schools. In order to 
remove any effect of having a foreigner in the classroom, the instrument 
was distributed in all cases by the classroom teachers. They were directed 
to explain the purpose as described in the title of the instrument) and 
assure the students that it was not a test. In most cases, 15-20 minutes 
was required for completion. 
During each school visit, the principal assigned the teachers to 
distribute the instrument and explain the necessary instructions. The 
students were instructed to fill in the forms by themselves, to complete 
the form, and not to reveal their identity on the form. The principals then 
answered the researcner's questions about tne socio-economic status of the 
population. The researcher remained at the school in all cases to help in 
case of doubt about questions or instructions. 
Phase 4: Analysis and Interpretation of Results 
Data preparation and analysis was completed with the assistance of the 
computer services of the Insitute of Education. Details of interpretation 
appear in Section V of this chapter. 
V: RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SURVEY 
This section presents the analysis of data obtained from the 
questionnaire. It is organized on a question by question basis, followed by 
a summary. 
Education Choices 
Responses to Question 11 about preparation for the HKCEE (Figure No. 
1, page 274) indicate that Science subjects were chosen most frequently. 
The predominance of Science can be explained by the fact that, in Hong 
Kong, it is regarded as a broad academic preparation for tertiary studies 
in Medicine (a highly sought-after qualification since the opening of the 
Medical School at CUHK in 1982), Engineering, Technology, Social Sciences, 
and the other sciences. Admissions policies of tertiary institutions have a 
great effect on the curricula of secondary schools, and the drive to gain a 
place at one of the universities is so strong that schools must take the 
admissions policies into account in planning curricula(75). These admission 
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policies favour competence in science(76). Fan wrote that "social pressure 
from school or parents [encourages students to] clog science classes and 
compete for the very few places in the universities, which, given the 
unstable economic and political situation, may not ensure them a rewarding 
career"(77). Interestingly on this point, only 3% of students responded in 
Question 19 that they are interested in a career in pure science areas, 
whereas a nigh percentage indicated science-derived professions in 
technology, medicine, etc. (Figure No. 11, p. 291). 
A.J. Youngson, in an analysis of the role of technical and scientific 
education in Hong Kong's future economic prosperity, describes the positive 
side to the heavy emphasis on Science study(78). According to Youngson, 
education in the 'scientific way of thinking' can contribute to economic 
growth in Hong Kong through its modernizing effect on thinking, and 
consequently on decreasing the need to import foreign technoigy. 
The percentage of students choosing Science examinations at the HKCEE 
level has declined significantly over the past 12 years in favour of 
subjects such as commerce and accounting(79). In summary, then, the 
preference for science examination courses is derived from the flexibility 
of the qualification in the Hong Kong education system, its high-status in 
the Chinese community(80) and its broad usefulness in preparing students 
for a range of career areas in Hong Kong, including technological 
skills(81). 
The result for Chinese Language is high (Figure No. 2, page 275). 
Forty-three percent of Form 3 students chose it, although the numoer 
dropped respectively to 30%, and 11% across the upper grade levels. No 
other subject had the same sharp downward pattern of choice. Economics 
showed an upward trend, rising from 9.5% of choices in Form 3 to 45% in 
Form 5. The high percentage of responses for English studies continues the 
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No. 1 % Distribution of examination courses chosen 
for preparation for the HKCEE - Forms 3-5- 84S Of'-"s. 
E 	 N TION rouRSES 
11 non-compulsory examination courses are listed. 
1. Commercial Subjects 
2. Chinese Language ana Literature 
3. English Language and Literature 
4. Chinese History 
5. Science (Biology, Chemistry, Physics) 
6. Computer Studies 
7. Design and Technology 
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9. Economics 
10. Geography 
11. Economics 
12. History 
13. Art and Design 
14. Civic Education 
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Figure No. 2 % Distribution of Chinese Language course chosen 
for preparation for the HKCEE - Forms 3-5. 
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historical preference for English which was described in Chapter 2. 
Responses, as shown in Figure No. 3, (page 280), on the usefulness_ of 
HKCEE examination show that students are planning to prepare for those 
fields which they consider most practical. This is despite the fact that 
tnere are various other factors which affect the choice of subjects for the 
School Certificate sucn as school organization(82), pass rates of various 
subjects, and the reputation of individual schools in various subiects. The 
cnoices in this case also support the hypothesis. 
Answers to Question 12, Figure No. 4, (page 281) snowed the same 
pattern, altnough the question was related to the HKHL or HKAL, exams which 
prepare for entrance to the universities and other forms of higher 
education. A greater total Percentage of choices is given to those courses 
which the study argues are pragmatic choices. 
Responses, as shown in Figure No. 5, (page 282) on the usefulness of 
fifteen Matricuation Course examination subject courses to their future 
suggest that students understand the Hong Kong economic situation: asked to 
choose one from the list, three courses related to business and economics 
received over half of the selections. These courses, plus English Language 
and Literature represent the top four choices and comprise 59.6% of the 
total sample. Chapter 2 has described the practical factors involved in 
English study and it remains a 'pragmatic' choice. Tne results, when 
controlled for the variable of language of instruction, snowed significant 
differences (0.001 level of significance). Although both groups agreed 
about the usefulness of Business Studies, Principles of Accounts, and 
Economics, students at Chinese language schools chose humanities courses - 
ChinPs.P. language (a)though not Chinese History) , English Language, 
Sociology and History - as useful to themselves more often than students at 
English language schools. 
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Responses about interests were widely scattered over the course list. 
The too three choices of 'useful to my future', which represented 51% of 
that list comprised only 23% of the most interesting' choices. Most 
interesting to the students are the science courses (40.2% of the total), 
with Chinese History and Language comprising the second largest interest 
area (12%) (Figure No. 6, page 283). 
Eighty percent of students responding to this survey indicated tnat 
their own Interest in the course was 'very important' or 'important' when 
selecting what to study. This figure is similar to that obtained by Chow, 
wno reported that 97% of freshmen at university select their major field 
out of interest(83) - however, three quarters of Chow's group also believed 
their major course would lead to a promising career(84). 
in reponding to Question 15, 87% indicated that study in China would 
not be useful in achieving their career goals, but responding to Question 
16, 75% expressed the opinion that study in an Overseas country would help 
them acnieve their goals. This suggests a high degree of realism among the 
group surveyed. A recent investigation into the employment patterns of Hong 
f:'..ong students who nave graduated from mainland tertiary institutions(85), 
revealed that these graduates, upon return to Hong Kong, "face 
discrimination from employers", have a more difficult time finding 
employment, and "often earn less' than their Hong Kong trained 
counterparts. There has also been recent acknowledgement by PRC officials 
that Western training in technology, management and business techniques is 
desirable as it will contribute to the modernizations. Study in the PRC 
offers, however, an alternative to those students wanting tertiary 
education but who fail to gain a place in Hong Kong and do not have the 
capital to study abroad. 
Question 17 asks on what basis the student will cnoose an area of 
study and gives six options asking the student to indicate the importance 
of each, As Figure No. 7 (page 284) demonstrates, resoonses snow tnat 
interest in the subject and its overall usefulness as preparation for a 
desirable job are of more importance to tne students than making a personal 
contribution to the future of Hong Kong in selecting a course of study. 
These responses were independent of all variables. 
Question 18 asks students to evaluate areas of study according to now 
important it will be to Hong Kong to have people skilled in the respective 
areas. Asked to choose the one most important subject, 26.0% of students 
chose Law and Pnlif'im the subject regarded as most important by the 
highest number of students (Figure No. 8, p. 285). The next three subjects, 
Marketing/International Business, Economics and Computer and Technical 
Studies were regarded by 49.1% of choices to be most important, higher even 
than Medicine and Health Care only 4.5%). Law/Poiitics, 
Marketing/International Business/Banking, Computer and Technical/Electronic 
Studies and Economics represent the top 4 choices and account for 65% of 
all selections. Of the four, three support the hypothesis that attitudes 
reflect the reality of the effect of the four modernizations. The selection 
of Law/Politics was unexpected and this factor emerges again in responses 
to Questions 19 and 22. The debates about the form the government of the 
HKSAR will take has been receiving extensive media coverage and has become 
a public issue. Altnough at the time of the fieldwork, the debate was not 
as much in the forefront of the news as it became later in the year,  this 
finding is consistent with the findings of a poll conducted in the autumn 
of 1987(86). This showed that, of the people who are in favour of holding 
direct elections, 60& are between the ages of 18 and 24 years old. It 
suggests tnat that the group responsible for the Hong Kong in the future 
recognize the need for Hong Kong to develop a capable pool of 
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politically-skilled individuals. 
Boys were more confident of the usefulness of Business studies (0.008 
significance level), Mathematics (0.003), Technical Studies (0.02), and 
Engineeering (0.003) (They appear to prefer it as course work also since 
about 70% of science majors at the Chinese University are male.) However, 
boys are less confident than girls of tne usefulenss of Psychology (0.003 
significance level), Sociology (0.000) and Social Work (0.003). These 
differences in attitudes and achievement in science vs. arts courses 
between girls and boys has been attributed to the "stereo-typed 
role-playing expected of the children by both parents and 
teachers"(87)(88). 
Question 19 asked the student to indicate which career they were most 
interested in, should they achieve their education goals (Figure No. 9, 
page 286). Again, despite the unsettled political and legal future, 
government, law, and politics emerge as an area of interest. Careers in 
government have been highly desirable in the colonial envirdment of Hong 
Kong as they are well-paying and stable. Chinese society has always 
respected the professional administrator. However, the present government 
will cease to exist as these students are beginning their careers, and it 
is, therefore, unlikely that responses reflect the historical situation. 
This factors of government and law has emerged in reponse to other 
questions and it is suggested that students are aware of the need for Hong 
Kong to develop local political and legal expertise in this area. Careers 
in finance and business were chosen almost equally by boys and girls, but 
there were significant differences in other areas. Boys chose Science 
almost six times as often as girls, chose Computer and Technology over ten 
times as often as girls. Girls preferred careers in translation and 
tourism. 
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Figure No. 4 % Distribution of examination courses chosen for 
preparation for HKHL and HKAL examination - Forms 6-7. - 3ab 0-LacsAs 
EXAMINATION COURSES 
Key: all non-compulsory examination courses are listed. 
1. Biology 
2. Chemistry 
3. Business Studies 
4. Chinese History 
5. Chinese Language and Literature 
6. Economics 
7. Economics and Public Affairs 
8. English Literature 
9. Geography 
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11. Other Approved Language 
12. Physics 
13. Principles of Accounts 
14. Religious Studies 
15. Sociology 
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Figure No. 5 % Distribution of student perception of usefulness  
of HKHL and HKAL examination subjects - Forms 6-7. 3 -th sl-Lac-ts 
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Figure No. 6 % Distribution of students' interest in 
HKHL and HKAL examination subjects - Forms 6-7. - 3.16 11-u.1evt's 
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Figure No. 7 Basis upon which academic courses are chosen by 
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Figure No. 8 % Distribution of student perception of the most 
important skill area in terms of the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong - Forms 3-7• %n cocs.;-e.de."\% 
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Figure No. 9 % Distribution of preferred careers - Forms 3-7. tu.S skLkle..ts 
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CAREER CHOICES 
Key to Career Areas: 
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2. Medicine, Education, Social Work 
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4. Finance and Business 
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6. Translation 
7. Arts 
8. Computer or Electronic Technology 
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Quest ion 20 asks the students to rank parents, self, friends, career 
counsel 1 or and teachers in terms of who would have greater influence on 
your job cnoice (Figure No. 10, page 290) . 
Students were next asked to report what features are important to them 
in eval uat ng the attractiveness of a Job. Figure No .11 (page 291) shows 
that the students value interesting, non-routine work in a friendly work 
env iroment , with good promotion prospects. They want a good salary and 
employment package, and career szability, These objective Job 
character ist ids are more important to them than the difficulty of the work, 
taking pride in the work or opportunities for travel More of a spread of 
results was obtained for the factor "contributes to Hong Kong society", 
whereas contributing to the PRC received an even |ess enthusiastic response 
with 57% rating it not important at al 	 This aspect is se +-centered , 
consistent witn the findings reported by T. S. Oheung and S .Y . Tam who 
concluded from their research that adolescents in Hong Kong have an 
'ego st ir mental ity' (89) . 
The trend is al so consistent with Birnbaum' s study of Acid 
characteristics models in Hong Kong with reference to 'core Job 
dimensions' of variety, identity, autonomy and Job feedback, found that 
this categorization model is applicable to Hong Kong (90) . The factor which 
a showed significant rel at ionsh ip to the variable of birthpl ace of parents 
was "helping other people". Responses, sign if i cant at the 0.002 level 
showed that ch i dren of Hong Kong-born parents were most 1 ik 1 ey to check 
this as very important and children of two PRC-born parents were most 
likely to rate it as not important. 
Overall, other results are independent of the factor of birthplace of 
parents, in tnat for all items, whether the parents were both born in Hong 
Kong or not, had no significant effect on the values of the child. However, 
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trends, though not reaching the level of significance of 0.04%, were 
observable. The factor of promotion prospects was dependent at the 0.05% 
level, showing that children both of whose parents were porn in Hong Kong 
valued promotion prospects higher than other groups. The factor of 
contributing to the good of Hong Kong showed 0.05% independence, with 
children of both Hong Kong-born parents showing the greatest commitment 
(81'4: (1) and (2) and children with neither parent born in Hong Kong, the 
least (82%1 (2) and (3)). 
Examining the effects of the variable of sex, there are several 
significant results. On the 'helping people' factor, the girls demonstrated 
(0.002 significant) more positive attitudes towards this. Whereas 65% of 
not important' ratings came from boys, 50% of the "very important" 
responses came from girls, although they represented only 43% of the total 
number of respondents. Significant at the 0.01 level, differences in 
responses to the factor 'contributes to the development of the PRZ", were 
observable. Boys were 2.5 times more likiky to rate this as 'very 
important", aithougn this response represented only 9% of all the hoye. 
rankings. Fifty-four percent of them indicated it was not important, and 
60% of girls had the same response. 
The factor 'offers me career stability' was significantly (0.008) more 
important to boys: 48% responded 'veryimportant" and only 40% of girls. 
Technical work was preferred more by boys also, 74% ranked it "very 
important' or "important", conpared with 55% of the girls. There were also 
significant differences in tne responses to 'good salary and benefits' 
factor. Forty-seven percent of boys as against 37% of girls rated it "very 
important' and, in percentage terms, twice as many girls rated it "not 
important'. This is significant at the 0.004 level, The 'opportunity to 
travel' was more important to girls (0.009 significance), and the factor 
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not too difficult 	 , although gaining only a 0.05 level of significance, 
suggested that girls are more concerned abou this factor. 40% of boys rated 
this as 'very important" or "important" as compared with 44.4% of girls. 
Question 22 asked students to se Pct the five career areas which would 
make tne greatest contribution to the survival of Hong Kong and rank them 
from 1-5. (Figure No. 12, page 292.) 
Financial Services was selected most often for the list, and also 
received the greatest number of first and second place nominations. Law and 
Legal Services was the second most often selected and also received tne 
second hignest number of combined first and second place nominations. 
Electronics received the third hicIest number of first and second place 
nominations, receiving 226 combined. Manufacturing was selected for the 
list the third highest number of times and received 198 combined first and 
second place nominations. Communications and transportation received 152. 
These represent the top five choices. Students again indicated their conern 
about provision of people skilled in Legal areas (Appendix No. 2). 
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Figure No. 10 % Distribution of individuals who have influence 
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Figure No. 11 % Distribution of student perception of impotgnt 
features of jobs - Forms 3-7. 1%4C444ey;ts 
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JOB FEATURES 
Key to Features: 
1. should not be too difficult 
2. friendly co-workers 
3. gives pride in the job 
4. good chances of promotion 
5. contributes to Hong Kong society 
6. not all routine, interesting 
7. a chance to travel 
8. good salary, fringe benefits 
9. technical work 
10. reasonable working hours 
11. offers career stability 
12. contributes to PRC development 
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Figure No. 12 	 Distribution of student perception of career 
areas most important to the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong - Forms 3-7. tx nAS vimleA 
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IMPORTANT CAREERS 
Key to Career Areas: 
1. financial and business services 
2. law and legal services 
3. industry and manufacturing 
4. electronics and computer technology 
5. communications and transport 
6. arts and humanities education 
7. construction industry 
8. tourism services 
9. journalism 
10. languages/translation 
11. community services 
12. real estate/housing 
13. merchandizing/sales 
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Overall 28% responsed to Question 23 by indicating that tne unsettled 
future of Hong Kong will cause him or her to delay a decision on an 
occupation,(Tab)e No. 5). bender appears to affect the results. Tne 
responses, when controlled for tne gender of the respondent, showed that 
only 19% of girls answered that they would delay making career plans 
because of the unsettled future, compared with 35% of boys who indicated 
they would delay making plans. Reponses to Question 24 showed that 39% of 
students believe that their best career prospects are working for a Hong 
Kong Chinese firm. whereas 55% believe their best career prospects are 
working for a foreign firm in Hong Kong. 
TABLE No. 5 % Distribution of Responses about delaying career nlans, 
c.:6.J-eer prospects in Hong Kong vs, fcceignTowned f.irms_„ 
RESFCINSE 
	 tLb 	 NC 
1. Will delay making career plans 
due to unsettled future of 
Hong ding: 	 73% 
2. Good career prospects are with 
a Hong Kong-owned 
firm: 
	 39% 
	 60% 
3. Good career prospects are 
with a foreign-owned 
not including the PFC) firm: 
	 55% 	 45% 
Question 26 asked students to rank 12 careers on the basis of prestige 
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in Hong Kong. Each student's answers were controlled for realism against 
the results, and those which deviated from the top five in two cases were 
eliminated (Appendix No. 3). 
Question 27 asked students, in an open-ended Question, to report the 
career advice they had been given by their parents. Eighty-one percent of 
students reported they had been given advice by their parents, but only 26% 
of this number indicated what had been the nature of the advice. Due to the 
apparent fault in Question design, the results are not thought to be valid 
and will not be discussed. 
Question 28 asked how likely it was that various factors, including 
the changes occuring in Hong Kong's government, could prevent a person from 
achieving career goals (Figure No. 13, page 295). The results support the 
widespread perception that the intense competition in Hong Kong is felt 
throughout a person's school life. Students also appear more convinced of 
its effects on their achievement: only 8.7% report being unsure about this. 
Although not regarded by students to be the greatest obstacle, 57.8% 
stated that it was 'very likely' or 'possible' that changes in the Hong 
Kong Government cou d prevent a student from achieving career goals, and 
34%, the highest percentage in this category) reported being 'uncertain' of 
the effect of this event on achieSent of goals. Also, a significantly 
greater (0.04 level) of boys than girls reported that this factor is very 
likely to interfere with achieving career goals (63% vs.37%). This is 
consistent with the findings on Question 23 which asked whether a student 
would delay making career plans because of the unstable future. Contrrlied 
for sex of respondent, boys revealed more uncertainty about the future and 
a greater likelihood to delay making piens (see also Appendix No. 4). 
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Figure No. 13 % Distribution of student perception of factors 
which may impede realization of career goals -
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Students did not, however, feel that the uncertain future of Hong Kong 
was the most likely explanation for students not achieving career goals. 
Asked which of the factors was the most likely explanation, 40% reported 
that the degree of competition in Hong Kong was the biggest obstacle to 
personal success. (See also Appendix No. 5:. 
VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this section a summary of main findings, followed by general 
conclusions, will be presented. In interpreting the results there are 
several important points to keep in mind. Firstly, the aim of the survey 
was to determine whether educational choices and occupational Plans are 
pragmatic in this decade of political change in Hong Kong. The objectives 
were to nOtain dara about these choices and plans, and about possible 
linkages between these plans and 1997. Secondly, the sample attempts to 
reflect a cross section of Hong Kong school children who will remain in 
Hong Kong after 1997, and does not claim to represent perceptions of all 
school children. Although independent and intervening variables did affect 
some response patterns, tne survey's purpose was not to investigate 
differences between groups, but to investigate a broad response pattern in 
the relevant age group. Lastly, this survey is intended to be illustrative 
of - or to ground - one aspect of the argument of the thesis. 
Overall, the results show that the students surveyed have a 
two-pronged attitude toward the problems poised by merger. On the one hand, 
there is a high percentage of students who plan to obtain qualifications in 
areas which, the chapter has demonstrated, correspond to Hong Kong's 
international economic status and to the PRC's recent economic policy. The 
transfer of Hong Kong to the PRC is eliciting a pragmatic response from 
students: there is an emphasis on accluiring oualifications in areas related 
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to Financial Services, Business, Light Technology and Tourism. Tnese plans 
reflect the probable impact on Hong Kong of the PRE's economic policies, 
whirr), as broadly described, emphasize re-linking with the international 
economic community and the transfer of technology into the FRC. Analysis of 
the impact of these policies on the Hong Kong economy suggested that it 
would be pragmatic to acquire several types of skills. These include 
training in managerial and production skills, expertise in computer and 
light technology, acquisition of expertise needed by the SE7's, and, 
lastly, training in marketing, financial and related services. All of these 
areas are represented in the findings of the survey. 
Students' perceptions of the skills which will be necessary for the 
HKAR to remain stable and prosperous are, therefore, highly realistic, 
conforming with opinions of economic analysts. Educational choices coincide 
more with the pragmatic selections than they do with the reported interests 
of the students. 
On tne other hand, trip equally and consistently nigh scores for 
choices in the category of Law, Politics, Government on many questions 
suggest that students are also concerned about the need for persons skilled 
in areas needed for Hong Kong to govern itself. Students appear to be 
concerned about the impact of imminent localization of many aspects of 
government on the manpower needs of the colony. This dual aspect to the 
responses is consistent with the suggestion, made in Section I, that two 
important issues nave emerged in Hong Kong the issue of local politica) 
mobilization and the role of Hong Kong in the economic aspects of China's 
modernization. In both of these areas, students describe a need for trained 
people to ensure the future stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Their 
reported educational choices and occupational plans correspond with 
probable demands of Hong Kong's economic and political situation, with 
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variables of medium of instruction, birthplace of parents, and sex were of 
varying and scattered influence on the results(91). 
conclusion, Chapter IV described empirical researcn into the 
reactions of secondary school youth to the public issue. The research 
suggests that the established, pragmatic behaviours, which have 
characterized Hong Kong society in the past, are being utilized to meet the 
challenges posed by the unfamiliar socio-economic contexts. The research 
has indicated that students plan to equip themselves with those 
professional skills needed in the emerging economic environment. Students 
also, however, perceive a need for people possessing skills to cope with 
the changing political environment. These behaviours and perceptions are 
adaptive and consistent with previous patterns of response to 
socio-economic change - essentially problem-solving in nature and with the 
aim of increasing personal reward from the situation. 
Pvie describes the Chinese as 'supreme realists vino are quick to adjust 
their behaviour in order to exploit the logic of whatever situation they 
find themselves in, and who act according to circumstances of the 
moment(92). Other social scientists observe that the Chinese believe it is 
highly reasonable for people to act according to what makes sense for them 
in a particular circumstance(93). Chapter 2 attempted to de.?monstrate now 
this characteristic has been utilized in tne past by Hong Kong residents to 
cope with rapid economic and demographic changes. In tne present 
circumstances of socio-political conflict and change, the survey suggests 
that these characteristics are again being applied to new circumstances. 
Tne thesis argued in Cnapter 1 that the issues of transfer of 
sovPreignity and its effects on the stability of Hong Kong have become 
salient in this decade. The results of this survey suggest that students 
have been affected by the public nature of the transfer issues, and of the 
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potential legal and political problems involved in the decolonization and 
transfer. Their perception that Hong Kong's most urgent requirement is for 
citizens skilled in Law and Government reveals concern about adminstration 
of legal and political matters of the territory. The relationship between 
these socio-political demands of the students and the content of schooling 
is, therefore, brought into Question, and will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
HONG KONG EDUCATION AND LOCAL SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE 
I PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
The preceding chapters have presented the major historical, 
socio-political and economic events which have led to the creation of the 
HKSAR. Although from the standpoint of international treaty or geography, 
the merger is arguably defensible, the residents of Hong Kong remain 
apprehensive and often pessimistic about their uncertain economic and 
social future. 
The thesis has argued in Chapter 4 that some residents will respond to 
the uncertainties by attempting to predict the effects of the merger on 
their lives and begin to adapt now. This adaptation, it has been argued, is 
characterized by the pragmatism which has been typical of their adjustment 
to the colonial situation and the economic growth which the colony has 
experienced. Chapter 4 focused on one event which demonstrates the 
pragmatism: the indications of adaptation, in the face of the uncertainty, 
by secondary school children to the new economic and political reality. The 
results of the survey showed, in part, that those surveyed are attempting 
to adjust and that they have identified two immediate tasks: the need to 
provide a pool of men and women with skills corresponding to the 
international economic status of Hong Kong and the open-door policies of 
the PRC, and the need to meet the internal changes which localization of 
the government and legal system will cause. 
Chapter 5 is linked to the survey component of the thesis by 
presenting a discussion of the dual themes of responsibility for, and 
prospects for, the continued development of the Hong Kong school system in 
ways which meet the socio-political and economic needs and demands of the 
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local community. The responsibility of educators originates partially in 
the evidence suggesting that contemporary youth are willing to adjust to 
the transfer process, and have already identified specific areas of likely 
contextual change in Hong Kong. 
These themes also link Chapter 5 to the overall argument of the thesis 
through its suggestion that the tensions caused by the structural 
contradictions between Hong Kong and the PRC can be partially resolved by 
appropriate action on the part of the educational system. Providing youth 
with the opportunity to acknowledge and understand the ideological and 
institutional contradictions between Hong Kong and the PRC would ease the 
adjustment problem facing them. The chapter argues, however, that 
historical and socio-cultural factors are interacting with contemporary 
events in such a way as to diminish the possibility of this kind of 
effective response. 
The chapter does not, however, argue that Hong Kong education will 
remain unaffected by the structural contradictions, and three possible 
scenarios of change are suggested, localization, sinocization, and ad hoc 
decolonization. Each of these reflects an attempt to deal with the 
contradictions. Localization involves reform of the educational system - by 
Hong Kong educators - with the aim of providing youth with the skills and 
knowledge necessary for realization of self-adminstration in Hong Kong. 
Realization of localization could resolve various cultural, political and 
economic tensions. The second scenario, sinocization, involves reform of 
the education system - by representatives of the PRC - to meet economic and 
socio-political needs of the PRC. Reform of this type would, eventually, 
resolve ideological tensions. Lastly, ad hoc decolonization involves 
allowing education to decolonize in an ad hoc manner, with the aim of 
maintaining the capitalist and conservative ideology prevalent in the 
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colony at present. Carried out by the present adminstrators, it may not be 
effective in resolving tensions. 
The chapter begins with a statement of the need for change to the 
education system. The chapter then suggests that the probability of 
effective, appropriate and purposive change is small because of the nature 
of the local agents of change. The chapter concludes with the description 
of three possible scenarios for education in the coming decades, arguing 
that these scenarios are of two general kinds: those which are purposive, 
i.e. with education deliberately being adapted to the new environment; and 
that which is passive and ad hoc, i.e. characterized by the education 
system being allowed to react to social change without purposive external 
manipulation. 
II THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG EDUCATION 
-ti‘esIs 
At the time the fieldwork for thetwas completed, the Hong Kong people 
were making choices. Those with opportunity and assets were making 
preparations to obtain resident visas for foreign countries or foreign 
passports. This, in many cases, required choosing one member of the family 
to live abroad for several years in order to establish residency 
requirements. Those with no opportunity to emigrate appear to have adopted 
an attitude of resignation. A few activists fight for the slender strands 
of self-determination which were guaranteed by the co-signers of the Joint 
Declaration: the appointment of a local person as governor, direct 
elections to the advisory body, the Legislative Council, in the years 
before 1997, or they campaign for visible guarantees of freedoms such as 
press and speech - freedoms which are being eroded even as a minority are 
fighting for more(1). 
Consequently, educators and those with responsibility for education 
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face an ethical problem. Whether Hong Kong residents accept the broad 
guideline suggested by 3. Piaget, that the purpose of schooling is "...to 
create [people] who are capable of new things; not simply of repeating what 
others have done - [people] who are critical, inventive, and discoverers 
who have minds which can be critical, can verify, and not accept what they 
are offered"(2), or accept the very basic principle that education should 
prepare youth for life, they should expect the schools of the 1980's and 
1990's to prepare youth for 1997. Students should expect to be taught the 
historical , political and cultural factors which have brought Hong Kong to 
'1997'. Schools have this responsibility because they have resources: 
teachers, access to information, means of presentation, to explain '1997' 
to their students. 
There is little convincing indication that Hong Kong is likely to 
assume the responsibility and attempt, either to create a school system in 
the Piagetian model, or to prepare students - skilled in examination, 
criticism and participation - to cope better with their environment. 
Historically, the Hong Kong Government has been slow to become involved in 
provision of relevant social services (including education). It was not 
until the mid-sixties that long-term strategies to meet these needs of the 
population were first proposed(3), and although most people are 
beneficiaries of one or another social programme, the government 
consistently insists that "social development must be an appendage to 
economic growth" and that it has a secondary place to the needs of the 
market(4). The existing programmes have been criticized by local social 
scientists for seeming "to be efforts to meet urgent needs or responses to 
emergency situations which have the potential of disrupting the social 
order, rather than the outcome of a declared comprehensive policy"(5). 
No comprehensive policy as yet reflects the profound changes which are 
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occuing on the social, economic and political levels in Hong Kong. Schools 
carry on with the curricula and methodology of the boom years of the 50's, 
60's and 70's and outwardly appear to ignore the changed world and emerging 
socio-cultural tensions which the graduates will face. 
Indications from the many participants in education signal that little 
deliberate will be done and that the education scene is, operatively, 
greatly distanced from the 1997 issue. Each participant: the business 
community, the Hong Kong Government, the Education Commission, educators, 
parents, and students, has particular needs and/or has specific 
characteristics which make taking appropriate or effective and timely 
action unlikely. These characteristics, or factors, can be sorted into 
three categories: those related to the possession of power in colonial Hong 
Kong, those related to the lack of power, and those related to the Hong 
Kong socio-cultural systems. The following section discusses these 
inhibiting factors, and describes power alignments, cultural traits, and 
the colonial experience have affected all those who participate in Hong 
Kong education. 
A. Power and Responsibility in Hong Kona 
Actors: local business elites, Hong Kong Government, teachers, 
parents 
1. Local Business Elites and Power in Politics 
Many wealthy Hong Kong members of the business community have 
traditionally cultivated relationships with the colonial hierarchy and have 
customarily held positions as unofficial advisors to Government. Through 
these positions, they have gained social status, as well as access to the 
decision-makers and to the decision-making processes. Some of these 
individuals, from real estate and financial circles, are members of the 
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Government and now have been awarded important posts on the Basic Law 
Committees. 
It is widely believed by the local population that the interests of 
these wealthy residents are generally placed above those of the general 
community to a much greater extent than is necessary or desirable(6). Miron 
Mushkat, in his study of the adminstrative class in Hong Kong, wrote of 
... the apparent proclivity of the Government to accomodate business 
interests at the expense of all others"(7). 
The dominant position of this group, the business community, would be 
probably be threatened by an informed, critical student body with 
democratic rights. Martin Carnoy has observed: "If democratization of 
political institutions occurs..., the dissatisfied majority could become 
increasingly powerful, and, if allowed, would eventually take power..."(8). 
Democratization of government in the Hong Kong context could result in loss 
of influence for members of the business community, and, speaking on this 
topic, F.Gilles observed that it was obvious to him "... that big business 
[in Hong Kong] is against direct elections more than even the PRC is 
against them"(9). 
Controlling members of the local business community, therefore, are 
attempting to use the educational institutions to preserve the 
political-economic and cultural privileges and status they enjoyed under 
British rule. John Waldon, a 30 year civil servant and former Director of 
the Office of Home Affairs in Hong Kong has warned: It is important at 
this time, of all times, that the Hong Kong community should clearly 
understand the limitations of the Hong Kong Establishment in safeguarding 
the interests of the Hong Kong community when it is under pressure"(10). He 
concludes his essay ,"Getting ready for 1998" with the argument that the 
"... Hong Kong Government's problem is not that it does not have the 
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apparatus to achieve responsible and credible government, but that it does 
not have the determination to face-up to the opposition of vested 
interests, privileged advisors and high-powered civil servants and 
introduce the obvious changes that can make it work effectively for the 
community as a whole"(11). 
2. Local Business Elites and Power in the Education System 
The influence of the business elites in government extends to 
education(12). At the highest level of their control over education is the 
Education Commission, which reported the 'fundamental' challenges of the 
next decade as: 
how to meet the challenges of mass 
education up to the senior secondary level at a 
time of rapid technological and other changes; 
now do we resolve the problems of competing 
demands of, and for, general education on the 
one hand and technology and vocational 
education on the other; how do we strike a 
balance between quantity and quality in 
education; how should we apportion investment 
among school building, curriculum development, 
and teachers; how can we achieve greater equity 
and efficiency in the education system; and 
above all, how do we harmonize the needs of the 
community and the wishes of the individual 
within the resources available(13). 
This statement was published in October 1984, one month after the 
Joint Declaration was signed. Despite the prominence of issues surrounding 
the JD and their effect on the local community, the emphasis of the 
policy-makers within education continues to be efficiency, resources, 
balance and investment. There is no mention of preparing students to 
understand the changes in the Hong Kong Government, to provide an 
understanding of the new type of system under which they will live their 
adult lives, nor of meeting the challenges of localization. In the same 
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report: "We  hope, and believe, that the views expressed...in the Report are 
anaamatic and central to the problems encountered in Hong Kong." 
(14)(underlining added) 
It is therefore argued that a substantial amount of the lack of 
responsiveness to the educational problems posed by 1997 on the part of the 
education system derives from three sources. Firstly, the system is 
coordinated by individuals who are outside of the education system and who 
are inside the business and colonial power hierarchy; secondly, the 
influence of these individuals over education extends to objectives, 
policy, quality, teacher training, priorities, planning and development, 
research, selection, financing. Thirdly, the emphasis of official policy 
has always been on the economic benefits of education to the colony rather 
than to the individual. "Educational policy, from the beginning, was 
directed by considerations of economy and utility"(15) or as a "powerful 
... method of extending British influence... [into China]"(16). 
3. Teachers and Power in the Education System 
Teachers have been generally kept out of the policy-making arena in 
Hong Kong education, and have accepted a dependent role. 
Carnoy suggests that 
Liberation from colonial rule requires a 
redevelopment of humanness and self-esteem; a 
redefinition of what it means to be 
independent. When people are colonized they are 
dtpendent and do not even know how to behave in 
a liberated condition. Decolonization, or 
liberation, demands personal and societal 
struggles which go far beyond lowering one flag 
and raising another(17). 
The factors of fear of compromising their positions, plus fear of 
being labeled political activists, primarily account for the lack of 
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leadership from teachers in the past and in the present situation. Teachers 
have been described as 'going very middle of the road' because of the 
nervousness about being associated with a position on 1997 and the current 
political situation in Hong Kong(18). Therefore, their focus in the 
classroom has not been on preparing students for the transfer experience. 
Philip Altbach has commented that "...the abolition of the colonial 
[education] situation requires the colonized to take significant and 
autonomous initiatives"(19). However, the dependent status of teachers 
means that they are not able to take appropriate curricular initiatives. 
School children, therefore, although are aware of the transfer, have not 
acquired systematic knowledge of the problems involved from their classroom 
teachers. 
4. Parents and Access to Power 
Historically, Government has provided few direct channels of 
communication between itself and the local population, and one legacy of 
this policy has been the almost negligible development of political 
institutions in the colony(20). Lau Siu-kai argues that 
Between the government and the Chinese 
society there is only a thin layer of 
intermediate leaders, who are predominantly 
leaders of traditionalist Chinese organizations 
[whose] attitude towards the government is 
deferential and submissive. They function 
to transmit the government's decisions and 
advice downward(21). 
As a consequence, he suggests, society has no way to convert its 
social , economic and political issues into demands on the government(22). 
To refute such criticism, the Hong Kong Government points to the existence 
of 'pressure groups' - but their leaders are generally the 'intermediate 
leaders' whom Lau describes. These kinds of groups are part of the colonial 
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tradition of Britain(23), and, in Hong Kong, serve the following purposes 
for the Government: to provide advice when the Government is introducing 
changes, to provide necessary statistics and technical expertise on certain 
issues, to carry out the jobs government wants done in social services, 
such as staffing and managing most of the schools, welfare agencies and 
hospitals, and lastly, to provide legitimacy to the government's rule by 
"virtually representing" the interests of the people(24). 
However, all pressure groups do not enjoy equal access to government, 
and the system of selectivity favours richer business and employer groups 
because Government needs their help and, therefore, cannot ignore their 
views(25). Groups representing the lower income groups are at a 
disadvantage - linguistically and politically, for the main language of 
government is English, and, without a direct vote, the poor cannot use 
their greatest asset: their numbers(26). Nelson Chow comments specifically 
on the effectiveness of pressure or interest groups in relationship to the 
development of the education system. Describing their demands as 
Imodest'(27) given the needs of the system, he suggests that not enough 
pressure has been placed on Government by such groups because they do not 
have a "foot-hold in the political arena"(28). 
This complex relationship extends to that between parents and 
policy-makers: parents have neither official nor efficient influence over 
the schools and policy, nor do they perceive grassroots pressure group 
activities to be worthwhile. People regard their ability to influence 
policy through pressure groups as small or very small(29), and have 
negative opinions about the trustworthiness of pressure group leaders. They 
believe that activities of pressure groups endanger the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong(30). All of these factors contribute to the 
inability of parents to effect the philosophical and curriculum changes 
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needed in the schools. 
B. British Colonial Education Philosophy and Responsibility 
actors: Hong Kong Government, educators 
1. Political Education and the Curriculum 
Although formal civic education could be a means of introducing the 
principles and procedures of self-government and could thereby assist the 
citizens of the HKSAR, traditional attitudes toward the inclusion of a 
political component in the curriculum have not changed. Part of the 
explanation for lack of effective curricular response is in the British 
attittude toward the role of civic education in the curriculum. As 
described in R. Murray Thomas, 
Schools [in England] are not seen as a 
prime source of political socialization [and] 
usually shun any direct teaching about the 
dynamic interplay of the civil service, 
Parliament, the political parites, foreign 
affairs, labour unions, and other participants 
in the political culture.... Some teachers who 
are themselves deeply interested in politics 
may deal with civics in a social studies 
course, but neither of these classses is a 
required one in British schools(31). 
Britain applied this practice to its colonial education system, and, 
although Hong Kong is a colony in a post-colonial world, the tradition of 
not teaching political socialization through civics has endured there. 
Civics has not been taught as an examinable subject in the Anglo-secondary 
schools since 1965 (1969 in the Chinese schools). At that time Economics 
and Public Afairs was introduced, which had the "general aim of ...enabling 
pupils to be well-informed and to become civic-minded enough to act as good 
citizens in the larger community to which they belong"(32). 
This policy has been criticized as a "clear strategy of 
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depolitization" because it included, until the mid-1970's, a civics 
education curriculum "...emphasizing a passive role of[sic] citizens"(33). 
Although the emphasis changed in the 1970's to an active role for students, 
the active role recommended for students was in social service, rather 
than concern for public affairs and politics"(34). 
A re-worked Civics Curriculum was introduced in September, 1985. After 
a review of "[...the role of the Education Department] in educating the 
public to more effectively[sic] cope with the implications arising from the 
proposals for developing the local system of government...", the Department 
decided to continue the 'hidden curriculum' approach to teaching civics and 
use 'inter-disciplinary' teaching. However, they appear not to have 
digressed significantly from traditional policy and content as the newly 
articulated goal is "...[fostering] harmonious relationships between school 
authorities, staff, pupils and parents"(35). This goal , as articulated, 
does not address the central problem which is to provide education in 
political participation skills which would enable the Hong Kong residents 
to respond to the current political situation effectively. Moreover, the 
new programme has been criticized locally as being insufficient to meet 
this need: "The education department does not seem to be in any hurry to 
introduce political discussion into the classroom"(36). 
At the end of 1986 the government reported that sixty percent of 
secondary schools had civic education programmes (eighty two percent of 
government schools, sixty two percent of aided schools, and forty two 
percent of private schools). However, the great majority of these schools 
present civics as part of the 'hidden curriculum'. Topics decribed in the 
hidden curriculum as civic education include a large proportion of lessons 
such as writing letters of complaint, singing a song about loving one's 
neighbour, and lessons on filial piety(37). 
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On the other hand, Cheng Kai Ming has questioned whether a call for 
compulsory introduction of a political aspect to the curriculum by the 
Government sets a precedent of government intervaion in the curriculum. He 
asks whether it is better to preserve a system in which government 
intervention in curriculum is unlikely or whether the curriculum should be 
changed in order to raise the political awareness of students(38). Clearly, 
local educators feel they are facing a political dilemma on this issue. 
2. Education Serves the Needs of the Colonial Hierarchy 
Carnoy writes that the purpose of colonial schools was to train the 
colonials for roles in the existing hierarchy(39). Ng Lun Ngai-ha has 
suggested that this policy has been applied to Hong Kong(40) and concludes 
that the Hong Kong policy was "...in line with the nineteenth-century 
British education policy...in other colonies"(41). The policy has not been 
changed throughout the 20th century. 
For example, M.Mushkat found that applicants for positions as 
adminstrative officers with the Hong Kong Government from Hong Kong 
University were as successful as graduates from British UniversitiL,es and 
more successful than other local groups(42). Mushkat suggests that this is 
explained by the fact that the "... general environment of the University 
of Hong Kong [in terms of its socialization effects] is more likely to 
produce the kind of graduate that the Government is looking for (the 
University of Hong Kong is closer to the colonial establishment and 
operates very much like a British institution)"(43). 
On this theme of universities as colonial agents, Altbach has written 
that, although in most countries universities are centres of intellectual 
activity, 
universities in the Third World are 
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colonial institutions in that they are almost 
without exception based on a foreign model and 
reflect many of the values and organizational 
patterns of foreign insitutions. In many 
instances the language of instruction remains a 
foreign language and many of the faculty have 
been trained outside the country. Foreign 
models brought to the Third World did not 
emphasize research or creative intellectual 
endeavour since colonial powers created 
universities largely to provide training for 
the middle levels of the colonial 
bureaucracy(44). 
Further, Carnoy suggests that colonial schools did not help students 
to develop societal relationships which carried beyond the colonial 
hierarchy, but tried to fit people to the needs of the hierarchy whether it 
benefitted them or not(45). 
It has also been argued that there is no attempt by colonial schools 
to prepare colonized for leadership in their own society(46). This policy 
appears to have been effective in Hong Kong to the extent that, as 
potential Chinese political leaders arise, they are seen to be absorbed 
into the colonial government(47). This gives the British the appearance of 
ruling with the consent and assistance of the locals, and, at the same 
time, "... effectively emasculates potential political opponents"(48). A 
result of these practices is that the local leadership, which has become 
active since the negotiations began, does not exist in sufficient numbers, 
nor is it able to mobilize sufficient and effective support, to impose its 
policy on government. 
3. Education and the Needs of the Local Culture 
Colonial government in Hong Kong has never systematically examined nor 
tried to meet the needs of the local culture. Those policies which have 
been recently developed to encourage a cultural identity "...have been 
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designed and implemented in an ad hoc manner"(49). The government has been 
criticized for this approach to socio-cultural matters, including 
education. The impression given is that economic advancement has precedence 
over other aspects of life in Hong Kong. For example, in her analysis of 
the decline of Chinese linguistic skills in Hong Kong, H.N.L.Cheng 
describes the typical policy of "...dominant socio-economic pragmatism Con 
the part of government]...at the expense of the larger goals of 
socio-cultural planning"(50). 
There has never been a written history encompassing all sociological, 
economic and political aspects of Hong Kong, although Alan Birch, historian 
at the Hong Kong University, argued, 
If the Hong Kong Government had wished to 
boost local morale [during the negotiations], a 
re-examination of its history would have been a 
vital element in establishing a sense of local 
solidarity. Presently the history of Hong Kong 
offends the sense of Chinese nationalism and it 
raises feeling of guilt in the minds of the 
British educated "Gweilo" administrators(51). 
Paulo Freire has suggested that lack of attention to the culture of 
the colonized results in lack of contact between the colonized and his/her 
own past and, consequently failure to understand the significance of 
his/her position in the history of the culture(52). On this link in Hong 
Kong between contact with their past and the significance of contemporary 
events, Birch adds, "It goes without saying that if the local people 
recognized their past achievments, they are hardly likely to acquiesce in 
this anticipation of demise"(53). 
This neglect has persisted since the last century(54). Whether it 
developed because "... the colonizer is required to deny the existence of a 
colonized culture. The native is declared insensible to values. He 
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represents 	 rne absence of values"(55) - or because making money in Hong 
Kong has always been more important to its policy makers than culture, the 
end result of the policy nas been to put the local people at a disadvantage 
by degrading tneir cultural and historical past(5o. There have been very 
minimal government efforts to examine and explain the culture of Hong Kong 
in the past, and, at the present time, no government effort is being made 
to examine the impact of the currect socio-political cnanges on culture and 
society. 
indeed, only very recently have colonial adminstrators first advocated 
the use of the local language, Cantonese, as the medium of instruction in 
schools. Despite this, the education system does not yet effectively relate 
curriculum to local culture and identity, and it has been suggested that 
As a colonial government, if the British authorities are not even 
enthusiastic aoout cultivating a sense of belonging to Hong Kong, there is 
no reason to expect them to do anything to encourage the formation of a 
Chinese identity through political socialization in school"(57). 
Because its cultural needs have been ignored, the Hong Kong population 
is often characterized as having little cultural identity and a sense of 
rootlessness. The students' sense of belonging to Hong Kong has been weak, 
and Hong Kong claims little of their loyalty and self-identification(58). 
Such factors, it is argued, limit the likelihood of broad and effective 
mobilization of the community in support of demands for more responsive 
government. 
C. Hong Kong Society 
Actors: parents, students. adminstrators 
1. Hong Kong Society and its Chinese Origins 
It has been argued throughout that the personality of the Hong Kong 
resident nas been formed by a comoination of the effects of colonization, 
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rapid modernization of the economy and the Chinese culture. Hence, the 
origins of single traits are often blurred. Attempting to ascribe one or 
another trait to ethnicity or to status as colonized can be difficult. With 
that qualification in mind, it is argued here that certain traits which 
appear to originate in the ethnicity of the population will affect the 
outcomes of the transfer process. To support this, several comparative 
investigations into the cultural differences between Hong Kong Chinese and 
other ethnic communities are the basis of this subsection. 
For example, Geert Hofstede has reported on cultural differences 
between several societies in work-related values. One of Hofstede's 
4-dimensional models(59) is the factor of Power Distance which is "...the 
characteristic of a culture defining the extent to which the less powerful 
persons in society accept inequality in power and consider it as 
normal"(60); it is, in other words, a measure of tolerance for the 
inequality in a society. On this factor, Hong Kong residents received a 
high score; they are able to tolerate inequality in power distribution(61). 
On the factor, Uncertainty Avoidance dimension, which is "...the extent to 
which people within a culture are made nervous by situations which they 
perceive as unstructured, unclear, or unpredictable, situations which they 
therefore try to avoid by maintaining strict codes of behavior and a belief 
in absolute truths"(62), Hong Kong emerges as a society which is unlikely 
to be agressive when confronted with personal risks in new 
situations(63)(64). Indeed, Miners wrote that Hong Kong residents have 
accepted, almost without question, the self-proclaimed British rule(65), 
and that it is the exposure to Western culture, along with higher education 
levels, that have begun to erode these attitudes(66). 
Hong Kong residents scored markedly low, comparatively, in sociql_ 
grincipledness, their score represents a "...strong authoritarian 
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orientation to defer without question to conventional authority and to 
accept unconditionally conventional norms and values"(67). 
A study on locus of control , defined as a set of generalized beliefs 
or expectancies about how positive and negative reinforcements are 
obtained(68) is also relevant. At one extreme of locus of control is 
internality, the belief that one can obtain rewards and avoid punishments 
by one's own efforts, skills, acceptance of responsibility. At the opposite 
extreme is externality, the belief that such reinforcements depend upon 
such uncontrollable outside factors as chance, luck, the behaviour of those 
more powerful and complex events in one's surroundings. In this study, the 
Hong Kong Chinese exhibited a stronger belief in external control of 
obtaining rewards and avoiding punishment than other groups. They exhibit a 
general tendency to depend on the behaviour of the more powerful groups 
around them. 
The thesis acccepts the argument of 0. Mannoni(69) that the original 
culture of the colonized is significant in determining outcomes and 
suggests that Mannoni's argument is applicable to the Hong Kong situaion. 
He suggests, first, that the pre-existing psychology of the colonized makes 
the colonizer-colonized relationship possible(70), and that the roles which 
the colonizer and colonized adopt are made possible by the psychological 
characteristics already developed in their respective cultures and which 
each brings to the new situation(71). In the context of Hong Kong, the 
psychological profile which emerges from the preceeding discussion is of a 
group likely to defer with little question to Government and unlikely to be 
aggressive when confronted with risks in new situations. These factors, 
combined with tolerance for the inequality which exists in Hong Kong 
society, are important components of the present environment of the 
transfer process. The implication for the transfer is that these cultural 
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characteristics are likely to affect the interaction process by minimizing 
the possibility of assertive demands for educational change. 
2. Parents and Decision-making in Education 
The attitude of Hong Kong parents is one of 'wait-and-see' - while 
clinging to the status quo. For example, the 1987 scheme which encouraged 
secondary schools to shift to the use of Chinese as a teaching medium has 
been poorly received by parents. The scheme has been described by the 
Government as providing an opportunity for children to deform better and 
for teachers to complete the examination syllabus earlier, thereby 
providing time for teaching of non-examination oriented material. However 
in March, 1987 only a quarter of the secondary schools had taken advantage 
of the scheme. The three quarters who were not willing to switch the medium 
of instruction point to the continued heavy emphasis on English in Hong 
Kong for advancement. 
A second factor which makes educational decision-making a complex 
process for parents is the new Chinese University admissions procedure 
which admits students provisionally after completion of one year of the 
matriculation course. It appears to penalize Chinese language schools 
because their programme is a two-year one. The policy, then, by extension, 
further favours students who have attended English language lower secondary 
schools(72). 
Most parents, in an environment of conflicting signals, are unsure 
about the type of fundamental educational change needed in the transfer 
proces. Therefore, they will not be able to mobilize and demand effective 
policy adjustments. Lower income parents, particularly, are decribed as 
having little awareness of the edcuational needs of their children and they 
continue to rely on their local schools to guide children(73). 
3. Society and Colonization 
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a. Psychological view 
Altbach has written that one effect of colonization on the colonized 
is the recognition by the colonized of the inferior position imposed on 
him(74). Other analysts write of colonial education being "not only elitist 
but also conditioning and subjugative"(75). This quality leads the 
colonized to attempt to reduce the differences between him and the 
colonizer which the colonizer has defined as being at the origin of second 
class status. This 'reduction' is attempted in terms of language: the 
colonized accepts and learns the language of the colonizer as a means of 
inproving his status in the society: "Employment in the modern sector was 
linked to knowledge of the colonial language and to European style 
education. Gradually the colonial languages became the medium for commerce, 
politics, science and government"(76). 
In Hong Kong, most senior posts are still reserved for foreigners and 
English remains the main language for government business, although it is 
spoken by only two per cent of the population(77). Since Hong Kong 
residents have accepted that mastery of English is a significant route to 
success in Hong Kong, it is suggested that interpretations can be made of 
some of their behaviour in the framework of the relationship between 
colonized and colonizer. 
In Mannoni's view, the colonial relationship is based on each 
participant playing a pre-determined role in the relationship and, 
consequently, "... social action by the colonized is only a response to the 
colonizer not fulfilling his expected role"(78). In this context, Leung 
Sai-wing found that people judge the Hong Kong Government, non-affectively, 
for its "instrumental use",(79) and appreciate its intrumental rather than 
its intrinsic value(80). In other words, in this relationship, as long as 
the Government continues to fulfilling its role, i.e., retains instrumental 
value, tne people will be non-critical. 
It could be argued that Britain abandoned its role by agreeing to the 
handover. However, Hong Kong residents have never believed that they would 
have a great deal of influence over their future, an opinion proved 
accurate in 1984(81). Therefore, Britain, though departing from its 
'pre-determined role' of guaranteeing a secure and stable environment, is 
seen to be merely handing its role to another agent. Because residents 
never expected that sociai-action on their part would influence policy, 
they are abJe to accept this transfer - as long as another party took up 
the role of governing the city. In other words, because the role of the 
colonizer will be assumed by the PRC in the post-1997 period, no assertive 
'social action' can be expected of the residents unless the PRC fails to 
fulfil 	 its role as useful and beneficient ruler. 
b. Economic-political view 
Franz Fanon and Albert Mem 'indicate that the only significant 
cnanges to take place in tne educational scene [of the colonized] are those 
initiated by the colonized himself"(82). But, rather than being anxious for 
significant change after decolonization, some societies resist it for 
economic or political reasons. Le T.K. has pointed out tnat 
What nas been imposed may later be 
accepted voluntarily for a number of reasons. 
[For example] because it corresponds to the 
needs of tne new ruling classes, which 
are...tied to international 
capitalism...because reforming methods, the 
linguistic medium, ana content is slow and 
difficult, given the lack of qualified 
personnel and popular resistance to reform(83). 
The 'ruling classes' described by Le T.K. exist in Hong Kong. 
Commenting on the lack of grassroots protest about social problems in Hong 
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Kong, Miners wrote 
There...seems to be a lack of disaffected 
intellectuals ready to take up the task... . 
The graduates of Hong Kong University and the 
Chinese University have little difficulty 
finding jobs and apparently soon forget any 
radical aspirations they may have felt in their 
student days. In other colonial territories 
political activities seemed to offer rich 
prizes: there was hope that a successful party 
leader might end up as prime minister when the 
British left. But there is little likelihood of 
this happening in Hong Kong(84). 
Another aspect is suggested by Leung's research into the perceptions 
of political authority among Hong Kong Chinese. He wrote that political 
issues are usually not discussed or solved according to political 
criteria(85) and, furthermore, that the Government seems to regard politics 
as an unsystematic intrusion into rational setting of goals by professional 
administrators(86). The residents themselves have internalized market 
principles rather than political principles(87), and public demand for 
changes to curriculum might be more likely if the changes are seen as 
having a market value. 
4. Students and Success 
The colonial child has been descibed as being alienated from his 
culture and the economic and social needs of his people. Schooling plays a 
role in preventing the individual from attaining self-definition. Once the 
student accepts the school treadmill and the lessons of the pyramidial 
structure, he or she usually finds that the ruling group's perception of 
his role in the society must be accepted in order to survive(88). The role 
of schools is, according to Carnoy, "to train the colonized for roles that 
suited the colonizer"(89). 
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Leung described the young respondents to his survey which was carried 
out in 1986, as not having an 
extended scope of concern beyond self, 
beyond family, and beyond their own generation. 
They do not have a sense of history. They do 
not thirst for returning to the motherland. 
They do not feel ashamed to be under foreign 
rule. They do not quest for the reconstruction 
of a stronger China. So long as the society 
allows their pursuit of individualistic life 
goals, there will not be any fundamental 
challenge to the British rule(90). 
These findings, the acceptance of the rigidly academic curriculum, and 
the reluctance to switch from English to Chinese as a language of 
instruction suggests that Hong Kong youth fit the description of being 
alienated from his culture and society. The student conforms to the more 
powerful group's perception of his or her role in the society, roles that 
encourage development of a self-centered, competitive viewpoint, and, 
hence, it is argued, they are not likely to become a direct agent of change 
to the school system. 
III PROSPECTS FOR EDUCATION IN HONG KONG 
The previous section attempted to demonstrate that, due to historical, 
economic and cultural factors, the task of achieving appropriate change in 
Hong Kong education is problematic and highly complex. This thesis, 
however, does not suggest that the education system will not be affected by 
the events surrounding '1997'. I. Faegerlind has written that "...education 
is both an agent of change and in turn is changed by society"(91), and Hong 
Kong society and education system will interact and change because of the 
events of this and the next decades. The purpose of this section is to 
investigate three possible modes of change to the education system which 
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are specific to tne current Hong Kong social and economic context. 
The section begins with a discussion of categories of change in this 
context and hypothesizes that there are two applicable categories: those 
which are systematic and those which are ad hoc. In the first category of 
change, education is purposefully changed and adapted to a new philosophy. 
In the second category, change results from ad hoc decision-making under 
the existing administration, allowing the system to react to social change 
without purposive manipulation and without immediate philosophical 
adjustment. 
This first category of systematized change includes two scenarios, the 
first is that administration of the education system would devolve to local 
educators, and the second possible scenario is that adminstrative control 
would be assumed by the PRC. 
Each scenario will be discussed in terms of the same themes. They are 
1. the forces, actors and ideology involved; 
2. the obstacles to its implementation; 
3. certain common issues about which, within each specific terms 
of reference, decisions must be made, including the nature of the 
relationship between schooling and the local culture, the link between 
schooling and both internal and external economic growth, the 
appropriateness of various forms of adminstration, the system of 
allocating places and of determining the curriculum, and the question 
of what in the existing system has permanent value; 
4. the benefits and disadvantages of each in the Hong Kong 
context. 
A. LOCALIZATION 
Actors: Hong Kong Educators and Local Leaders 
Ideology: democratic 
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Colonial Hong Kong education authorities have historically exhibited a 
reluctance to reform the educational system in such a way that local 
society would,  receive tne skills and encouragement necessary for playing a 
greater role in solving its own proolems. The British Government 
traditionally Justified the overall lack of progress within Hong Kong 
toward localization, or self-admitration, by arguing that Hong Kong could 
never be independent because of its size, because of opposition from Cnina, 
and the nature of the lease(92). The effects of this reluctance by 
Government to permit more local control over aspects of local 
adminstration, including education, is now one of greatest obstacles to 
achieving the self-determination which many people desire(93). 
The importance of achieving local control of education, and eventually 
of wider systems, is empnasized by Altbacn - who suggests also why it is 
seldom acnieved: 
A locally-controlled education system is 
one necesssary means by which a colonized 
people can address their own cultural and 
economic needs. The political implications of 
that control make realization an exceedingly 
difficult process(94). 
Despite the political obstacles to localization inherent in the 
colonial system, eventual localization of control over education in tne 
HKSAR is one important alternative before the educators, particulaAy if 
they wish to ensure that Hong Kong residents are able to address their own 
needs in the HKSAR. Local educators have begun to comment on this option: 
Ming Chan and Michael W. Kist wrote tnat ''...because of the depressed 
public mood over 1997 and the destabilizing influence which colonial 
education has had on the traditional stabilizing values, [only] an expanded 
and refined education system with accountibility to the local public at 
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large" can ensure that the prosperty and stability achieved during the last 
three decades persists in the future(95). 
In the present Hong Kong context, the colonial system, as discussed in 
this thesis, has contributed to the economic mobility of the local 
population but ignored their cultural and social needs. Neither has it made 
provisions for a pool of skilled local administrators. Therefore, it is 
argued that the primary forces which recommend localization are 
socio/cultural and political. In order to achieve it, the present 
government must be petitioned by the populace and by enlightened educators 
- a political action. 
Despite the strong arguments in favour of localization of many 
branches of the administration of Hong Kong, there are two major obstacles 
to localization. The first is the need to implement it speedily in the 
present political climate of relative independence and freedom - as each 
year passes in the countdown to 1997, the political environment becomes 
more complex and many will react to the increased complexity by maintaining 
lower political profiles. The second, and equal , obstacle is the reluctance 
on the part of the business elites who currently control many aspects of 
colony policy, to accede to the democratic movement because of their 
conviction that the advocates of democracy are apt to mismanage public 
funds in their attempt to gain power and maintain public support for their 
positions(96). 
If, however, local educators are successful in gaining control of the 
adminstration of education, the following issues would probably be dealt 
with. 
1. Appropriateness of the existing adminstration. 
The present highly centralized administration by business and 
political elites has already been critited by local educators as being too 
rigidly accountable to the Government "...at the expense of flexibility and 
therefore accountability to the public"(97). Cheng Kai-ming wrote that "The 
underlying issue [to reform] is the likely change in the policy-making 
machinery in order that it will be consistent with the representative 
government and have the capacity to deal with normative issues."(98) Local 
educators have begun to demand a more active role for educational experts 
and legitimization of the consultation system to include elected members 
from all sectors of the educational community(99). 
2. The relationship between schooling and society. 
As Hong Kong schools have been, as other colonial schools were, "... 
detached from the local culture in the language and in the social values 
they taught"(100), localization would investigate, as a fundamental task, 
methods of strengthening the relationship between schooling and the local 
culture. Reviewing comments of local educators suggests that these methods 
could include increased use of the local language as the language of 
instruction and could include the strengthening the process of 
democratization in schools(101). Rung Yee-wang has written that the 
democratizing process in Hong Kong schools is "only in its infancy"(102), 
and suggests that the importance of democratizing schools, through the 
introduction of democratic procedures in school management as well as the 
inclusion of a demos.,ratic component in the curriculum, is measured in 
terms of its beneficial effect on democratizing society(103). 
3. The link between schooling and economic growth. 
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This link has been described as crucial and two-way by local education 
leaders(104). At present local educators consider it advisable to develop 
educational plans which recognize the impact of the PRC manpower needs on 
Hong Kong(105). They have also expressed the goal of strengthening, at the 
teritiary level, the evolving "unprecedented concentration of interest in 
subjects which are practical,...and readily acceptable in the labour 
market"(106). In addition, the potential contribution of Technical and 
Vocational Education to economic growth in Hong Kong has recently been 
defended by admirietration(107). However, vocational education has been 
resisted by the local population because of their cultural values, and in 
fact, recent local research into a link between technical education and 
economic growth does not support the Government's policy, and generally 
supports a general education policy for the colony(108). 
4. The appropriateness of the existing selection procedures in 
determining curriculum. 
The present selection system has a very high number of procedures 
designed to select students to fill places in higher education in the 
colony, and these procedures dictate curriculum to a large extent(109). The 
effect of examinations on curriculum has led to the creation of 'elite 
schools' which possess the resources to meet the demands of the 
examinations for places in tertiary education. In this way, higher 
education plays a significant role in determining many curricular and 
funding decisions in the colony. In addition, the existing admiristration is 
"extraordinarily generous" in subsidizing higher education compared to the 
funding allocated to secondary education(110). This situation does not 
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ensure that a sufficient number of secondary schools receive the resources 
necessary for remaining competitive in the examination race. 
Local educators recognize the need to loosen the link between higher 
education and lower school curriculum. Cheng Kai-Ming poses the following 
question: 
Are we going to open up the system so that 
opportunities are more 'equal" and more readily 
available by creating more university places; 
or are we going to maintain disparity and 
limited places, and consequently the high 
private rate-of-return?(111) 
5. The determination of aspects of the present system with permanent 
educational value. 
Local administrators are likely to acknowledge that there is much to 
build upon in the present system: a system which incorporates an 
international language in the curriculum, has facilities for universal and 
compulsory secondary education, is free from political indoctrination, and 
has trained a skilled, international and flexible populace. They have 
acknowledged that a missing component is training in the political skills 
and theory needed in order to meet the needs of self-adminstration promised 
by the Joint Declaration. 
However, there are areas which, under the terms of reference of a 
local adminstration, would be perceived as problematic. Among these are 
Civic Education, Vocational and Technical Education, and Language of 
Instruction, issues which have been discussed in other sections of the 
thesis. 
In addition, there is the question of focus of the curriculum. Pedro 
Pak-toa Ng comments that for quite a time, "...a weakness in Hong Kong's 
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education system has been the overly narrow emphasis on the study of 
subject matter, without sufficient concern given to how the business of 
study may relate to life situations",(112) and he argues for broad exposure 
to a formal and non-formal curriculum, particularly in light of the 
changing socio-political structure of the colony(113). The nature of the 
present policy and the capitalistic system encourages a competitive 
approach. However the transfer process provides an opportunity to consider, 
in the midst of societal adjustment, an alternate, more child-centered 
policy of curriculum design. 
They are the areas where reform is necessary, and they relate directly 
to the challenges posed by '1997'. These areas are included in a commentary 
on this theme made by a local educator who suggests the following major 
tasks: "[firstly,] the improvement of secondary and sixth-form education, 
including new language policy, a revised, needs-based curriculum, revised 
teaching techniques - in quantity and quality -, and, [secondly,] the 
democratization of education at all levels"(114). It is also suggested that 
the democratization goal is the more important "...because it is concerned 
with the basic attitude of the people. If we get the basic attitudes right, 
the other problems will not be too difficult to solve"(115). 
Benefits 
Localization of the education system would benefit society in two 
crucial areas. Firstly, it could effectively and efficiently prepare 
students for the societal changes facing them, and, secondly, the 
installation of an locally-run system is legitimized by accountability to 
local society. 
There are other advantages of localization. Designed and carried out 
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within Hong Kong, education would utilize the local language and reflect 
local perceptions of cultural and economic needs. This offers the 
opportunity for a greater part of the population to participate in debate 
and wield influence within the city(116). 
Hong Kong has in place universal and compulsory secondary education, 
and has the financial assets to develop its education system further. In 
this way Hong Kong is different from other decolonized education systems. 
Also, assuming that local teachers are committed to socially-relevant 
policies and objectives, the potential for rapid expansion and invigoration 
of the intellectual life of the community is excellent. 
Another benefit would be the opportunity for local intellectuals, as 
well as local institutions of research and education, to develop without 
the limiting influence of a foreign power and language. Within Hong Kong's 
'neighbourhood' of South East Asia, there would be a possibility to 
establish Chinese language knowledge networks which would strengthen the 
intellectual infrastructure that area. 
Disadvantages 
There are two types of potential disadvantages to attempting to 
localize education in Hong Kong. Firstly, because the political future - in 
terms of the amount and definition of human rights - is unclear, it is 
difficult to predict the consequences for participants in public political 
activity. Secondly, the degree commitment of the local population to the 
kinds of changes described in the previous paragraphs is unknown. For 
example, there was very little positive response to the recent opportunity 
offered by the Government to change the medium of instruction in some 
schools from English to Cantonese. (Parents pointed out that English 
337 
continues to dominate the business, adminstrative, and legal systems.) 
This resistance to change disappointed many proponents of localization of 
education, but it has been observed in other decolonized nations. It has 
been attributed in other former colonies to the kinds of economic, 
power-based, intellectual, and practical reasons(117) which were described 
65 existing in Hong Kong. 
B. SINOCIZATION 
Actor: the PRC 
Ideology: Central Reform Document of 1985(118) 
The Hong Kong education system will come under critical examination by 
the PRC, and it is suggested that there are three factors which may 
determine the degree and type of influence the PRC will exert over it. 
Firstly, the PRC may conclude that, because of the international knowledge 
base available in Hong Kong, PRC adminstration of the Hong Kong education 
system will enhance PRC national development. Further, the PRC may 
determine that, by controlling the political components of the Hong Kong 
curriculum, the state and the newly-unified nation would be strengthened. 
Lastly, they determine that sinocization could be effected without 
alienating the business and educated elites of Hong Kong - in other words, 
having a negative affect on stability and prosperity. In this environment, 
sinocization of the system would proceed as a political and economic event 
with the PRC as agent. The determining forces fall into two types: 
economic/technological and politicaliideological(119). 
The obstacle to legitimized sinocization would be the establishment in 
Hong Kong of a4effective localized education system in place of the 
colonial system. The presence of a local system would weaken attempts on 
the part of the PRC to appeal to the nationalism of the Hong Kong Chinese 
in order to justify their activities. 
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The PRC, within the terms of the Central Reform Document , will 
address similar themes as the local educators: their deliberations will be 
affected by both economic/technological and ideological/political 
considerations. There are five issues which they must attempt to resolve. 
1. The nature of the relationship between schooling and the local 
culture. 
it is suggested that the PRC will for ideological/political reasons - 
in the interests of its own national unity - attempt to reproduce its 
part cuiar socio-political system in Hong Kong. To achieve this goal 
without jeopardizing the 'stability and prosperity' of Hong Kong, the PRO 
must convince Hong one residents of the ideological justification of such 
a move. Therefore, introducing an ideological/political component theme to 
the curriculum is, from the PRC point of view, a logically defensible 
tactic. 
Again from the standpoint of national unity, the PRC might decide to 
introduce a new medium of instruction (Potungnua) as they have done in 
other regions of China(120). Some local educators have already judged the 
introduction of Potungnua to be useful, describing it as an added language 
of wider communication"(121), out there is pessimistic viewpoint. it is, in 
fact, foreseeable that the PRC would seek to replace the local language in 
education witn Potunghua, thereby further distancing schools from the local 
culture. 
2.The most efficient link between schooling and economic growth. 
Depite tne economic links between the two societies, complete 
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convergence of the Hong Kong and PRC economic systems is potentially 
difficult and unquestionably complex. An example of the complexity is the 
difference in the ideological view of the individual's place in relation to 
the economy; PRC society has a collectivist view point of the 
responsibility of the worker, whereas Hong Kong, a more individualist 
commitment. Therefore, investigation of the link of the Hong Kong economy 
with education and the role of the individual in the economy is crucially 
important to the PRC. 
A second difference is in the interpretation of the relationship 
between the classroom and the workplace: in Hong Kong there exists a 
dichotomy between the workplace and the classroom, which differs greatly 
from the PRC's ideal model of schools serving a vocational function. 
A third contradiction is the manner of selecting people for various 
roles in society. Within the socialist education system, the workplace , 
rather than the schools, selects people for various roles in society(122). 
In Hong Kong, education continues to be the primary means of social 
mobility. 
From the economic/technological aspect, the new emphasis on education 
in scientific and technological fields in the PRC suggests they might 
recognize the advantage of extending this policy to Hong Kong. Local 
educators recognize the likelihood of this influence and appear prepared to 
cooperate, not least because they see ways in which Hong Kong could benefit 
from cooperation. In an article on the impact of China's manpower needs on 
Hong Kong, Grace Chow of the Chinese University of Hong Kong wrote: 
There is an obvious need for the labour 
force in Hong Kong to adapt and modify itself, 
structurally and otherwise, to facilitate 
compatibility with the immense and relatively 
conservative labour force of China. Hong Kong 
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is expected to play its part in the 
modernization of China by providing expertise 
in international trade and finance, and by 
supplying management and technological 
know-how(123). 
However, it is important to note that the link between education and 
the economy is not perceived as one-way by the PRC and there are examples 
of educational change enabling economic reform(124). This suggests that the 
PRC is in a position to examine the impact of the existing education system 
and its relationship to the economic boom which Hong Kong has experienced 
with an open mind. 
3.The appropriateness of various forms of adminstration. 
The Joint Declaration promised minimal direct admin6tration by the PRC 
over the HKSAR, and recent overall Party policy favours decentralization of 
administration of many aspects of mainland society. Specifically, the 
rationale of the Reform Document stresses autonomy of local PRC education 
systems(125). For example, the link between higher education and Party 
bureaucracy in the PRC has recently been weakened(126). All of these 
signals are, on the surface, reassuring for Hong Kong educators who hope to 
obtain control over the system. Chapter 2, however, described the concern 
arising from the vagueness of the term "local residents". Within the terms 
of the Joint Declaration, it is possible for the PRC to install officials 
in Hong Kong who are local residents but who have Party allegiances and are 
willing to comply with central Party preferences concerning Hong Kong's 
education policies. 
4.The system of allocating places and of determining the curriculum. 
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Higher education is effectively the crucial factor in allocating funds 
and determining curriculum in the present Hong Kong schools. In the PRC, 
however, places are allocated according to centralized manpower plans(127), 
a method which the Reform Document has endorsed(128). Whether the PRC would 
attempt to impose this system on Hong Kong education is arguable since, on 
the one hand, Hong Kong schools are training the kinds of experts which the 
PRC wants from Hong Kong. Also, Hayhoe notes that municipal higher 
education systems in the PRC are allowed to set guidelines for curricular 
development consonant with the development needs of their city(129). On the 
other hand, the Hong Kong education system has provided places for some 
courses which PRC Curriculum guidelines describe as not "serving economic 
modernization"(130). Whether such courses would remain on offer is 
questionable. 
5.Determination of elements of the existing system with permanent 
value. 
The PRC is likely to acknowldge that the following components of the 
existing system are useful in achieving their goals: its position in the 
international communications network, the provisions for access to modern 
technology, universal and compulsory education to age fifteen, and an 
autonomously functioning Western-connected higher education system. In 
addition, there are areas of the existing system which would perceived as 
problematic by PRC reformers. These include Language of Instruction, the 
absence of a political component in the curriculum, and the lack of broad 
support for Technical and Vocational Education, all of which have been 
discussed in detail in other sections. 
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Benefits 
Sinocizatiqp could provide what has been termed the 'patriotic 
education' component in the curriculum which some local educators have 
described as a fundamental requirement for the success of the 'one party, 
two systems' policy. They emphasize, in this context, that patriotic 
education should stress a national identity, in other words, concern for, 
and ties to, China, not support for the Communist Party(131). 
Disadvantasies 
There are disadvantages of several kinds. 
On the very practical level, educators in Hong Kong have expressed the 
fear(132) that the standard of education will deteriorate if, as a result 
of PRC control over Hong Kong education, more PRC students are allowed to 
take advantage of the Hong Kong facilities. The infrastructure - libraries, 
science laboratories, classrooms etc.- would become more overcrowded. At 
present, schools are being utilized at greater than capacity point, and 
they are inadequate for the large numbers that they now support. 
China has isolated itself once from the "international knowledge 
network" (133), adopting a policy of self-sufficiency and, although they 
have re-entered the international network, if they sever ties again - after 
1997 - the HKSAR, as dependent part of the PRC, would be negatively 
affected, experiencing loss of the contacts, support, and partnerships it 
now enjoys with leading institutions in the industrialized world. 
Thirdly, there is the possibility that the relative autonomy from 
political pressure which the schools now enjoy would be seriously eroded by 
sinocization. R. M. Thomas has suggested that 
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Whatever the source of politicization, 
once the process of breeching the institutional 
walls separating educational government and its 
internal politics from the general ongoing 
political conflicts of the state are underway, 
additional educational issues are likely to 
become similarly politicized. The expansion of 
conflicts about education in the general 
day-to-day politics 	 eventually surface 
[sic] Questions about the legitimacy of 
education itself, its structures, internal 
politics, and governing philosophy(134). 
Many in Hong Kong have expressed fear that political indoctrination 
would be introduced in the classroom(135). If the PRC were to attempt to 
use education in this way to strengthen its legitimacy, Hong Kong residents 
would have little political expertise, and little power, to withstand such 
a move. 
There is finally the potential in sinocization of the education system 
for what has been termed 'internal colonization'(136). At the macro level, 
it is defined as the "domination of a 'nation' (defined geographically, 
linguistically, or culturally) within the national borders of another 
nation-state. [It] entails usurpation and replacement" and implies 
absorption of the colony into the nation-state(137). Education in such a 
system "...is characterized by remaking the colonial child in the dominant 
state's image, trying to integrate the colonized into the colonizer's 
culture"(138). The cultural and national past of the minor party is 
rewritten to highlight the similarities rather than differences between the 
two. In this way internal colonialization is more assimilationist than 
classical colonial schools and has as its goal the eradication of the local 
culture through assimilation(139). 
C. AD HOC DECOLONIZATION 
Actors: Big Business, Elites 
344 
Ideology: Conservative and Capitalist 
The essence of decolonizing education, in the view of writers such as 
Freire and A. Memmie is "...utilizing the right and the means to educate 
oneself"(140). It has been observed that decolonizing countries originally 
intend to adjust their education systems to reflect their national 
character(141). However, most states have failed to achieve this goal, 
because of the resistance of education systems to change (142), or because 
of difficulties encountered in practising self-determination(143). 
Hence, Keith Watson writes that "...the trappings of Epost-colonial] 
school systems, their ethos, methods of instruction, buildings, grade 
promotion, examinations, certificates, diplomas and degrees, and at 
tertiary level all the paraphernalia of faculties, administrative structure 
... owe much to their colonial/European creators"(144). Furthermore, in 
former colonies which have been linked to capitalist influences, education 
continues to produce local elites who serve their own economic interests 
rather then the interests of the people(145). 
Recently, Lau Siu-kai described Hong Kong residents as being in a 
"state of political lethargy out of a sense of defeatism, powerlessness and 
aversion to politics, [and] suspicious of the motives of leaders"(146). It 
is, therefore, suggested that this psychological state may interact 
negatively with the difficulties inherent in effecting educational change, 
resulting in an ad hoc decolonization of Hong Kong education, similar to 
the pattern of other former colonies. In other words, the education system 
would not adapt in an effective manner to new political contexts. Change 
would be effected on a reactionary and ad hoc basis rather than on the 
basis of philosophical commitment to the needs of the community. 
This ad hoc decolonization would occur in Hong Kong in the following 
specific circumstances: 1. if Hong Kong residents become immobilized by 
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apprehension about possible political retribution for activism and/or by 
uncertainty about the most advantageous course to follow, or 2. if the 
local people succumbed to anomie , a possibility suggested by Wong 
Siu-lung, resulting in the rise of self-seeking rather than social 
behaviour(147), and/or 3. if the Party determined that it was not 
politically advantageous for them to interfere immediately with Hong Kong 
education. 
A requirement, however, is the retention of existing economic systems 
by the HKSAR Government. If the ruling elites perceive that the economic 
system will be changed by the transfer, their commitment to admiristering 
the colony will weaken. Therefore, the social forces which result in ad hoc 
decolonization would be economic and political. 
Ad Hoc Decolonization of education would be primarily a economic event 
with the business community and other elites as the hidden agents whose 
ideology was conservative, i.e., aimed at retention of the existing 
economic system and maintenance of independence from governmental controls 
and interference. 
The most formidable internal obstacle to ad hoc decolonization is 
presented by groups campaigning for localization of the system. However, 
established business interests, whose support is necessary to implement 
localization successfully, are not likely to provide that support because 
their own interests would be jeopardized. Lau Siu-kai has noted that these 
groups are 'dooming' the movement of the democratic activists in the 
political arena(148) because democratisation would remove the protection of 
a government committed to economic growth, and therefore the movement has 
no relevance to their self-interests(149). 
The nature of ad hoc decolonization is further clarified by examining 
it in context of the issues discussed in the contexts of localization and 
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sinocization. 
I. The link betweem schooling and the economy. 
The existing link between schooling and economic growth - which led to 
the description of education in Hong Kong as a 'highly utilitarian means to 
economic ends'(150) - has evolved with the approval of the elites. Civic 
and business elites have traditionally expected that higher education meet 
the manpower needs of the economy Hong Kong, and funding for education is 
largely determined by the ways in which, and the degree to which, the 
programmes will meet manpower needs in the economy(151). 
In addition, as long as local residents perceive education to be the 
means to achieving economic propserity, they are likely to utilize it as 
such and not demand changes. In effect, the link would remain strong. 
2. The link between school and society 
Within the conservative and capitalist framework of ad hoc 
decolonization, the link between schooling and the local culture would 
weaken - as the effective aims of education continued to move further from 
Hong Kong's social and cultural needs and toward emphasis on individual 
achielfient in a capitalist context. Education would continue to function as 
a means of social mobility, encouraging the competitiveness of the 
population, thereby serving the needs of the elites who wish to preserve a 
capitalistic, competitive system. 
3. The appropriateness o+ existing administration 
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The existing control of administration by business and political 
elites would continue. These groups have, in the past, resisted moves 
toward more representativeness in adminstration of Hong Kong's 
institutions(152) on the grounds that a representative government endangers 
stability, and it is unlikely that they would alter this opionion. 
4.The appropriateness of current selection procedures 
The role of manpower planning and higher education in legitimizing 
planning and funding(153) and role of the examination system in allocating 
places and in determining the curriculum are consistent with the elite 
ideology. 
Adjustment in these areas could occur, however, if the elites perceive 
that their own political position would be strengthened by compromise with 
leaders of the daicratic groups, who have been particularly critical of 
these aspects of elite adminstration(154). From the perspective of the 
terms of references of the elites, there is much in the present system 
which suits their aims, especially, the emphasis on high participation and 
individual achievement, and the role of the 'hidden curriculum' in 
imparting their ideology. 
Benefits 
Retaining the existing pattern of schooling, compatible with Western 
tertiary institutes and providing local students access to overseas 
schools, would be beneficial in the present situation in which the number 
of tertiary places falls far short of local demand. In addition, the 
existing system is organized coherently, and continued commitment to the 
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expansion of number of places and the open selection system is 
advantageous. 
Disadvantages 
Altbach has written of an international knowledge network and 
describes the operation of this network as including the exchange of books 
and journals, films and and education advice, experts circulating among 
countries, student exchanges for study and research, and translations of 
publications(155). "The more 'modern' a nation is in terms of involvement 
with technology, industrialization and current political and social 
thought, the more involved it is in an international system of 
knowledge"(156). 
Hong Kong, because of its modernity in the technological and 
industrial spheres and because of its colonial status, has enjoyed the 
benefits Altbach describes: close ties with British publishers, favourable 
status of Hong Kong students in gaining places in UK schools and tertiary 
institutions, the exchanges of lecturers with the UK, and connections of 
its industry owners and managers who have been trained in the West. So 
that, keeping in mind Altbach's criticism of the dependency relationships 
between colonies and the "centre" nations which control knowledge(157), it 
must be recognized that "Unless individual intellectuals in the Third World 
have established paths of access to the multiple institutions that dominate 
knowledge production, they are barred from free participation in the 
international intellectual community"(158). 
The important question is whether the useful ties (as opposed to those 
ties which Watson criticizes as being a form of neocolonialism) which exist 
between Hong Kong and the richer countries would be weakened by 
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decolonization (159). For, as Altbach later writes, "Knowledge traded in 
the international marketplace is subject to various pressures of supply and 
demand, and political or economic power"(160). If, as Hong Kong looses its 
colonial status, it also begins to loose economic power, the benefits made 
possible by membership in the industrialized group of nations diminish, 
then the favourable international status of Hong Kong's intellectuals would 
also diminish. 
A second disadvantage could be experienced if, under ad hoc 
decolonization, schools abandoned what Watson described(161) as a major 
purpose of the colonization of secondary schools: the utilization of 
schools to train those who ran the bureaucratic machinery. Although 
Watson(162) emphasizes the negative consequences, this provision by 
education could continue to provide Hong Kong with the clerks and 
adminstrators which will be needed if it achieves self-government 
post-1997. Ad hoc decolonization would not tackle the language issue, i.e. 
English, because it serves the elites, although the continued use of 
English as language of instruction causes many children to underachieve. 
In summary, this section has argued that there are two broad 
categories of change possible in the context of Hong Kong education. The 
first category includes change brought about purposively, with the purpose 
of toward adaptation of the system to perceived internal or external needs. 
Decisions are made with the goal of reducing cultural, political and 
economic contradictions between Hong Kong and the PRC. Within this category 
it is argued that there are two possible scenarios. Firstly, the system 
could be modernized from within Hong Kong specifically to meet internal 
cultural, political and economic needs. Localization would be carried out 
in Hong Kong by Hong Kong people, and has as its fundamental ideological 
reference the socio-cultural needs of Hong Kong residents. The second 
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purposive scenario comprises intervention by the PRC. The PRC may find it 
to their advantage to sinocize education in Hong Kong. This intervention 
would be implemented with the economic and socio-political needs of the PRC 
overriding any other consideration. The immediate ideological reference 
would be the recent Party education Reform Document . 
The second category of change deals with allowing education to 
decolonize in an ad hoc manner. It is argued that decisions in this 
category would be based on a capitalist and conservative ideology and would 
be made by adminstrators with the dimensions of internal politics and 
economics as reference points. 
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter 5 examined the issue of relevant change to the Hong Kong 
education system. In this context, three topics were discussed. Firstly, 
the need for change to the system. It was argued that the need for change 
in grounded in the tensions arising from the contradiction between the 
content of education today and the challenges of the evolving society. 
Secondly, it was suggested that necessary and appropriate changes will 
be difficult to effect, partly because of the distribution of power within 
the colony and partly because of the nature of Hong Kong society. Power 
over education is shared by the colonial government with the elite business 
community, and education has effectively served their needs. Teachers, 
students and parents have not had sufficient access to power in the colony 
to effect the changes they might desire now, nor do the exert significant 
influence on the schools. Relevant aspects of British colonial education 
philosophy were examined, but as part of a larger network of social 
dynamics in Hong Kong. It was argued that Hong Kong education has not 
effectively served the needs of the local culture, and that because 
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political education has not been part of colonial education practices, it 
is unlikely that it will be introduced now, in the current crisis. The 
structure of the system has encouraged students to strive for examination 
success and, often, to place pragmatism above cultural values. The 
psychological and the economic-political effects on Hong Kong society were 
discussed. 
Finally, the chapter discussed the issue of change to the education 
system, and suggested three scenarios for education as its adjusts to the 
transfer process, localization, sinocization and ad hoc decolonization. 
Localization category is purposive intervention, oriented toward adaptation 
of the system to reducing cultural, political and economic corLtradiction. 
Its fundamental ideological reference would be the socio-cultural needs of 
Hong Kong residents. The second scenario comprises intervention from the 
PRC, who may find it to their economic and political advantage to sinocize 
education in Hong Kong. Ad hoc decolonization is allowing education to 
decolonize without intervention. It is argued that decisions in this 
category would be based on a capitalist and conservative ideology and made 
with the dimensions of internal politics and economics as reference points. 
V. THESIS CONCLUSION 
Decolonization of Hong Kong has not resulted in self-rule for its 
citizens, but in transfer of control over Hong Kong from one external power 
to another. The intent of the new authority, the PRC, is to merge Hong Kong 
with the PRC to form 'one country, two systems'. Hong Kong residents 
quickly became aware of potential difficulties involved in maintaining the 
existing life style, including standard of living, personal freedoms, and 
institutional integrity under the new authority. Therefore, the thesis 
argues, the imminence of the transfer is causing changes in existing social 
3,52 
patterns. 
This thesis began with examination of one transformation which, it 
argues, is occuring in Hong Kong as part of the transfer process: the 
emergence of the transfer as a public issue, resulting in realignment of 
patterns of power within the colony. This change was initiated by the 
interaction of influences from media, local and international economic 
leaders, foreign Government representatives, and local political leaders. 
The thesis argued that the emergence of 1997 as a salient public concern 
changed the context of the transfer process. But, as the thesis attempted 
to demonstrate, the resulting change is, indeed, on-going as it is modified 
and counteracted by the continuing influence of participants and of 
external events. 
The thesis then described the distinctions between the socio-economic 
infrastructures and the political ideologies of the PRC and Hong Kong. It 
attempted to highlight the social structures which are unique to each, and 
which it is argued, also affect the context for transfer. This section 
focused on the existing differences in socio-political formations, in 
economic assumptions and in educational systems. The existence of these 
structural contradictions, it is argued, has an inhibiting effect on the 
transfer context because the structural contradictions cause tension, and 
therefore require resolution before successful merger of the societies is 
possible. 
The attempt to resolve these contradictions, and thereby ensure 
successful merger as well as enhance the possibility of preserving the 
stability and prosperity enjoyed before the transfer began, will force Hong 
Kong residents to adapt. The thesis investigated one specific example of 
the effort to adapt. It was argued that the PRC economic model demands a 
broad spread of information and expertise to meet the demands of the recent 
353 
decentralization of decision-making and expertise, and further, that the 
Hong Kong residents will refer to their past patterns of adaptation to meet 
these needs. It was argued that they will adjust their educational and 
occupational choices accordingly. 
Lastly, the thesis argued that, in the present social context, there 
are several different scenarios of change possible for education. It 
described the range of participants in the bid for control of education. 
Specifically, it described the cultural and structural factors associated 
with each participant, their goals, and it highlighted the resources 
available to each. Finally, the thesis attempted to show how each scenario 
would relate to the existing system. 
From the research, a perspective about education and intrusive and 
non-spontaneous social change has emerged. This perspective suggests that 
such a situation, comprised of some components which are unwanted and 
neither familiar nor, initially, identifiable, requires examination in time 
and in context. For example, at the heart of the contextual analysis is not 
only the unwanted nature of the social change, but also the contradiction 
posed by the unfamiliar socio-cultural structure, economic practices and 
political ideologies of the PRC. Also made visible is the sequential impact 
of the negotiating process on Hong Kong indhtutions, the social interaction 
process on Hong Kong, and the effect of internal adjustment on the transfer 
process. 
The impact of the transfer process is, as suggested in Chapter 1, a 
continuing process. As the research for this thesis was being completed, 
the government of Hong Kong published a policy document outlining plans for 
development of representative government in the colony. Reform to the 
existing undemocratic and unrepresentative structure is necessary in order 
to have in place a pool of experienced adminstrators at the time of the 
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transfer. However, the White Paper: The Development of Representative 
Government: The Way Forward(163) fell far short of the hopes, though not 
the expectations, of local people. The White Paper announced that no direct 
elections would be held until after the promulgation of the Basic Law by 
the PRC in 1991. At that time less than 20% of members of the Legislative 
Council, an advisory body, will be directly elected. Direct elections had 
previously been suggested as a possibility for 1988(164), but the Hong Kong 
government apparently heeded the objections of Peking that political reform 
in Hong Kong must converge with the Basic Law. The White Paper demonstrates 
that, although administrative announcements are issued by the Hong Kong 
government, policy is made by consultation with London and Peking. 
Government prepared the population for the contents of the White Paper 
through pre-publication leaks to the media(165). Therefore public reaction 
to the actual publication was muted, further so because the White Paper was 
released shortly before the beginning of the Chinese New Year holiday. 
Private reaction to the publication was sharp, however, and is best 
summarized by the comment of the owner of a small Hong Kong restaurant: 
"Everybody wants to get out"(165). 
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legal powers to censor films on political grounds. The present Governor of 
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51.1% 5.5% 
58.3% 21.9% 
58.1% 23.3% 
43,7% 41.0% 
36.4% 58.6% 
35.6% 57.3% 
38.1% 8.1% 
44.5% 7.5% 
45.9% 9.5% 
49.8% 7.4% 
46.1% 17.8% 
48.8% 18.6% 
50.2% 32.4% 
29.7% 55.8% 
Appendix No. 1 Evaluation of job features 
1 
Individual Perceptions of Job 
friendly co-workers 
contribute to HK society 
helping people 
gives pride in the job 
level of difficulty 
contribute to PRC society 
ObigIctive Job Characteristics 
not all routine 
promotion prospects 
career stability 
good salary, finge benefits 
be own boss 
reasonable working hours 
technical work 
travel opportunity 
Key: 1 = very important 
2 = important 
3 = not important 
42.4% 
19.8% 
18.6% 
15.3% 
5.1% 
7.1% 
53.8% 
48.0% 
44.5% 
42.8% 
36.1% 
32.6% 
17.3% 
14.6% 
Appendix No. 2 Distribution of 14 career areas according 
to the significance of their contribution 
to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong 
- By rank order from 1 to 5, 
1 = most important - 0 = no rank 
1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Financial 	 :..-iervir. Ps 562 206 102 52 10 178 
Law, 
Legal 	 Services 193 180 114 95 91 476 
Industry/ 
Manufacturing 113 178 142 130 99 488 
Electronics and 
Computer Technology 181 166 120 109 71 501 
Communications/ 
Transport 83 135 127 117 115 574 
Education 152 104 67 67 93 672 
Tourism Services 71 103 93 77 99 707 
Journalism 64 86 64 72 60 804 
Construction 68 71 60 64 69 818 
Community and 
Social 	 Services 52 69 41 67 836 
Languages/ 
Translation 60 58 47 64 49 872 
Real 	 Estate/ 
Housing 41 jt, 48 37 934 
Mercnandizing 44 18 19 16 39 1036 
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Appendix No. 3 Prestige rankings for 12 career areas: 
Showing number of time selected as one of 
3 most prestigious jobs in Hong Kong 
Doctor 	 836 
Government Adminstrator 	 761 
Scientist 	 415 
Architect 	 409 
Manager 	 358 
Auditor 	 241 
Police 	 183 
Teacher 	 136 
Tourist Officer 	 30 
Labourer 	 22  
Housewife 	 19 
Factory Foreman 	 12 
Apendix No. 4 % Distribution of impact of various factors on 
achievement of career goals 
1 2 3 4 
Degree of competion in HK 51.2% 36.7% 3.4% 8.7% 
Low interest in the career 28.8% 54.4% 5.5% 11.2% 
Lack of preparation 26.5% 51.3% 7.1% 15.1% 
Not worked hard enough 29.7% 41.4% 9.8% 19.1% 
Changes in HK government 17.2% 40.4% 8.7% 33.7% 
Key: 1 = very likely to interfere 
2 = likely to interfere 
3 = not likely to interfere 
4 = not sure about its effect 
Appendix No. 5 % Distribution of of students' perception 
of the factor most likely to interfere 
degree of competition in Hong Kong 
	 40% 
lack of interest in the job 	 30% 
has not worked hard enough 
	 26% 
lack of preparation for the job 
	 14% 
unsettled future of Hong Kong 
	 10% 
3f:)6 
Appendix No. 6 English version of the survey 
(The students' copy is in Chinese.) 
Survey on Education and Occupational Preferences 
of Secondary School students in Hong Kong, 1987 
Dear Student: Your cooperation is appreciated very much. These are 
questions about the plans you have for your own education and the plans you 
might already have for your career after finishing school. There are no 
correct answers to the questions, so do not worry about each answer but 
please give your personal opinion. 
Please do not write either your name or the name of your school on this 
paper. 
Biographical Questions 
Please circle the appropriate answer: 
1. Present Class: 
	 Form 	 3 	 4 	 5 	 6 	 7 
2. your sex: 	 Male 	 Female 
3. your school: 	 Anglo Secondary 	 Chinese Middle 
4. Your average grade this year: 	 A 	 B 	 C 	 Lower 
5. Were both your parents born in Hong Kong? 
yes no one of them not sure 
6. What was the highest level of school your father attended? 
Primary 	 Secondary 	 Higher 	 Not Sure 
7. your mother? 
Primary 	 Secondary 	 Higher 	 Not sure 
8. What is your father's job? 	  
9. What is your mother's job? 	  
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EDUCATION PLANS 
10. Which is the highest level you expect to attend in school? 
Circle one: 	 Form 3 	 4 	 5 	 6 	 7 	 post-secondary 
11. If you are sitting the HKCEE in the future, check ( 
	
) the subjects 
plan to study in preparation. 
(Please check at least 1 and not more than 3.) 
Commercial Subjects 
Chinese Language and Literature 
English Language and Literature 
Chinese History 
Science (Geography,Bio)ogy,Chemistry,Physics) 
Computer Studies 
Design and Technology 
Metalwork 
Economics 
Geography 
Economics and Public Affairs 
History 
Art and Design 
Civic Education 
The subject from the above list most useful to my future is 	  
12. If you are goina  to sit the HKHL or HKAL , check ( 	 ) the subjects you 
plan to study in preparation. 
Biology 
Chemistry 
Business studies 
Chinese History 
Chinese Language and Literature 
Economics 
Economics and Public Affairs 
English Literature 
Geography 
History 
Other approved language 
Physics 
Principles of Accounts 
Religious studies 
Sociology 
The one subject from the above list which is most useful to my future is 
• 
13. To me, the most interesting_ subject from the above lists is 
• 
Please answer the following questions by circling 'yes' or 'no'. 
14. My own likes and dislikes are most, 
important when choosing what subject 	 yes 	 no 
to take next. 
15. Study in China would help me to 
achieve my career goals. 	 yes 	 no 
16. Study in a Overseas country would help 
me achieve my career goals. 
	
yes 	 no 
Please answer the next question by putting a check in the right column 
very important/ important/ not important 
17. I will choose a area of study based on: 
steady job prospects from the area of study 
preparation for a high-salary job 
my own interest in the area 
confidence I can get a good grade 
usefulness to the future of Hong Kong society 
my family's advice 
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18. Please check these secondary and teriary subjects on the basis  how 
important it will be for Hong Kong to have citizens skilled In the area . 
very important/important/not important/I am uncertain 
General Business 
Psychology 
Accounting/Book-keeping 
Translation 
Banking 
Architecture 
Medicine/Health Care 
Science 
Marketing/International Business 
Law/politics 
Engineering, Electronics 
Teacher Education 
Technical Studies 
Computer Studies 
Mathematics 
Social Work/Administration 
Economics 
Sociology 
Management 
Which one of these subjects will be the most important to the future of Hong 
Kong? 
OCCUPATION PLANS 
19. If I achieve my education goals, I am most interested in a job as a 
20. Please rank the following in terms of who will have greater influence 
on your job choice. Number (1) is the person with the most influence, and so 
on to number 5: the person with the least or no influence. 
	
 parents 
self 
... 	 career counsellor 
	  teachers 
friends 
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21. What are some of the things a job should offer? Please put a check in the 
right column. 	 very important/important/unimportant 
should not be too difficult 
friendly co-workers 
gives pride in the job 
good chance of getting promoted 
contributes to Hong Kong society 
be not all routine, is interesting 
a chance to travel 
good salary, fringe benefits 
be technical work 
reasonable working hours 
offers me career stability 
contributes to PRC development 
helping people 
being my own boss 
22. Please rank the top five career areas in terms of the long-term survival 
of HK. Put (1) by the the career area making the most contribution to the 
long-term survival, (2) by the second, etc. Choose only 5. 
merchandizing/sales 
real estate/housing 
communications/transport 
industry/manufacturing 
construction industry 
	  tourism services 
	  languages/translation 
	  journalism 
community and social services 
	
 financial/business services (banking, insurance, 
import/export, accountancy) 
	
 arts/humanities education 
	
 electronics and computer technology 
	  the law and legal services 
23. Because of the unsettled future of 
Hong Kong I'll delay making a 
decision about a career. 
	 yes 	 no 
24. My best career prospects are working 	 yes 	 no 
for a Hong Kong Chinese firm. 
25. My best career prospects are 
working for a foreign firm in HK. 	 yes 	 no 
26. Which do you think are the most respected jobs in Hong Kong? (Please 
choose the top 3) 
	  general manager 
	
 police 
	  auditor 
	
 government adminstrator 
	  teacher 
	
 hotel or airlines reservations officer 
	  construction labourer 
	  architect 
	  housewife 
	  factory foreman 
	  doctor 
scientist 
27. What type of work have your parents suggested to you? 
no suggestion 
28. In your opinion, how likely or unlikely are any of the following 
explanations if a Hong Kong student does not achieve his/her career goals? 
(Please put a check in the right column.) 
verylikely/likely/neutrallunlikely 
1. He has a career he is not really 
interested in and therefore does 
not work as hard as possible. 
2. He has not prepared well for the job by 
not working hard enough in school. 
3. The degree of competition in Hong Kong 
is very high and this can make it 
difficult to achieve all goals. 
4. The changes occuring in Hong Kong's 
government may affect the job market perhaps 
making it necessary to change some 
of the original goals. 
5. He has not worked hard enough on the job 
due to laziness. 
Which of the above is the most likely reason? Number _ 
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